Such difference as there was, it must be repeated, was only one of emphasis. There was no disagreement on the persistent threat to the system from the capitalist-imperialist world, with West Germany playing a major role under the leadership of the United States. Nor was there disagreement on the high probability of a future threat from China, on the dangers of heresies in national communism, on the absolute need to keep the Party supreme and watertight, or on any other fundamental issue. There was also complete agreement on the inevitability of the ultimate triumph of the system everywhere, on the necessity to exploit every external opportunity to advance the Soviet interest, on the wisdom of tactical manipulation in the short term to secure greater gains in the long, and on the paramount necessity for a dominant position of military strength abroad — at the cost if necessary of damping down progress at home — as a fulcrum for the lever of Soviet political power.
The differences lay chiefly in the choice of areas of exploitation. The old guard were inclined to look towards the centre, towards the manifest contradictions of developed capitalist societies and the unstable relationships between them. The younger men looked more to the periphery, to the opportunities offered among developing societies and the relations not only between these societies but also between their own developing world and more developed countries.
There was no shadow of disagreement on the necessity to neutralize West Germany at some time, by military force if necessary. Centralists put this higher on their list of priorities, perhaps, than the others, and might have been more inclined to pre-emptive action. It was agreed policy to impair the coherence of the Atlantic Alliance wherever possible; to reduce or offset the military strength of NATO by any means that offered; and to maintain a military capability at sufficient strength and readiness to ensure that any crisis in central Europe, up to and including full-scale warfare, could be managed to Soviet advantage.
Politically the years since the re-arming of West Germany (which had to be recognized as a major setback) had seen considerable improvements to the Soviet position. The departure of France from NATO was a great gain. The Vietnam War had been a useful distraction. There had been advantage in the existence of some movement in the United States towards a degree of disengagement in Europe; in the financial and economic difficulties of the United Kingdom, particularly where balance of payments and budgetary difficulties had combined to reduce troop deployments in continental Europe — and also, peripheralists might say, in the British withdrawal from the East; in the strong growth of left-wing elements in the politics of every one of the Atlantic Allies; in a general decline among Western democracies in public interest in defence; and in certain other developments. The pursuit of detente had been helpful to the Soviet interest, and negotiations on arms limitation and force reductions had brought small but useful gains.
A very highly classified planning document, given a strictly limited circulation in the Kremlin in October 1983, which fell into Allied hands after the fighting was over, throws a sufficiently clear light on Soviet policy in relation to NATO to justify the inclusion of a summary of it here.
Subject: Removal of the threat from NATO to the security of the USSR in Europe.
This could be achieved in the following way.
Rapid military defeat of AFCENT, with the simultaneous elimination of AFNORTH and AFSOUTH, followed by an advance to a voluntary stop-line: Hook of Holland-Nijmegen-Maastricht-Saarbrucken-Trier-the Rhine-Basel. The intention of the USSR to stop on this line without entering French territory will have been made abundantly clear worldwide. It is assumed that a government of the Popular Front will continue to be in power in France when the action takes place and that, in spite of not unimportant differences between France and the USSR, there will be sufficient reluctance on the part of the French to become involved in hostilities with the Soviet Union to ensure an adequate response to the pressures that can be brought to bear. It can therefore be expected, though of course not guaranteed, that French forces will not participate in these operations.
Once the FRG has been totally occupied its neutralization can be put in hand on the usual lines under accepted procedures. The complete collapse of the North Atlantic Alliance can be confidently expected to follow from its failure to prevent this from happening. Bilateral negotiations can then be opened with the USA. Other ex-allies can for the time being be ignored.
A firm decision to act along these lines will only be taken in the light of the prevailing situation and in relation to all other relevant developments, though complete military plans will be kept up to date for this contingency in itself. Nevertheless, certain factors bearing on choice of time should be kept in mind.
A resounding military victory over the West, followed by the dismantling of the FRG and the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance, will reinforce Soviet hegemony within the Warsaw Pact and weaken divergent national socialist movements outside it. Current tendencies suggest the advisability of achieving this fairly soon. It might be unwise to delay it beyond 1987.
NATO countries have recently initiated some improvements in ‘defensive’ preparedness. These are at present modest, but the maintenance of the same rate of expansion will in time set constraints on Soviet freedom of action. In five years’ time the achievement of the military objective will be considerably more difficult.
Although it has been consistently and warmly denied in the West, we think there are plans to open offensive operations at some time against the Warsaw Pact with an attack on the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic is clearly having considerable difficulty in overcoming the reluctance of some of the Allies but might still succeed in staging an attack not later than 1986. The policy of ‘forward defence’ makes no sense from a military point of view unless it involves action well to the east of the frontier, and it can be taken as no more than a cloak for the planning of an invasion of the GDR, possibly already far advanced.[1]
China does not yet present the major military threat which can be certainly expected to develop later. NATO must be reduced before this. What requires urgent attention now, however, is the Chinese action, with powerful US support, to stimulate dissidence in the Asiatic republics. This is sharply on the increase. It would appear that unless the question of NATO can be resolved before the autumn of 1986 a deteriorating security situation in the Military Districts of Central Asia and the Far East, and possibly in those of Siberia and the Trans-Baikal as well, might offer distraction from Europe and considerable temptation to the FRG to exploit the position.
There would thus clearly be advantage in action to eliminate the FRG and ensure the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance not later than the summer of 1986. The course of events, particularly in the light of a possible requirement to intervene in Yugoslavia, may compel earlier action, and arrangements for mobilization will, of course, be kept under constant review.
The greatest relative advantage to the West, as NATO studies confirm, will be if the Warsaw Pact can spend fourteen days in the mobilization process as against seven days for NATO. It should not be difficult to use summer exercises to conceal the first seven days. The utmost use will have to be made of deception arrangements, nevertheless, to indicate, once we are seen to be mobilizing for a possible attack, a date for it later than any that might be chosen.
1
It is probably unnecessary to say that at no time was there any planning in NATO for an invasion of the GDR. The suggestion had some propaganda value in the USSR, and among Soviet sympathizers abroad.