In spite of some recent improvement in NATO’s state of readiness, including arrangements to deploy two to four additional divisions in an emergency, further reinforcing formations cannot be expected to arrive in the European theatre, once hostilities have started, before D+16 at the earliest. Naval and air interdiction can be expected to reduce, but not entirely destroy, their effectiveness. It will be important to secure the stop-line before the arrival of major reinforcements.
Even more important, in the matter of duration of operations, is the question of nuclear release. The USSR will make it clear beyond any possible doubt that use of radiation to any significant degree in offensive weapons of war will be regarded as an open invitation to discard all restraints on nuclear warfare. Escalation into strategic exchange, to use the Western mode of expression, will certainly follow battlefield applications.
There will unquestionably be doubts and hesitations in the Alliance over the initiation of nuclear release. Widespread unwillingness to allow the use of battlefield weapons on Federal territory can be counted on in the FRG, for the effect of battlefield weapons there would only differ in degree from that of strategic attack on the homelands of the USSR and USA. The USSR can count at the outset on a high superiority in non-nuclear capability. This would be largely offset if battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced. It would therefore be foolish in the extreme for the USSR to resolve NATO’s doubts on their introduction by introducing them first.
The earlier that military operations in Europe can be brought to a successful conclusion the lower will be the probability of the neutralization of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority by the arrival of major reinforcements or the introduction of nuclear weapons. The conclusion from a close study of all these considerations is that the stop-line should be reached not later than the evening of D + 9. The military plan will be framed accordingly.
The essence of the military plan to implement this policy, which can now be recognized as of quite unique importance in the study of the Third World War, has been distilled from captured documents and is summarized below. It deserves careful consideration.
Invasion from a standing start from normal locations, though attractive, is for ground forces of the Warsaw Pact not practicable. Even with exercise cover, and with an excuse for military movement in the shape of real or imaginary internal security difficulties in satellite countries, it would not be possible to count on complete surprise. Some degree of precautionary preparation on the part of NATO would have to be counted on. This could be expected to include the flying-in of the personnel of certainly one heavy division from the United States to marry up with its pre-positioned equipment, and possibly of two, and the partial deployment to its emergency positions of much of AFCENT, including the Dutch and Belgian corps in NORTHAG and some of the entirely new II British Corps. It would also include the alerting of air defences. NORTHAG continues to offer the most attractive point of decisive entry, in spite of the lack of depth in the CENTAG sector, because of the inadequacy of reserves to fight the battle in depth which will inevitably develop in the NORTHAG sector. Forward deployment (adopted in the FRG for purely political reasons) has made a main thrust against NORTHAG particularly inviting.
The cover plan must firmly indicate a date for the opening of the offensive not earlier than D + 9 or 10. The actual offensive on D-day will thus catch the defence not yet prepared for it.
On the night D — 1 there would be widespread attacks by undercover forces (some 400 KGB-controlled cells are already deployed) on suitable targets in the FRG, stiffened by expendable Soviet airborne units. Shortly before first light on D-day airborne formations, making the best use of undercover forces, would seal Hamburg, make good Bremen airfield and seize crossings over the Weser; if possible, over the Rhine as well. The securing of Bremen airfield as an airhead would be indispensable. The success of other airborne operations would be a bonus.
Just before first light on D-day, and synchronized with the widest possible interference with US space reconnaissance satellites, an air operation of the very highest intensity, using both high explosive and chemical munitions, would be launched simultaneously against the Allied air force bases and control systems and the movement of AFCENT’s land forces to their main defensive positions. When the full shock of this had taken its effect, and a favourable air situation had been achieved, the weight of air effort would be shifted to direct support of a general offensive along the entire AFCENT front, exploiting both normal mass-attack tactics and deep penetration action, the latter intended primarily to pre-empt NATO anti-tank suppressive action. In ground action chemical weapons would be employed at army commanders’ discretion, with the emphasis on nerve gases, persistent or non-persistent. Airborne assaults on suitable targets, especially airfields, air defence sites, headquarters and obstacle crossings would continue. All ground force operations would have maximum tactical air support.
2 Guards Tank Army with two Polish divisions and some GDR troops would attack on the north of the NORTHAG sector, 3 Shock Army in the south of the same sector, followed by 20 Guards Army, with two GDR divisions under command.
8 Guards Army would attack on the CENTAG front, objective Frankfurt, 1 Guards Tank Army further south, objective Nurnberg.
One Polish and two Soviet divisions would move northwards through Schleswig-Holstein into Denmark, supported as necessary. The main thrust into AFNORTH would be out of the Leningrad Military District through Kola in the first instance. The follow-up would be by rail through Finland. All effective resistance in AFNORTH should cease by D + 6, though difficult country may delay the southward advance in Norway.
By first light on D + l armoured columns in the north must reach the Dortmund-Ems Canal, making good all Weser crossings north of Minden soonest thereafter. In the CENTAG area Giessen must be secured, to develop an attack on the Frankfurt-Mainz complex, already under heavy pressure from the east.
Air-portable formations operating on the ground out of Bremen airhead should secure river crossings into Holland for rapid consolidation by following armour. Airborne troops will be used to extend the depth of the penetration in Holland. It is imperative to seize the Hilversum radio and television complex intact at the earliest opportunity. By D + 2 resistance in Holland is expected to be minimal. All Holland is to be occupied as far south as the River Waal by D + 6.
While strong pressure continues on CENTAG from the north-east and east, the main effort will now be in an offensive north to south along the west bank of the Rhine. This is expected to be decisive in the outflanking of CENTAG and destruction of AFCENT.
There must be maximum exploitation of refugee movement everywhere. Civilian casualties are wholly irrelevant and may even be advantageous. Towns and cities are to be bypassed wherever possible for subsequent attention.
Berlin will be contained. Its early capitulation can be counted on when AFCENT breaks.
Resistance can be expected to continue in difficult country, such as the Harz, Spessart, Schwarzwald and Thuringer Wald and the Bavarian high country. This can be masked and ignored. It is also likely to continue in Rhineland and Ruhr cities. Here it must be ruthlessly eliminated.
NORTHAG can be expected, when its forward defences have been penetrated, first of all to take up positions roughly east and west along the Teutoburger Wald, no doubt hoping to deny crossings across the Lower Rhine by a manoeuvre battle in depth. They will have insufficient troops for this, and there is no hope of their succeeding.