With the new equipment and new organizations and tactics to match, morale in the British Army of the Rhine, not at its highest in the 1970s, was now fully restored.
Of the Dutch forces in the Northern Army Group (I Ne Corps) only one armoured brigade and one tank and one reconnaissance battalion were located in Germany, the rest being held back in Holland. Of the 75,000 men which constituted the whole strength of the Dutch Army, more than half (43,000) were conscripts, doing no more than fourteen months’ service. It had long been hoped in NATO that the Netherlands would be persuaded to station more of its assigned forces further forward, nearer to their emergency defence positions. The international tensions of late 1984 succeeded where previous arguments had failed and, though the false detente of the following spring tended to put the movement into reverse, the centre of gravity in the deployment of I Netherlands Corps in the summer of 1985 was further forward than it had ever been before.
The position of the Belgians was not dissimilar, though the conscripted element in the army (23,000 out of 62,000) did only eight months’ service if posted to the Federal Republic of Germany, where there were stationed in peacetime one corps and two divisional headquarters, with one armoured and two infantry brigades, as opposed to ten months if serving in Belgium. I Belgian (I Be) Corps, with some 300 Leopard I tanks, like I Netherlands Corps, with some 450, was under command to NORTHAG. Both corps had received a good deal of new equipment, notably APC, ATGW and air defence weapons. In both cases, however, the supply of new weapons to the reserve formations and battalions that would reinforce them was limited, as was the training carried out by reservists.
In addition to the major national formations Allied Command Europe also included the Canadian Brigade Group which had become by late July the equivalent almost of a small division.[5] An all-regular force, its quality was high. Old hands in other Allied countries (particularly among the British), who recalled their experience with Canadian troops in the last world war, saw with satisfaction that in their technical skills and their robust and disciplined approach they were, in the changed circumstances of today, as good as ever. The Group was stationed in the CENTAG area, not far from the French divisions.
Though France had not been a member of NATO since 1966 II French Corps, of two divisions, with corps and some army troops nearly 50,000 strong, continued to be stationed in Germany, with close military liaison with CENTAG. Three mechanized divisions in France formed the balance of the First French Army, to which the French divisions in Germany belonged. The equipment of the five divisions in the First French Army was modern and good and included battlefield nuclear weapons held inside France, under French control. Little of the equipment was standardized with NATO however, raising potential problems in supply. In addition to the Forces de Manoeuvre, of which the First French Army was part, France disposed of Territorial Defence Forces (Defense Operationelle du Territoire, or DOT) some 50,000 strong. These had a very important role, among others, in the defence of key points in metropolitan France against disruption by sabotage and against civil disorder.
On the southern flank, Italy (twelve months’ service for 120,000 conscripts in an army of 218,000) disposed of twelve divisions (three armoured) with a mixed inventory of tanks. Though Greece’s membership of the integrated military organization had been somewhat conditional since 1974, she continued to have some military links and had modernized most of her mainly conscript army (28–30 months’ service) of twelve divisions (one armoured), largely with French equipment, and, it must be admitted, with an eye on Turkey rather than the forces of the Warsaw Pact. Turkey (twenty months’ service) could field twenty-two divisions (one armoured and two mechanized) in an army of 375,000. Differences between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, sharpened by competition for Aegean oil, had by the beginning of the eighties grown somewhat less than in the years before. The curtailment of military aid from the US to which this had given rise (it was resumed in 1982) had inevitably reduced the war-fighting capability of both countries, though this had latterly begun once more to improve. Turkish equipment was generally somewhat elderly and in an indifferent state; mobility was limited and it had not been possible to reach a high level of training.
To this brief account of NATO ground forces must of course be added something of how the tactical air forces stood, since in any battle their operations would be indivisible. Here not only the aircraft stationed alongside the ground forces have to be reckoned with, but also those that could operate in a given sector from immediately outside it, as, for example, from the United Kingdom or the western Soviet Union, or from aircraft carriers that might be in the vicinity, or — though this applied more to Soviet forces — medium bombers that could be flown from relatively distant airfields.
An accurate tally of air strength is therefore not easy, because of its inherent flexibility, but, taking ground-based fighter aircraft as the main yardstick, NATO deployed for operations in the critical central sector — excluding French forces — some 2,800 aircraft, compared with approximately 4,500 deployed by the Warsaw Pact. This numerical disparity had long presented a problem and still did. It was a problem compounded by the relative ease of reinforcement enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact, by an insufficiency of forward airfields on the Allied side, and by some difficulties in inter-operability, caused by the variety of different aircraft in use in NATO air forces.
There had, however, been a marked all-round improvement in NATO tactical air strength in the previous few years. Several first-class new aircraft had been introduced, embodying the most up-to-date technology. For the air superiority role the American F-15 was better than any other fighter, both in its performance and in its armament. It was admirably complemented by the lighter F-16. Both were greatly assisted in their task by the ability of AWACS (airborne warning and control system), belatedly introduced in the 1970s, to detect intruding aircraft and control the operation of our own. For strike missions the Tornado, with its ultra-low flying capability, presented the Warsaw Pact with severe problems, as did the Jaguar and the smaller AlphaJet and Hawk ground-attack fighters. The adoption of increasing numbers of aircraft developed and built in co-operation by two or more allies was beginning to give more flexibility to NATO air operations, with a higher degree of inter-operability.
The quality of the new aircraft was more than matched by the weapon systems they carried, tailored to what were seen to be the essential tasks of stopping the Soviet tanks and cutting off the flow of immediate reinforcements to the battle area. Precision-guided weapons, cluster munitions and the all-important electronic aids were given great emphasis.
The decision by the United Kingdom to provide once more a proper defence of its own airspace, described in detail in Chapter 19, helped the tactical air forces to solve two of the problems mentioned above: first, it provided protected airfields that enabled aircraft to be diverted to as well as based in the United Kingdom, thus easing the operational difficulties posed by an insufficiency of airfields; second, it enabled reinforcement by fighter squadrons from the United States to be carried out more safely, taking advantage of the steps that the United States had put in train to make her large reserves of aircraft rapidly available.
The Soviet Air Force had, of course, been increasing its own ground-attack and deep strike and interdiction capability for some years, which posed severe air defence problems for the NATO forces, ground and air. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s own dense air defence made the task of NATO aircraft much more difficult. Despite this, NATO air commanders had some confidence that the quality and versatility of their aircraft, the edge that their weapon systems and electronic warfare capability gave them, and the higher training standards of NATO airmen, would all go a long way to redress the numerical imbalance with which they had to contend.
5
Armoured infantry, 3,500 strong, together with a regiment of sixty tanks, an artillery regiment of 155 mm SP howitzers, anti-tank and anti-air missiles, support troops and a tactical helicopter squadron.