It was with these considerations in mind that SACLANT’s operations were planned. It was essential, as a basis for them, to exploit two capabilities, which had been developed in recent years, to provide early warning of impending attacks. The first of these concerned submarines. The knowledge of Soviet submarine dispositions and movements painstakingly built up in peacetime had been augmented by the use of the surface-towed array surveillance system (STASS), operated in a number of suitably stationed patrol ships. These monitored the noise made by submarines underway, especially when they exceeded modest speeds. The information so obtained could be fed into the total submarine surveillance system, with corresponding improvement in its reliability and comprehensiveness. The second important system was the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), operated in large patrol aircraft. This could provide long-range warning of low-flying aircraft or missile attack, and hence help to offset, to some extent, the danger of defences being overwhelmed by the weight of a surprise missile onslaught.
The Soviet Naval Staff, in planning the naval operations which would support ‘defensive action’ by the Warsaw Pact, if that should prove necessary, were quite clear in their minds about what had to be done. The Soviet Navy had to show that its contribution to the achievement of the Soviet Union’s political goals could be more than just supportive of the ground forces’ campaign. By concentrating upon the isolation of the north-west European battlefield, it could not only help the Red Army directly but also do much to weaken the commitment of the United States to Western Europe. The main tasks of the Soviet Navy, therefore, during the first ten days of hostilities, would be to:
1 Maintain the Soviet Navy’s strategic nuclear forces intact and at readiness, whilst limiting as much as possible the damage which could result if NATO were to unleash strategic nuclear warfare or tactical nuclear warfare at sea.
2 Help the ground and air forces to seize and keep open the Baltic Exits, and the Kiel Canal.
3 Support the ground and air forces in the invasion of Norway from the north.
4 Destroy as many NATO warships, submarines and naval aircraft as possible, in the Arctic Ocean, Norwegian Sea, North Atlantic, North Sea, English Channel and Baltic. Outside these areas, in the Atlantic south of the Tropic of Cancer and elsewhere, NATO forces, or the forces of NATO member states, would only be engaged when hostile action seemed to be inevitable, or had already begun.
5 Interdict all sea traffic between the United Kingdom and the Continent.
6 Neutralize or destroy the North Sea oil and gas installations.
7 Maintain freedom of movement for Soviet submarines in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, whilst denying this to NATO submarines.
8 Prevent shipping, and especially military transports, from reaching NATO’s European ports.
9 Get all Soviet and other Warsaw Pact ships, including fishing and research vessels, into friendly or neutral ports before their capture or destruction.
NATO’s warning of imminent attack by the Warsaw Pact had been brief. Much reliance had been placed upon detection of the increased deployment of submarines from the Soviet Northern Fleet, based on Murmansk in the Kola Inlet, into the Atlantic. The Soviet naval command was aware of this. Although, under reasonable excuse, there was a movement of surface shipping from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and the Straits (see above), no change was permitted in the pattern of submarine movements during the three weeks prior to D-day, 4 August 1985. There was, in fact, no need for it. Of the sixty nuclear-powered general purpose and forty diesel-electric patrol submarines in the Northern Fleet immediately available for operations, about one third were always at sea on a variety of tasks. They were primarily concerned with surveillance — of the US and UK strategic nuclear submarine forces, and of major US naval force movements and exercises. The submarines invariably went on patrol ready in all respects for war. They could remain on task, once hostilities broke out, until they had used up all their weapons, or were running short of food and (in the case of the diesel-electric submarines) fuel. What did happen, on 4 August and during the next few weeks, showed that, although the efficiency of the Soviet submarine force had improved a great deal since the Second World War, the anti-submarine measures of the Atlantic Alliance had done so too.
The situation at sea was uncannily reminiscent of the early months of the Second World War. Something like a ‘Blitzkrieg’ in Central Europe, accompanied by supporting naval operations; submarine attacks on shipping in the Western Approaches; sporadic attacks, submarine, surface and air, on Allied shipping worldwide; the bottling up, capture or destruction of the merchant shipping of the continental power, the Warsaw Pact, by Allied naval forces.
There were differences between then and now. These were, first of all, politico-military. Unlike Germany in 1939-40, the Soviet Union in 1985 was firmly established in the Middle East, and in both West and East Africa. On the other hand, the United States in 1985 had not stood aside, as in 1939-41, when Great Britain and the Commonwealth stood almost alone against Nazi Germany. The United States was now, from the very outset, at the head of a great alliance of countries formed for the purpose of supporting each other if attacked on land or — but here was the rub — if any of their ships or aircraft were attacked in the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer (the southern limit of the NATO area) or in the Mediterranean. Outside these specified sea areas, unfortunately, the Alliance could not operate as such.
The rapid growth in the number of independent nation states since 1945, most of them with sea coasts and maritime interests both commercial and naval, had added correspondingly to the complexity of war at sea.
The best that NATO could do had been to set up NATO Shipping Councils at the world’s main ports. These consisted of representatives from the shipping and forwarding agents of NATO countries, as these existed in each place, together with diplomatic representatives of the nations concerned. Communication between the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping and NATO naval authorities made it possible for NATO to organize and protect its shipping outside as well as inside the NATO area. This was no substitute for the worldwide system of naval commands and shipping control officers by means of which Great Britain and her maritime allies had conducted the ‘sea affair’ in 1939-45, but it was better than nothing. Better, indeed, than the over-centralized Soviet system. The advantage of flexibility and initiative enjoyed by the NATO Shipping Councils was in stark contrast to the difficulty the Soviet Union’s representatives had in obtaining permission to act, as they so often felt that the situation demanded, in the light of local knowledge of rapidly changing circumstances.
The second set of differences, in the general conditions of the war at sea, between the Second World War and the Third, was technical. The most important new factor was the advent of nuclear-powered submarines. Able to go two or three times round the world without having to refuel or replenish, and not having to show any part of themselves above water (except momentarily for navigation or communication purposes), these were potent instruments of sea power. That is to say, they were potent instruments of sea power in the negative sense, namely, of the power to deny the use of the sea to a hostile country or coalition. To the positive side of sea power, submarines could contribute a good deal less. A French naval officer had aptly described nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines as ‘myopic and brutal’. In placing such reliance upon a huge submarine force as the main instrument of her putative sea power, the Soviet Union underlined, one might think, its own ‘myopic and brutal’ character. For the quintessence of sea power, exemplified par excellence by the British Empire in its hey-day, is the positive contribution which it can make to peaceful and growing international trade. Maritime strike aircraft, although the reverse of myopic, were if anything more brutal than submarines. The latter at least could operate, in certain circumstances, with due regard for humanity, using minimum force and helping survivors to safety. This a shore-based aircraft could never do. In 1985, therefore, the Soviet Union at last had to face certain facts. The possession of enormous ship-sinking power, together with a huge merchant marine directly controlled from Moscow, was no substitute for the carrying power of the West’s ships, freely co-ordinated, under the protection of the Allied navies of the maritime governments whose flags they flew.