In addition to the most welcome reinforcement of the sadly depleted CAVALRY escort force by the British support group, of which the anti-submarine cruiser HMS Invincible formed part, two of JACWA’s escort groups, one with a British escort carrier, and a number of Dutch and German, as well as British frigates and destroyers, had joined the convoys by 12 August. It looked as if the worst part of the ocean transit was now over. CAVALRY would soon come under the umbrella of the United Kingdom Air Defence Region.
In the Norwegian Sea, Strike Fleet Atlantic had succeeded in destroying five of the Backfire bombers returning from their attack on CAVALRY. NATO submarines had successfully attacked the Soviet surface strike force off the North Cape and sunk a Kiev — class light aircraft carrier and a Kara-class cruiser. Early on 12 August, within twenty-four hours of the combined air and submarine attacks on the CAVALRY convoys, US Strike Fleet Atlantic began to pound the Soviet naval bases and airfields in the Kola Inlet. C-in-C Soviet Navy, Admiral Starsky, in order to justify his decision to use the main Backfire force to attack the troop convoys, rather than concentrating on neutralizing the US Strike Fleet, accepted with alacrity the reports he received of the ‘annihilation’ of the CAVALRY convoys by air and submarine attack. He therefore ordered C-in-C Northern Fleet to send his available Backfires to attack Strike Fleet Atlantic. In fact, having lost only one more transport and two escorts to submarine attack, the convoys were now, on 13 August, under air cover from the UK and France. One hazard remained to be overcome. The Le Havre mine counter-measures force, working round the clock to keep the approach channels swept, detected mines during the night of 13–14 August. Possible diversions of the troop convoys were considered. Cherbourg was in any case the destination of some of the ships. But every hour of delay in getting the troops and their equipment to the battlefield would diminish the prospect of averting the use of nuclear weapons, if the Soviet advance was to be checked. It was a balance of risks.
The French Flag Officer-in-Charge of the First Maritime District had reason to believe that the mines had been laid by a small force of Soviet coastal craft, under cover of the severe fighting in the Channel four or five days previously. It had not been possible to plot all the contacts, while so many things were happening at once. He decided, therefore, having conducted a clearance sweep and re-swept the main channel, to accept the planned number of CAVALRY transports in Le Havre, the remainder being sent to Cherbourg and Brest. In the event, there were no further casualties to the troop convoys. Out of the forty-eight transports which had sailed from the USA and Canada, twelve had been sunk or badly damaged. But ‘the US CAVALRY had arrived in time’.
This letter written at the time gives one man’s experience of Operation CAVALRY. It is from a young American serviceman.
“Haslar Hospital
Gosport,
England
24 August 1985
Dear Mom,
You should have heard by now that I’m O.K. - some cuts, bruises and burns here and there, but believe me, I’m in good shape. I guess I’ll be back to duty in a couple of weeks. What then I don’t know. Another ship, I expect. I’m being looked after real well, though. Yeah, but how come you ended up in hospital? I hear you ask. O.K., well — you remember I was drafted suddenly to Military Sealift Command, at Norfolk Va? Next thing I was aboard a great big container ship in Boston. I’d better not give you the name. Believe it or not they censor your letters here. At any rate, this ship was loading the Army’s weapons. And then they slung a whole lot of bunkhouses aboard — big containers. About 120. Then came the soldiers, 1,000 or so. My job was in the extra radio team we took for the voyage.
Things happened fast. Two days after we heard the Russians had invaded Germany we sailed from Boston. Then we waited in Halifax NS until the convoy had gathered. When we sailed there were forty-eight ships, all big and fast, and full of soldiers. We were really four convoys, each of twelve ships, three columns of four in each. Ours was ahead. We also had two aircraft carriers, but they were old ones, and full of troops. There was one at the head of each of our outer columns. My station was on the bridge. I had to pass the signals to the Skipper, or whoever was in charge of the ship — the watch officer. So I could hear and see a good deal. On the third day out things began to; happen. We ran into some submarines that fired missiles. We weren’t hit then, but I could see columns of smoke coming up here and there. Of course there were ships — troopships or escort ships, big and small — everywhere. We passed near where a couple of “choppers” were hunting a submarine. We didn’t think they had much chance of getting a “nuke”. But suddenly there was an explosion in the sea and we reckoned they’d got one.
A few hours later, when it was dark, there was another missile attack — more ships hit. Again we got away with it. Two of our convoy were hit, though. In a moment they were ablaze, and hauling out of line. The rest of us said a prayer and pressed on. Next day we copped it. I got the missile raid warnings on my radio net. This time, as the submarines opened up on us, there came the air-to-surface missiles. We were a long way from Murmansk, but these boys found us and reached right out. Suddenly there was a terrible flash and bang-crack, all at once. Then in a moment another. We were all thrown in a heap. The Skipper (I think it was) shouted, “Full left rudder! Emergency stop!” We had to haul out of line, you see. That’s about all I remember till I came to in a life-raft. I said, “Where’s the ship?” Some guy squatting there lifted up my head. “There,” he said, pointing. “She’s still afloat, but pretty near burned out.” I could see the smoke. I didn’t feel too good. But I guess I was very lucky. We all were, who were on the bridge, or somewhere aft. The missiles had hit amidships and killed most everyone around. Then the fire took hold. But as we turned out of line we brought the ship’s stern to the wind. And as we stopped, the wind took the fire away from the after superstructure, where we were — and a good many life-rafts. Some of the soldiers who jumped straight overboard when the missiles hit were saved. But hundreds were lost. It was bad. We were lucky. A British frigate found us, and that’s why I’m in Gosport, England, Mom. There’s a great joke going around here that Britain’s been saved by the US Cavalry riding in — like those old movies, you know? Hope you are all well at home.
Love,
Dan?”
In assessing the outcome of the war at sea, which continued unabated until the NATO counter-offensive checked the enemy’s advance in the Central Region, it is necessary to consider the aims of the respective naval commanders, the extent to which these were achieved, and at what cost. In the first place, it may be said that in failing to interdict more than 25 per cent of the immediate seaborne reinforcement sent from North America to Allied Command Europe, the Soviet Navy failed to support the Red Army decisively. SACLANT and JACWA between them had for their part decisively supported SACEUR. As to the war at sea in general, the losses of warships, aircraft and submarines on both sides, during the first phase, had left the balance little changed since the outbreak of hostilities, although at a lower level. Losses had been heavy, and there were virtually no reserves. Replacement by new construction would take years.
NATO did enjoy one advantage over the Russians, however. It remained a good deal simpler for the NATO navies to redeploy their existing surface forces than for the Soviet Navy to do so. Several important US units from the Pacific were soon on their way to the Atlantic, to replace elements of the Strike Fleet which had been sunk, some by air but more by submarine attack, during the withdrawal of the force from the Norwegian Sea. But the Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, despite the seizure of the Baltic Exits and the transfer of Black Sea units to the Mediterranean, were unable to support each other. NATO maritime strike aircraft in Britain, ‘the unsinkable aircraft carrier’, and NATO submarines in the Mediterranean, were a constant discouragement to Soviet naval movements. Soviet naval and air forces in the Middle East did succeed, for a time, in dominating the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. But a combined US, British and Australian force, operating in the Indian Ocean, eventually neutralized them. Again, losses on both sides were heavy.