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The struggle which began with Cuba-leaning Guyana at this time was welcomed by some extreme right-wing nationalist groups in Venezuela, plus some of the Venezuelan military, but it was really initiated by Cuba-leaning politicians in Guyana itself. A quarrel between these countries is always easy to ignite, because Venezuelans think that two-thirds of the land area of Guyana should actually belong to Venezuela. Some Guyanan politicians wanted to integrate their country more closely with Cuba because this would advance their own careers. They could feel fairly certain that the movement of armed bands across the disputed areas, spilling occasionally over the frontier, would trigger a reaction from Venezuelan generals. The trigger was pulled, and the reaction came. The spectre had now been raised of a war on the South American mainland.

Guyana asked for Cuban military help, and new teams of Cuban ‘advisers’ quickly turned up. All the other Caribbean countries tried to persuade Venezuela and Guyana to come to terms peacefully, and their general mood was against Venezuela. A left-wing inspired campaign against ‘Venezuelan imperialism’ spread throughout Trinidad, Tobago, Curacao, anti-colonialist Grenada, Dominica and even Jamaica. It was embarrassing to the US that its key ally in containing subversion in Central America and the Caribbean should start to lose sympathy in both regions as a result of a ninety-year-old territorial dispute with a black-dominated, English-speaking Caribbean country. Cuba did not miss the opportunity to show its anti-colonialism. It prepared to station military units on the mainland ‘at the request of a friendly government, threatened by foreign aggression’.

In November of 1983 America’s fortunes in Central America therefore seemed at their lowest ebb. The US Administration, committed to a policy of containment of subversion, but not opposed in principle to moderate change, had almost given up hopes that any middle-of-the-road alternative was feasible in countries torn apart by extremists from left and right. Mexico persisted in its anti-US stand, willing to take risks with the centre-left and more extreme left-wing movements. The Venezuelan Government had lost most of its capacity for action as the election approached, and it was unpopular internationally because of its border disputes with Colombia as well as Guyana. The Soviet Union was delighted to see the United States caught in the elephant trap and wallowing ineffectively, while the Soviet Union’s Cuban ally was recovering political prestige and gaining opportunities to intervene militarily at the request of ‘friendly governments’, as it had done in Africa.

As only one example, Cuban technicians now accelerated work on the new airport in Grenada, begun in 1980, which was clearly going to be able to service sophisticated combat aircraft. The United States had to decide whether it was going to take military action to-stop ‘new Cubas’ from arising right across Central America and the Caribbean.

The US Administration adopted, as the only possible way out of the trap, Teddy Roosevelt’s old policy in the area: ‘speak softly, but carry a big stick’. The big stick hit the headlines. The United States gave warning to Cuba that the despatch of any more Cuban troops to countries outside its borders would be regarded as a casus belli. Units of the United States’ Atlantic Fleet took up stations around the island. If any attacks were launched on these ships, Washington announced, selected targets in Cuba would be attacked from the air in return. The soft speaking at this time was the US President’s statement that in view of the ‘crisis towards which the Soviet Union is now clearly moving, there can be no sense in any Caribbean or Central American country so far from its borders remaining under its vassalage. We will hold out a genuine hand of friendship, and aid, to governments which wish to break away from that vassalage. We hold no animosity against leaders now in power.’

The policy worked. The ships were not attacked, and no more Cuban troops were despatched to the mainland or through the Caribbean. The CIA triumphantly attributed this to the big stick. As was reported in the New York Times, the CIA view was that ‘The moderates within the Cuban elite are worried at the appalling economic conditions in Cuba and at the mess developing in the Soviet Union. They might have moved to oust the Cuban leadership if it had sent missiles against the American ships.’ Cuba’s excuse for running away looked more subtle. ‘We can afford to be patient,’ a communique from its premier said. ‘The revolutions against the repressive regimes of Central America are already irreversible. If America tries to prop them up, it will fail. If America were to move to encourage less fascist regimes in the junta-run countries, then it might be worthwhile exploring new relationships with it. But let us stir no more pots until the Christian Democrats have lost the Venezuelan elections in early December.’

They duly did so. The Social Democrats (Accion Democratica) won the Venezuelan election with a substantial majority. The US Administration, horrified at first, later found good reason to be pleased.

The new Venezuelan President-elect, who was to assume office next April according to Venezuelan constitutional procedures, held several early meetings with US and Mexican leaders. He made it clear that Venezuela would no longer follow the US line of interpreting conflicts in Central America in purely East-West terms. He wanted to try to bring moderate elements into the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. Venezuela, explained the President-elect to US representatives, accepted the US policy of a ‘big stick and soft words’ towards Cuba. As regards the stick Venezuela would never condone military intervention from foreign powers in Central America or the Caribbean. As regards the soft words, Venezuela like Mexico regarded Cuba as a Latin American country which, it was thought, could be gradually weaned away from the Soviet embrace by a policy of cautious rapprochement. This had been Mexico’s policy for twenty years; it was Venezuela’s policy from 1973 until 1978, and now from 1984 onwards it would again be the official attitude of the Venezuelan Government.

The new alliance between Venezuela and Mexico proved patient, systematic and rather efficient. The isolation of the military regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala, supported now only by a tiny minority, made it surprisingly easy for Venezuela and Mexico to create a democratic alliance against them.

Mexico and Venezuela persuaded leading Salvadoran Social Democrats to separate themselves from the most radical elements in the Marxist revolutionary ‘Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front’ and to accept a ‘common front’ for a provisional government with other democratic organizations such as El Salvador’s Christian Democrats. The US was asked to propose the establishment of an international conference with the participation of all democratic Salvadoran political organizations, supervised by Mexico and Venezuela. The main role of the US would be to persuade the extreme right-wing members in El Salvador’s military government to accept a transition towards democracy. To these Salvadoran members of the junta, the only offers would be that there would be no prosecution for ‘crimes of war’ and that there would be an honourable end to their careers, still as quite rich men.

The initial response to these proposals by the right-wing military and the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador was the same: total rejection. The Marxists condemned ‘those who are trying to steal the triumph of the Salvadoran people’.

This inclined the US Administration to accept the Mexican-Venezuelan plan. Washington made three conditions: (a) no Cuban participation at any stage of the proceedings; (b) the exclusion of Marxists and pro-Cubans from key positions in the new Salvadoran Government; (c) general elections to be held six months after the installation of the Provisional Government.