No proposal could have been equally liked by all parties concerned, but the new plan commanded sufficient support among those who were in a position to influence the waverers that it formed the basis for implementing Resolution 435. In essence this new plan was that the ceasefire would be followed by elections to a constituent assembly; this assembly would then be required to pass by a two-thirds majority a constitution; an election under the constitution would in turn open the way for independence itself. The system of government under the proposed constitution was to have three branches: an elected executive branch responsible to the legislature; a legislature elected by universal suffrage; and an independent judicial branch. The electoral system, being based on membership from both the constituencies and the parties, would ensure proper representation in the legislature to the various political groups among the Namibian people throughout the country. The constitution was also to contain a declaration of fundamental rights to guarantee personal, political and racial freedom.
Throughout the first part of 1982 international diplomacy at the United Nations and intensive negotiations in Africa itself gradually removed the obstacles to agreement to implement a revised UN plan which was finally reached at the 1982 Geneva conference. The wise statesmanship of Zimbabwe's Prime Minister did much to facilitate the finding of a solution to the vexed question of the ceasefire — who would supervise it and where would South African and SWAPO forces withdraw to? His proposals enjoyed the authority of experience and the attraction of simplicity. Broadly, an international force, which would police both ceasefire and elections, would be drawn from black and white Commonwealth countries (including Zimbabwe itself, Nigeria, Canada and New Zealand), Scandinavia, the Philippines, Venezuela, Eire, Finland and Switzerland. They would be commanded by an Indian general whose reputation for persuasiveness, impartiality and common sense had been greatly enhanced by his handling of previous peacekeeping operations. The camps to which the opposing forces would withdraw, broadly in the north for SWAPO and south for South African, were chosen with a view to combining ease of monitoring and administration with inability to intimidate or influence local opinion. Two sensitive and difficult problems — first the actual methods of conducting and supervising elections, second, the future integration of SWAPO troops with the existing South-West Africa Police and Territory Force — were to be handled roughly in the same way as had been so smoothly and successfully done in Zimbabwe.
This was but one demonstration of how practical difficulties facing those striving for a peaceful way forward were tackled. There were many others. First and foremost was the future constitution itself, and here the principal hurdle to be cleared was how to reconcile the differing views of SWAPO and the Namibia National Party (which had the largest support from the 100,000 Afrikaner population — out of Namibia's total of roughly one million) backed by Pretoria. Constitutional guarantees could mean different things to different groups, and only safeguards of minority rights in which those concerned could believe were likely to satisfy the Namibia National Party and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. None the less a constitutional conference to draft the basis of an independent Namibian government convened at Geneva late in 1982, and the fact that it did so had been brought about by a number of other agreements and disagreements involving the United States, South Africa and the black African nations, particularly Angola.
In a climate where moderation had begun to assume support which it had formerly lacked, two immoderate lines of policy had fortunately lost credibility and been put aside. One was the attempt by the African group in the United Nations to secure agreement for imposing economic sanctions on South Africa because of this country's refusal to comply with the original plan under Resolution 435. The move was blocked by the vetos of France, the United States and the United Kingdom. More important was the realization by the African group that only some accommodation with South Africa could in the end lead to an independent Namibia — short of continuing the fight with infinitely greater resources, rather more success than had hitherto been achieved, and non-interference by the United States should this elusive success be sought by increasing Soviet or Soviet-proxy support.
With the idea of sanctions out of the way, progress could be made elsewhere. Notable here was the second abandonment of immoderation. At one time the United States had had the curious idea that a settlement in Namibia could be linked to a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Indeed one State Department paper had contained the extraordinary suggestion that African leaders would be unable to resist the Namibian-Angola linkage once they were made to realize that they could only get a Namibia settlement through the United States and that the US was in earnest about getting such a settlement. In this bizarre notion there was one element of realism. The African states did understand the importance of the US role in securing a settlement in Namibia, but it had little to do with Angola. It concerned essentially America's relationship with South Africa.
The persuasion which the US was enabled to apply to South Africa at the continued meetings between the former's Secretary of State and the latter's Prime Minister during the early months of 1982 did much to open the 'new chapter' of relations which the two countries were henceforth to establish and cement. The most immediate benefit from these meetings was that South Africa agreed to support the Western group's plan for an independent Namibia and undertook to ensure that Namibia's internal political parties would do so as well.
In parallel with this advance, the black African nations, led by Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Angola, were able to induce the leader of SW APO that this Western plan — despite its constitutional guarantees for minorities — was the best, indeed at that time the only, basis for seeing to it that Namibia's future would be determined by himself and his organization. After all, they pointed out, if SWAPO was justified in its claim to be the sole representatives of the Namibian people, what had it to fear from requirements for multi-party democracy with elections at prescribed intervals, or from a bill of rights to protect minorities? Conditions relating to the non-expropriation of private property or guaranteed representation for whites in parliament need not be a deterrent. They had not deterred Zimbabwe. Better surely to go for the legitimate, albeit slow, path to ultimate black domination, as in Zimbabwe, than the more rapid, more dramatic, but still disputed triumphs of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
In Angola the position was still an unhappy one. Ill discipline, corruption, rivalry and inefficiency seemed to be the pattern there. Shortcomings in the transport system alone seemed to make impossible the proper distribution of food. The war against South African forces had robbed the civil transport system of half its vehicles. UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) guerrillas further disrupted railways in the centre and south of the country. Ambushes by the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA) forces interfered with life in the north. If Angola were to climb out of its pit of incompetence and strife, it would hardly be by encouraging SWAPO to continue the fight against South Africa and pledging its support to that fight. Happily, the leader of SWAPO found these arguments convincing.