There is a revolution going on in this country—and the principles, goals, and desires of the other side are much closer to what Americans believe in than those of GVN…. I am convinced that, even though the NLF is Communist-dominated,… the great majority of the people supporting it are doing so because it is their only hope to change and improve their living conditions and opportunities. If I were a lad of eighteen faced with the same choice—whether to support the GVN or the NLF—and a member of a rural community, I would surely choose the NLF.31
Faced with a crumbling political situation, Johnson and his advisors again decided to increase the number of troops. Meeting on July 22, they estimated long-term troop requirements at between 500,000 and 600,000, assuming the Chinese did not become involved. If the Chinese entered the conflict, an additional 300,000 would be required. In the short run, they agreed, 100,000 would be needed by the end of the year and another 100,000 in January 1966 just to halt the slide and prevent defeat. They were relieved that the president would finally have to level with the American people about the country’s commitment to a major war. Johnson addressed the nation on July 28. He announced an immediate troop increase of 50,000, raising the total in the country to 125,000. Because an unspecified number of additional forces would be needed later, he was raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 to 35,000 per month, but he had decided against calling up the reserves.
Congress applauded Johnson’s restraint, taking comfort in the moderate troop commitment. At the Pentagon, however, both civilians and military advisors were shocked by Johnson’s decision to deliberately mislead the American people about the reality of the situation in Vietnam and the commitment the United States was making to a major war destined to last for years. Joint Chiefs Chairman Wheeler later explained, “We felt that it would be desirable to have a reserve call-up in order to make sure that the people of the U.S. knew that we were in a war and not engaged at some two-penny military adventure.”32
No one was angrier than Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson. Johnson put on his best dress uniform and set off to see the president. In the car ride over, he unpinned the stars from his shoulders. But before seeing the president he had a change of heart and pinned them back on—a decision he later regretted. He told one colleague, “I should have gone to see the president. I should have taken off my stars. I should have resigned. It was the worst, the most immoral decision I’ve ever made.”33
From there on, troop deployments steadily escalated. Meanwhile, the NLF continued to make gains throughout the country.
Not everyone supported sending combat troops. Clark Clifford tried repeatedly to convince Johnson and McNamara not to commit more troops, a position shared, at least privately, by Hubert Humphrey, Chester Bowles, William Bundy, George Ball, John Kenneth Galbraith, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, NSC official Chester Cooper, White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Adam Yarmolinsky.
Johnson chose catastrophe over capitulation. But he did so gradually instead of all-out, as the Joint Chiefs wanted. Major Charles Cooper, an aide to Admiral David McDonald, the chief of naval operations, accompanied McDonald to a meeting of the Joint Chiefs in November 1965 at which General Wheeler expressed “serious misgivings” about the direction of the war and urged the use of “overwhelming naval and air power,” including mining Haiphong harbor, blockading the North Vietnamese coastline, and bombing the North, including Hanoi. The other chiefs assured Johnson that they endorsed Chairman Wheeler’s proposal. Cooper recalled Johnson’s response:
Johnson exploded…. He just started screaming these obscenities…. It was something like: “You goddamn fucking assholes. You’re trying to get me to start World War III with your idiotic bullshit—your ‘military wisdom.’” He insulted each of them individually. “You dumb shit. Do you expect me to believe that kind of crap? I’ve got the weight of the Free World on my shoulders and you want me to start World War III?” He called them shitheads and pompous assholes and used the f-word more freely than a marine in boot camp. He really degraded them and cursed at them. Then he stopped and went back to a calm voice…. “Imagine that you’re me—that you’re the president of the United States—and five incompetents come into your office and try to talk you into starting World War III…. What would you do?” General Wheeler said: I can’t do it, Mr. President…. It’s got to be your decision and yours alone.” … Johnson erupted again. “The risk is just too high. How can you fucking assholes ignore what China might do? You have just contaminated my office, you filthy shitheads. Get the hell out of here right now.”
“I know memories are usually dimmed by time,” Cooper assured his interviewer, “but not this one. My memory of Lyndon Johnson on that day is crystal clear.”34
The United States gradually increased its bombing of the North, expanding the list of targets to heighten pressure on Hanoi. Responding to his advisors’ concerns about provoking China, Johnson believed this gradual approach would limit the possibility of Chinese entry into the war. He reasoned that
the slow escalation of the air war in the North and the increasing pressure on Ho Chi Minh was seduction, not rape. If China should suddenly react to slow escalation, as a woman might react to attempted seduction, by threatening to retaliate (a slap in the face, to continue the metaphor), the United States would have plenty of time to ease off the bombing. On the other hand, if the United States were to unleash an all-out, total assault on the North—rape rather than seduction—there could be no turning back, and Chinese reaction might be instant and total.35
When Senator George McGovern warned that the bombing might provoke strong responses by both the Chinese and North Vietnamese, Johnson responded, “I’m watching that very closely. I’m going up her leg an inch at a time…. I’ll get to the snatch before they know what’s happening.”36
U.S. bombing sparked protests around the world. In March 1965, students and faculty held an all-night teach-in at the University of Michigan. The following month, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held an antiwar demonstration in Washington, D.C., at which an astounding 25,000 people showed up.
Convinced that Communist governments were behind the nascent antiwar movement, the CIA began a massive surveillance and information-gathering effort against antiwar activists. Johnson demanded the CIA uncover proof of Communist involvement. The CIA’s illegal domestic surveillance operation, code-named Chaos, was run by a newly created Special Operations Group. It lasted almost seven years, compiling a computer index of 300,000 citizens and organizations and extensive files on 7,200 individuals.37 Johnson nevertheless berated CIA Director Richard Helms for failing to prove Communist involvement.