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It became very clear the dangers we were facing at our first meeting of the National Security Council in early February. By law this is supposed to be the most senior cabinet members and other critical people, a ‘mini-cabinet’ to contemplate war and peace. Besides the President and the Vice President, you had the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the head of the CIA. Along with these mandatory members, you also had ‘invited’ members who almost always showed up, like the President’s Chief of Staff and the Attorney General.

One of the biggest changes in American politics became obvious at the Cabinet level, and that was the utter decline of the value of being a military veteran. A generation before the majority of the male members of the Cabinet and virtually all of the National Security Council would have seen some form of military service, even if it had only been running the motor pool at Fort Dix. Now it was almost unheard of. In the entire cabinet, at least from what I could determine, the only veterans were Colin Powell, Tony Principi at Veterans Affairs, and me. Tommy Thompson and George Bush had both been in either the Reserves or the National Guard, and they had worked their asses off in order to avoid actually having to serve. The National Security Council was just as bad.

That is not to say that these were bad people. Just because you wore a uniform at some point in the past, that didn’t make you some kind of saint or an expert on all matters military. I was a pretty good company level commander and could have probably handled a battalion without too many problems. That did not make me the next Patton! However, it does give you a feeling for what will be required and what should be considered in any discussion of the use of military force.

The meetings of the National Security Council are supposed to be run by the President, with questions being asked of and instructions being given to the other participants. I raised an eyebrow at Colin Powell when as soon as George Bush called the meeting to order he turned it over to the Secretary of State. Dick Cheney opined on the problems we were having with Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis (basically, they weren’t doing what we wanted them to do, which was to turn over Saddam Hussein to us for a nice, clean hanging), and then he turned it over to the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Paul Wolfowitz.

Wolfowitz then began to recite the issues that we were discovering through our intelligence and surveillance of Iraq. I began taking a few notes. They were routinely thumbing their noses at us and testing the limits of the no-fly zones we had created after the Gulf War. There was an active program to develop a nuclear bomb. They already had chemical weapons. They were hiring Russian scientists to develop biological weapons. They were developing missiles capable of carrying these warheads, not just to Israel, but farther, to Europe. They were in discussions with terrorist groups in Lebanon and North Africa. The bottom line was that we needed to strongly consider some form of stronger response to their aggression.

There was no discussion because Cheney immediately turned the meeting over to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an Air Force General named Meyers, who had replaced Shelton when he had quit during the nonsense with me in the election. General Meyers promptly reported that he agreed with everything Director Wolfowitz had said, and that it was imperative that we begin preparing a variety of responses to Iraqi aggression. George Bush, on cue, ordered General Meyers to begin developing possible plans.

I cleared my throat, drawing attention to myself. “Excuse me, but I have a few questions.”

Before the President could respond, Cheney said, “Carl, this is only a preliminary investigation into these matters for the sake of the President.”

“Regardless, I still have some questions, and the President might be interested in hearing those answers.” I looked over at George Bush. “Mister President?”

“Go ahead, Carl. Let’s hear some questions and answers,” he replied, amused at my trumping Cheney.

“Thank you, Mister President.” I turned my head to Wolfowitz. “Mister Director, You claim the Iraqis are developing chemical weapons. They already have them. Gulf War Syndrome was a consequence of low level exposure to them. What has changed to warrant any changes on our part?”

That was the start. I also pushed on details about his other claims. What proof did he have for the nuclear bomb program? Where were the biologicals being developed? Why would an avowed secularist dictator like Hussein want to have anything to do with the terrorist groups Hizbollah or Hamas, which were primarily supported by the Iraqi’s mortal enemy, the Iranians? Wolfowitz blustered ferociously about all the classified information the CIA was developing, none of which, of course, could be given in detail to us. I simply nodded.

Then I turned to General Meyers. “General, you must have provided the Director with the information about the attempted violations of the no-fly zone and the other provocations. We’ve been living with that for the last ten years. Is there anything different now than before? We’ve been containing these idiots just fine. Why stop?”

To his credit, General Meyers didn’t bluster and fulminate. Still, his responses were that Hussein seemed to be increasing the tempo of his provocations and that we were using a lot of resources to contain him. Worst of all, ever since the Gulf War, some of these guys thought combat was a video game.

I looked over at George Bush and shook my head. “Mister President, I have to tell you that this is very disturbing. I can see no good reason why we should go to war, which is what the Secretary and the Director and the Chairman want. Pardon my French, but Saddam Hussein is an asshole, not a threat, and we simply can’t go around killing assholes just because they are assholes. We will run out of bullets before we run out of assholes!” Cheney looked furious at this, but Condoleeza Rice looked amused. Powell simply looked thoughtful.

Bush nodded and held up a hand to forestall any responses. “Fair enough, Carl.” To Wolfowitz he ordered, “Paul, you need to get a lot more information before we can continue in this direction.”

After that we went on to other topics and areas of the globe. Later, I invited myself into the Oval Office and sat down with President Bush. “George, I won’t deny that I have my differences with some of these guys, but this is more than that. We’re not just talking about money. This isn’t about taxes or deficits or Wall Street. This is about sending young men and women to their deaths. Some of these guys think it’s going to be just like ten years ago, cheap and easy. That was a onetime thing, a once in a thousand years event. Real war is a lot messier, and it is never quick and easy. I am begging you, go slow on this.”

“Carl, I appreciate your thoughts. It is still too soon to know what we need to do. If I do have to send our troops in, I won’t do it lightly.”

I thanked him and left. I was not reassured. The idea of avenging his father’s ‘defeat’ rankled the man. Realistically, the Saudis would never have allowed us to go to Baghdad and depose Hussein. On the plus side, almost immediately afterwards, I was asked to a meeting with Colin Powell, who basically promised to keep me completely up to date on whatever Cheney and Wolfowitz and Meyers were up to. He was as concerned as I was.

A couple of months later we had a similar meeting, but to this one I made an invitation and brought in Richard Clarke, the Counter-Terrorism Adviser to the National Security Adviser. He put together a dog and pony show on what both he and I felt was a much more serious threat, Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. He mentioned Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda specifically, along with several other groups. The only thing that Bush and Cheney wanted to know was the kind of contacts they had with the Iraqis. Clarke gave them a funny look and glanced over at me, then said, “I’m sure the Iraqis are keeping track of them, simply because Al Qaeda wants to kill Saddam Hussein. Other than that, they have no involvement with them.”