27 conference dates: Letter, Robert Hutchins to Earle, Sept. 6, 1945, Edward Mead Earle Papers, loc. cit.
27 “The atomic bomb”: “Summary of the Meetings on Thursday, September 20: Mr. Viner’s Memorandum,” ibid.
27 “What difference”: Jacob Viner, “The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations” in Proceedings on the American Philosophical Society, Jan. 29, 1946, p. 54.
28 “agreement not to use”: Edward A. Shils, “Approach to the Problem,” Edward Mead Earle Papers, loc. cit.
28 “Proposals for the short-run”: William T. R. Fox, “Control of the Atomic Bomb Through Existing Types of International Institutions,” ibid.
28 “There is no need”: Norman Cousins, “Modern Man Is Obsolete,” Saturday Review of Literature, Aug. 18, 1945.
29 Browning poem: Frederick S. Dunn, “The Common Problem” in Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, p. 3.
29 publication dates: Frederick S. Dunn, “Report of the Yale Institute of International Studies 1945–46,” p. 2, Charles Seymour Papers, Box 87, #2 folder on IIS, Yale Univ.
29 source of title: Fox, “International Control of Atomic Weapons,” in Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, p. 181.
30 “one of the coolest”: Seymour, speech, “Yale Institute of International Studies Dinner, Jan. 29, 1946,” Charles Seymour Papers, loc. cit.
30 admired by officials: Frederick S. Dunn, “Report of the Yale Institute of International Studies 1945–46,” loc. cit.
30 State Department consultants and Research Counciclass="underline" Seymour speech, loc. cit.
30 “superiority is not”: Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, p. 46; cf. pp. 40–45.
30 “the primary targets”: Ibid., pp. 46–47.
31 “the number”: Ibid., p. 48.
31 “If 2,000 bombs”: Ibid.
31 “must fear”: Ibid., pp. 73–74.
31 “The first”: Ibid., p. 76.
32 “Everything about”: Ibid., p. 52.
3: PLANNING FOR WAR
33 Kennan article: X, “The Source of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
33 “the fact remains”: Brodie, “The Atom Bomb As Policy Maker,” Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1948, p. 30.
33 “requires appraisal”: Ibid., p. 24.
34 Times articles: New York Times, Nov. 9, 1947; Brodie refers to this in Brodie, “New Techniques of War and National Policies,” W. F. Ogburn, ed., Technology and International Relations (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 163–64, which consists of speeches at a May 1948 symposium.
34 eight bombs tested (as of 1948): Brodie, “The Atom Bomb As Policy Maker,” loc. cit., p. 16.
34 uranium scarce: Brodie, “New Techniques of War and National Policies,” loc. cit., pp. 163–64.
34 on three-to-one margin: Brodie, “The Atom Bomb As Policy Maker,” loc. cit., p. 28.
34 margin favors U.S.: Ibid., pp. 28–29.
34 survey of military thinking: Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 3, LRS folder, UCLA; his findings were published in “War Department Thinking on the Atomic Bomb” and “Navy Department Thinking on the Atomic Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June and July 1947.
34 War Department paper: U.S. War Department, “The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on National Security,” Mar. 1947; Brodie’s reaction in “The Atom Bomb As Policy Maker,” loc. cit., p. 31.
35 “What we need to know”: Ibid.
35 book plans: Frederick S. Dunn, “Report of the Yale Institute of International Studies, July 1, 1949-June 30, 1950,” A. Whitney Griswold Papers, Box 126, folder 1153, Yale Univ.; and Letter, Earle to Brodie, Jan. 30, 1950, Edward Mead Earle Papers, Box 10, B folder, Princeton Univ.
35 read Survey, talked with Anderson and Kaysen: Letter, Brodie to Earle, Aug. 15, 1950, ibid.
35 air power as decisive: See Generals H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Army Flyer (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942); on Douhet, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), Pt.l; and Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 8.
36 dwellings destroyed, people killed, but no effect: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), Sept. 30, 1945, pp. 1, 3–4. See also Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), Chaps. 13–15.
36 20 percent of bombs in target area: The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), p. 5.
36 German economy: Ibid., pp. 5–7, 12; Galbraith, op. cit., pp. 204–06, 210–12; Burton H. Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959).
37 results too late: Brodie, “Strategic Bombing: What It Can Do,” The Reporter, Aug. 15, 1950; quote, p. 29.
37 bombing as adjunct to ground forces: Brodie, “Strategic Implications of the North Atlantic Pact,” Yale Review, Dec. 1949, p. 206.
37 “strategic bombing would be”: Brodie, “Strategic Bombing: What It Can Do,” loc. cit., p. 28.
37 “had given very little”: Ibid., p. 30.
37 “the biggest single factor”: Ibid., p. 28.
37 illogical aim points: Ibid., p. 31.
38 “we cannot accept”: Ibid.
38 Norstad and Vandenberg read piece: Letter, Brodie to Col. John R. Maney, Sept. 21, 1953, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 9, Air War College Correspondence folder; and letter, Brodie to David A. Rosenberg, Aug. 22, 1977, Brodie Papers, Box 9, Pending folder.
39 “may attack”: JCS 2081/1, End. B, Feb. 13, 1950, JCS 1954–56 File List, 471.6 USSR (11-8-49), Sec. 2, NA/MMB.
39 Korea just a ploy: See NSC-76, July 10, 1950, Collection of NSC Documents, Box 5, NA/MMB; Brodie, “Schlesinger’s Old-New Ideas,” unpublished paper, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 33, folder 8.
39 “strategic air offensive”: Cited in JCS 2056/7, Aug. 12, 1950, Records of JCS, CCS 373.11 (12-14-45), Sec. 2.
39 Offtackle and target appendix: Walter S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. IV, 1950–52 (JCS Historical Division, 1979), pp. 161–64. The appendix was called JCS-2056.
39 panels on whether A-attack would stop Soviets: See especially the so-called Harmon Report, JCS-1953/1, May 12, 1949, Records of JCS, CCS 373 (10-23-48), B.P., NA/MMB.
39 fewer than 300: War plan Offtackle called for using 290 A-bombs, and it is noted elsewhere that the target annex for Offtackle was not a study stating requirements, but was rather intended to provide the maximum damage possible with the small number of bombs the U.S. had at the time. For 292, see WSEG Report #1 in JCS-1952/11, Feb. 10, 1950, p. 194, B.P., Pt. 2C; for nature of annex, see JCS-1953/12, End. B, Apr. 24, 1950; in JCS File List 1951–53, CCS 373 (10-23-48) and (10-23-58), respectively, NA/MMB.