79 “not so absolute”: Ibid., p. 10.
79 “makes strategic bombing”: Ibid., p. 20.
79 Clausewitz: Ibid., pp. 3–4; for Brodie’s earlier view, see Brodie, “The Security Problem in Light of Atomic Energy,” Quincy Wright, ed., A Foreign Policy for the United States (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 89.
80 “national objectives”: Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” loc. cit., p. 22. Cf. letter, Brodie to Prof. [T.] C. Schelling, Jan. 9, 1957, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 2, Schelling folder.
80 “We seem to be”: Ibid., p. 20. In retrospect, it appears that NATO forces were probably never so overwhelmingly outnumbered on the ground. See Andrew Cockburn, The Threat (New York: Random House, 1983), Chapter 6.
80 “Strategic bombing has”: Ibid., p. 21.
80 “if…”: Ibid., pp. 28–29.
81 Oppenheimer and Vista: Philip M. Stern, The Oppenheimer Case (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971).
81 Brodie and Oppenheimer: In the J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, LoC, see: letter, Brodie to Oppenheimer, Sept. 22, 1947, Box 18, Br folder; letter, Brodie to Oppenheimer, Feb. 26, 1951, and memo, “Proposed Study of Strategic Air Warfare,” Box 1972, Strategic Air Warfare folder (the memo is unsigned and undated, but it is clear from style and substance that the author is Brodie—also the memo and the Feb. 26 Brodie letter are the only two items in the folder); letter, William T. Golden to Oppenheimer, Feb. 27, 1951, Box 36, Golden folder. Also Memo for File, Conversation with Oppenheimer, Feb. 27, 1951, in William T. Golden private papers, “Government Military-Science Research: Review for the President of the United States, 1950–51” (thanks to Mr. Golden).
81 briefing: Implications of Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons, RAND R-237, July 10, 1952 (FOIA/USAF).*
82 people briefed: Norman Moss, Men Who Play God: The Story of the H-Bomb, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 60; and interviews.
82 “Ernie Plesset and I”: Memo from Brodie, re: attached letter from Gen. Wilson, Mar. 24, 1952, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 9, Air War College folder. Brodie notes that the “mention of Ernie’s name and the omission of Charlie Hitch’s was simply to help Wilson identify the subject, which apparently he did….”
82 tritium: Moss, op. cit., p. 60; and interviews.
83 Teller and Frisch: Ibid., p. 71.
84 security risk: Stern, op. cit.; In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
84 Griggs and Oppenheimer: Stern, ibid., pp. 91, 182–85, 187–92, 194, 348–52, 363–64, 508; quote, p. 185.
84 “It’s a boy.”: Moss, op. cit., p. 78.
6: THE VULNERABILITY STUDY
86 Paxson and systems analysis: RAND lecture to group of USAF officers by Dr. E. W. Paxson, “Aerial Bombing Systems Theory and Analysis,” Sept. 24, 1947 (provided to author); and interviews.
88 systems analysis and uncertainties: See E. S. Quade, “Pitfalls of Systems Analysis,” Quade, ed., Analysis for Military Decisions: The RAND Lectures on Systems Analysis (New York: American Elsevier Pub. Co., 1970).
89 Air Force on Paxson bomber: Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), p. 105.
89 costs for 3,000 versus 3,600 miles: Chart is reproduced in A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz, H. S. Rowen, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, RAND R-266, Apr. 1954, p. 64; cf pp. 23–24, 63, 65.
90 dilemmas: Ibid., pp. 57–59; interviews reveal that this was the beginning point of Wohlstetter’s analysis.
91 “the analysis of systems”: Project RAND, Fourth Annual Report, RAND R-184, Mar. 1, 1950, p. 27, in Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-101, RAND folder, LoC.*
91 McKinsey and game theory: J. C. C. McKinsey, Introduction to the Theory of Games (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952); The Annals of Mathematics Studies, Princeton Univ., 1950, No. 24.
91 Paxson and game theory: See his correspondence with von Neumann, John von Neumann Papers, Box 25, RAND folder, LoC.
93 “‘Pearl Harbored’”: WSEG Report #1, JCS 1952/11, Feb. 10, 1950, p. K-61, JCS File List 1951–53, CCS 373 (10-23-48), B.P. Pt. 2C, NA/MMB.
93 “Soviet forces are”: reprinted in ibid.
93 “We would be”: LeMay, “The Mission, Organization and Capabilities of the Strategic Air Command,” lecture, Air War College, June 1, 1950, p. 15, Max. AFB.
93 LeMay and intercontinental bomber: Ibid.; memo, LeMay to Thomas Finletter, Mar. 11, 1950, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-64, Diary Jan.-June 1950 folder.*
95 “Most Sophisticated”: “Senior Mind,” The Campus, Mar. 5, 1934, City College of New York Archives Library.
98 number of planes and bases: Wohlstetter et al., op. cit., pp. 3, 5.
99 SAC operations: Ibid., pp. 3ff.
99 vulnerability: Ibid.
99 120 bombs: Ibid., p. xxiii.
99 every conceivable way: Smith, op. cit., p. 207; and interviews.
99–100 conclusions: Wohlstetter et al., op. cit., pp. xxii–xxiv.
100 Paxson-inspired questions: Cf. ibid., p. 13.
100 cost and target comparisons: Ibid., pp. xxxvi–xxxvii.
101 Carswell tornado: Memo, Vandenberg to Curtis LeMay, Sept. 11, 1952, Hoyt Vandenberg Papers, Box 45, Strategic Command folder;* its significance to the Wohlstetter study came from interviews.
101 wind gusts of forty-kiloton bomb: Author’s calculation, based on Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer in back of Samuel Glasstone, ed., Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1977).
102 R-244-S: This became the summary at the beginning of R-266, referred to above as Wohlstetter et al.
104 ninety-two briefings: Smith, op. cit., p. 219; and interviews.
104 SAC get in first blow: see, e.g., memo, Col. D. O. Monteith to Col. Watson, “A Brief Resume of RAND Report R-266, ‘Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases,’” Apr. 8, 1955, p. 3, Radford File, CJCS 381, NA/MMB; and interviews.
104 SAC resistance: Smith, op. cit., p. 222; and interviews.
104 “On some Mondays”: “Question and Answer Period at National War College,” Mar. 28, 1950, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-64, Diary folder.*
104 Ad Hoc Committee: Smith, op. cit., pp. 223–24.
105 White interview: Ibid., pp. 224–25; and interviews.
105 Soviet H-bomb: Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: Freeman Press, 1976), p. 10; and interviews.
105 “That the vulnerability”: Memo, Gen. Robert Burns, “Decision on AFC 22/4b: Vulnerability of the Strategic Striking Complex,” Nov. 2, 1953, Nathan Twining Papers, Box 103, Air Force Council Chief of Staff Decisions, Vol. I, Tab 22/4b, LoC.*