208 Barlow-Digby study: Staff Report: Air Defense Study, RAND R-255, Sept. 1, 1951, and Air Defense Study, RAND R-227, Oct. 15, 1951; both in Curtis LeMay Papers, B-101 RAND folder, LoC.*
208 counterforce as alternative: Digby, op. cit., p. 3.
209 “principal deterrent”: Albert Wohlstetter and Fred Hoffman, Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s, RAND R-290, Sept. 1, 1956, p. 89.
211 ATD-751 in EWP: A letter to Loftus from Col. Gordon M. Graham, Chief of Target Analysis Division, dated May 1, 1953 (provided to author), reads: “The highest tribute which can be paid you… is the recent approval without modification of the results of your work by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Digby, op. cit., also refers to how counterforce “seems to have pervaded U.S. plans in the past year. SAC now accords it the highest priority, and apparently finds that the JCS agrees.” (p. 3) Digby must have learned this from Loftus. (And interviews.)
214 “surprise (‘sneak’) attack”: Herbert Goldhamer and Andrew W. Marshall with the assistance of Nathan Leites, The Deterrence and Strategy of Total War, 1959–61: A Method of Analysis, RAND RM-2301, Apr. 30, 1959, pp. iii, 2 (FOIA/DoD).*
214 “utilities or values”: Ibid., p. iv.*
215 “Very likely”: Ibid., p. 109.*
215 “utility to the Soviet”: Ibid., p. 11.*
215 “might be worthwhile”: Ibid., pp. 109–10.*
215 “trying to estimate”: Ibid., p. 64.*
216 “We believe”: Ibid., p. 22.*
218 “managed”: William W. Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” Kaufmann, ed., Military Policy and National Security, p. 128.
218 “messages”: Ibid., p. 113.
218 “have a good chance”: Ibid.
219 “Constant Monitor”: From Brodie, “Strategy Hits a Dead End,” Harper’s, Oct. 1955, p. 37; footnoted in Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” p. 119.
14: DR. STRANGELOVE
220 “first came in contact”: Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), p. 484. (All page numbers refer to 1969 2nd-edition paperback published by The Free Press.)
221 Monte Carlo and H-bomb: RAND Staff Report R-192, June 1, 1950; and interviews.
222 Brodie and two million: Kahn, op. cit., p. 169; and interview.
223 “Doomsday Machine”: Ibid., pp. 144ff.
223 44 “rungs”: Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).
223 Credible-First-Strike: Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, passim, especially pp. 27–36; on Not-Incredible, see p. viii.
224 tit-for-tat: Ibid., p. 282n. This is not actually a Kahn term, but he sticks by it.
224 I, II, III: Most lengthily discussed in ibid., pp. 126–38, 138-44, and 126-37 and 285-86, respectively.
224 “If the Soviet”: Ibid., p. 143; for more on “blackmail,” see pp. 165ff., 174, 348, 463.
224 “Deterrence Gap”: Ibid., pp. 201, 474.
224 Munichs or Pearl Harbors: Ibid., pp. 286, 377, 403ff., 411ff., 476, 562.
224 “our negotiators”: Ibid., p. 221.
224 “however the next”: Ibid., p. 463. Obviously, as detailed in a later chapter, the real crises of 1961 and 1962 turned out quite differently.
225 “The whole purpose”: Ibid., p. 647.
225 “Any power”: Ibid., p. 213.
225 “perfectly conceivable”: Ibid., p. 649.
225 “Insofar as”: Ibid., pp. 647–48.
225 “an adequate”: Ibid., p. 516; and interview.
226 Kahn civil-defense team: The resulting report was A Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, RAND R-322-RC, July 1, 1958, of which Chap. 2 in OTW is a sort of summary.
226 radiation meters: Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pp. 626ff.
226 Goldhamer and Marshall and counterforce: The Deterrence and Strategy of Total War, 1959–61, RAND RM-2301, Apr. 30, 1959, p. 124 (FOIA/DoD).*
226 “winning”: Letter, Kaufmann to Gen. Thomas White, Feb. 18,1960, p. 6, Thomas White Papers, Box 36, Missiles/Space/Nuclear folder, LoC.*
226 “war-fighting”: Letter, Frank Collbohm to Gen. White, July 25, 1960, Thomas White Papers, Box 37, RAND folder; that Kaufmann wrote the letter comes from interview.*
226 “Will the Survivors”: Title of Chap. 2, Kahn, On Thermonuclear War; “Tragic But Distinguishable,” ibid., p. 20.
226 5,000 people: Ibid., p. xxvi.
227 30,000 copies: Norman Moss, Men Who Play God, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 279.
227 “Now just imagine”: Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 86.
228 “War is a”: Ibid., pp. 45–46.
228 “the increase would”: Ibid., p. 21.
228 “we can imagine”: Ibid., p. 646.
228 “This is”: James R. Newman, “On Thermonuclear War,” Scientific American, Mar. 1961.
228 Kahn and Flanagan: Letters, Kahn to Flanagan, Mar. 6, 1961; Flanagan to Kahn, Mar. 15, 1961 (provided to author).
228 Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962); and interview.
229 “The one circumstance”: Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 158; Kahn even italicizes this passage.
229 “seven optimistic”: Ibid., p. 84.
229 “However, experience”: Ibid., p. 81.
229 “The A food”: Ibid., p. 66.
230 “comes from assuming”: Ibid., p. 67.
230 “a nation like”: Ibid., p. 91 (emphasis added).
230 “did not look”: Ibid.
230 “all these things”: Ibid., p. 92.
230 “How much confidence”: Ibid., p. 94.
230 “We may not”: Ibid., p. 95.
231 Dr. Strangelove: In researching the film, Stanley Kubrick discussed strategy at great length with such people as Kahn, Kaufmann, Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling and others. (Interviews.)
231 “to create a”: Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 5.
231 “more reasonable”: Ibid., p. 240.
15: THE REAL RIVALRY
232 “Admirals’ Revolt”: See Warner R. Schilling, “The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950,” in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962).