329 “Nothing is more”: Report, Taylor to Kennedy, Nov. 3, 1961, in Pentagon Papers: The Defense Dept. History of U.S. Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel Edition, Vol. II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 654.
329 targets political and psychologicaclass="underline" Pentagon Papers, Vol. Ill, p. 272.
329 “use selected”: Memo, Bundy to Johnson, “Basic Recommendation and Projected Course of Action on Southeast Asia,” May 25, 1964, National Security File, Aides’ File, Box 1, McGeorge Bundy, Memos for President, Vol. 4, LBJL.
329 “kill the hostage”: McNamara, Report on Honolulu Meeting, Pentagon Papers, III, p. 706.
330 Kaufmann-Schelling-nuclear-Vietnam connection: Thomas Schelling notes the resemblance between his own limited-war theories and the Ann Arbor speech, and also likens them to early Vietnam strategy, in Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 24–26, 154, 162–65, 190–92, 75–76, 79, 83–86, 141ff., 166–76; for Kaufmann statements, see chap. 12.
330 “enlightening similarities”: The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge/Harvard University Press, 1960).
331 “non-zero-sum games”: Ibid., pp. 83–118.
331 Schelling and arms controclass="underline" Ibid., pp. 205–229; Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: 20th Century Fund, 1961); “Reciprocal Fear,” “if the advantage,” p. 231, and Chap. 9, Strategy of Conflict.
332 “still be capable”: Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, pp. 252–53.
332 “The power to hurt”: Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. v, 2, 3.
332 “War is always”: Ibid., p. 142.
332 “the bargaining power”: Ibid., p. 31.
333 McNaughton and Test Ban Treaty: David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 442 (paperback ed.).
333 “small, tightly knit”: Memo, Bundy to Johnson, “Planning Actions on Southeast Asia,” May 22, 1964, National Security File, Aides’ File, Box 1, McGeorge Bundy, Memos for President, Vol. 4, LBJL.
333 “use selected”: Memo, Bundy to Johnson, May 25, 1964, ibid.
333 “we should watch”: Memo, McNaughton to McNamara, Sept. 3, 1964, Pentagon Papers, III, pp. 558–59.
334 Bien Hoa: Ibid., p. 288.
334 “Option C”: Ibid., p. 600.
334 target was the wilclass="underline" Ibid., p. 289.
335 March 2: Ibid., p. 272.
335 “The situation”: Memo, McNaughton to McNamara, “Proposed Course of Action Re Vietnam,” Mar. 24, 1965, ibid., pp. 694–700.
335 “If anything”: Ibid., pp. 352–53.
335 “that it will take”: Ibid., p. 706.
336 “almost ineradicable”: Reprinted in McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 142.
336 “regarded as a test”: Memo, McNamara to Johnson, “South Vietnam,” Mar. 13, 1964, National Security File, Aides’ File, Box 1, McGeorge Bundy, Memos for President, Vol. 2, LBJL.
336 “a gross” and “The United States”: McNamara, The Essence of Security, p. 148.
336 “to meet”: Ibid., pp. 148–49, 150.
336 “Who is man?”: Ibid., p. 158.
336 “international”: Ibid., p. 144.
336 cool facade crumbled: Henry L. Trewhitt, McNamara (New York: Harper &Row, 1971), pp. 230–31.
337 military do productive things: McNamara, The Essence of Security, p. 151.
337 landlords, job training: Ibid., pp. 122–40.
337 “McNamara’s gone dovish”: Trewhitt, op. cit., p. 270. 337 much more satisfying: Ibid., p. 296.
337 Ellsberg and war criminals: See Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), pp. 275–309.
337 Pentagon Papers: On the case, see Peter Schrag, Test of Loyalty (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974); Harrison Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor (New York: Times Books, 1980).
338 Brodie and France: Letter, Brodie to William Marvel, May 9, 1960, and to Peter Caws, Sept. 17, 1965, both in Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 3, Carnegie Corp. folder; and interviews.
338 Gallois position: E.g., Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); Raymond Aron, The Great Debate (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), especially Chap. 4; and interviews.
339 only one who had thought about strategy before: Brodie made this point frequently: e.g., Brodie, The American Scientific Strategists, RAND P-2979, Oct. 1964; and interviews.
339 envy of Wohlstetter: For sampler, see letter, Brodie to Colin Gray, Aug. 11, 1975, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 8, G folder; see also Brodie, “The McNamara Phenomenon,” World Politics, July 1965, a very revealing article, a deprecating review of William Kaufmann’s semiofficial chronicle, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), a review that Brodie saw as a major statement separating himself from his former brethren. He wrote his friend Peter Paret that the review “has been hanging over my head for months” (Brodie Papers, Box 2, P folder), sent reprints of it to dozens of friends, and told Pierre Gallois, “I think you will like it because I am mean” (Brodie Papers, Box 1, G folder). Kaufmann personally considered the book a “potboiler… about 50% McNamara and others, and about 50% me” (letter to Brodie, Brodie Papers, Box 1, K folder). That Brodie felt this way in the early 1960s as well is confirmed by interviews.
339 “between the use”: Brodie, The Meaning of Limited War, RAND P-1222, June 10, 1958, p. 19; also in Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), p. 327.
339 “the idea that”: Letter, Brodie to Fred Ikle, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 1, I folder; he made the same point in numerous articles in the mid-1960s, as cited below.
339 “the significant name”: Brodie, “Disarmament Goals and National Security Needs,” lecture, Iowa State, Mar. 17, 1960, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 17.
339 “I think the balance”: Brodie, “On Predicting Weapons Systems, Especially Nuclear Strategic Systems,” lecture, IIS/CEIP conference, June 17–19, 1970, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 6, last folder.
339 “It may indeed”: Brodie, “How Probable Is General War?,” RCAF College Journal (1961), in Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 10, Shorter Reviews 1944–65 folder; also in “Defense Policy and the Possibility of Total War,” Daedalus, Fall 1962, p. 741.
339 “Unless we are”: Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, RAND RM-4544-PR, June 1965, p. 38.
340 “Everything we know”: Brodie, “What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?,” RAND P-2696, Feb. 1963, p. 20; a shortened version appeared in The Reporter, May 23, 1963.