340 “violence between”: Ibid., p. 28. Cf. pp. 19ff.; letter, Brodie to Eugene Rabinowitch, June 20, 1963, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 1, R folder; Brodie, The Political Dimension in National Strategy, UCLA Security Studies Paper #13, 1968, p. 40; Brodie, “The Strategic Issue: Has NATO a Future?,” lecture, Aug. 1967, Brodie Papers, Box 20, Book Reviews 1966–67; Brodie, “U.S. Strategic Policies,” lecture, Mar. 1969, p. 26, Brodie Papers, Box 6, last file; letter, Brodie to Stansfield Turner, Jan. 16, 1976, Brodie Papers, Box 9, T folder.
340 no inclination to invade: Brodie, memo, “Afterthoughts on CWE from the Meeting (with Herr Erler) of April 16,” Apr. 22, 1963, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 18.
340 “tends to displace”: Letter, Brodie to Thomas Schelling, Dec. 15, 1964, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 2, Schelling folder; cf. “What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?,” pp. 23, 31; Escalation and the Nuclear Option, p. 46.
341 “Thus far”: Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 76. He cites this in his last published article, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security, Spring 1978, p. 65.
341 Vietnam failure: Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1971–72, p. 159; and interviews.
341 “have almost universally”: Brodie, “Learning to Fight a Limited War,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 1967; and interviews.
341 “It is an old”: Brodie, Japan Lecture #7, undelivered, pp. 3, 4, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 33, folder 7.
342 “simply playing” and “The rigidity”: Ibid., p. 6; and interviews.
24: THE ABM DEBATE
343 “of all”: In Richard Pfeffer, ed., No More Vietnams? (New York: Harper &Row, 1968), pp. 1–6.
343 1946 and 1956 decisions: Fred A. Payne, “A Discussion of Nike-Zeus Decisions,” unpublished paper, 1964 (provided to author).
344 “Such a weapon”: Memo, W. E. Bradley to Dr. Killian, “Effectiveness of the Nike-Zeus System Against ICBM Attack,” Oct. 29, 1958, White House Office file, Office of Special Assistant for Science & Technology, Box 4, AICBM (1), DDEL. Information about RBIG comes from Payne, op. cit., and interviews.
344 “decoys,” radar attacks, blackout: Memo, Bradley to Killian, ibid.
344 nuclear tests and blackout: James Killian reported this to Eisenhower on Feb. 25, 1958. See A. J. Goodpaster, Memo of Conference, Feb. 25, 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 30, Staff Notes, Feb. 1958, DDEL; for further detail, see Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin, “Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems,” Scientific American, May 1968.
344 PSAC report: “Report of the AICBM Panel,” May 21, 1959, White House Office File, Office of Special Assistant for Science & Technology, Box 4, AICBM (1), DDEL; and interviews.
345 Army 7,000 missiles: Memo, Robert McNamara to Kennedy, Appendix II, “Program for Deployment of Nike-Zeus,” Sept. 30, 1961, p. 13, National Security File, Box 275, DoD, Defense Budget, FY63, 11-12/61, JFKL.
345 McNamara twelve batteries: Ibid., p. 12.
345 McNamara reasons for limited: Ibid., pp. 2, 9–11. The same points were made in a report otherwise highly critical of Nike-Zeus by McNamara’s R&D office, “ODDR&E Assessment of Ballistic Missile Defense Program,” Apr. 17, 1961, p. 8 (FOIA/DoD).*
345 Bell memos: Memo, Bell to Kennedy, “FY 1963 Defense Budget Issues,” Nov. 13, 1961, pp. 3–1, 3–2, National Security File, Box 275, DoD, Defense Budget, FY63, 11-12/61, JFKL; and interviews.
346 nearly $500 million a year: In 1964, McNamara requested $400 million for FY66 funds for Nike-X R&D; in 1965, he asked for $417 million and in 1966 for $420 million. This was in addition to money for Project Defender, an R&D program to look into technology for more advanced ABMs. Spending on Defender ranged from $113 million in 1961 to $130 million in 1965. On Nike-Zeus funding, see Memo, Cyrus Vance to Johnson, “Summary of Force Structure Changes,” Dec. 14, 1964, National Security File, Agency File, Box 11–12, DoD, Vol. II, LBJL; DPM, McNamara to Johnson, “Recommended FY 1967–71 Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces,” Nov. 1, 1965, p. 3 (FOIA/DoD);* DPM, McNamara to Johnson, “Recommended FY68–72 Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces,” Nov. 9, 1966, p. 2 (FOIA/DoD).* On Defender, see memo, David Bell and Jerome Wiesner to McGeorge Bundy, “Request for DX Priority Rating for Project Defender,” Sept. 25, 1962, National Security File, Box 339, NSAM 191, JFKL; and DPM, McNamara to Johnson, op. cit., Nov. 1, 1965, p. 37.*
346 December 6 meeting: Edward R. Jayne II, “The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security,” Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 1969, p. 338.
346 January meeting with science advisers: Ibid., p. 347; Anne Hessing Cahn, “Eggheads and Warheads: Scientists and the ABM,” Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 1971, pp. 38–39. Those present were James Killian, George Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, Donald Hornig, Herbert York, Harold Brown, John S. Foster, Jr.
347 China rationale: Memo, McNamara to Kennedy, “Program for Deployment of Nike-Zeus,” Appendix II, Sept. 30, 1961, National Security File, Box 275, DoD, Defense Budget, FY63, 11-12/61, JFKL; memo, Henry Glass, “Record of Meeting on DoD FY 1967 Budget (Nov. 9, 1965),” Nov. 10, 1965, National Security File, Agency File, Box 14–17, DoD FY67 Budget Book, LBJL; memo, McNamara to Johnson, “Defense Department Budget Issues to Be Raised by the Joint Chiefs,” Dec. 9, 1965, National Security File, Agency File, Box 11–12, DoD, Vol. Ill, LBJL; DPM, McNamara to Johnson, op. cit., Nov. 1, 1965, p. 36 (FOIA/DoD);* memo, McNamara to Johnson, Dec. 13, 1966, Confidential File, Box 69, ND 10 Preparedness, LBJL.
348 San Francisco speech split in book: Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), Chap. 4 and Appendix I; and interviews.
348 Wohlstetter China threat: Stanford Research Institute (for Army Deputy C/S, Military Operations), Report to Secretary of Defense, Nike-X Deployment Study, Oct. 1, 1965, Appendix E, Annex 6, ‘The Question of Bypassing BMD Through Sabotage or Clandestine Delivery,” by A. Wohlstetter, p. E-6–5; cf. Annex 2 to the same study, “Ballistic Missile Defense and ‘Asian Hostages to China,’” by A. Wohlstetter, F. C. Iklé, A. M. Jonas, L. Sloss (FOIA/Army).*
349 Wohlstetter on proliferation: E.g., Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+l Country,” Foreign Affairs, Apr. 1961; and interviews.
349 Bethe/Garwin article: “Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems,” Scientific American, May 1968.
350 scientists had been in PSAC, RBIG: See PSAC, “Report of the AICBM Panel,” May 21, 1959, p. 15 for members, White House Office file, Office of Special Assistant for Science & Technology, Box 4, AICBM (1), DDEL. Rathjens, Kistiakowsky and Doty were not on the panel, but all were active in PSAC. They also took part in a PSAC “MIDAS Panel,” which also explored ABM technology; see “Ad Hoc Midas Panel,” ibid., AICBM (3); and memos, Rathjens, Sept. 9, 1960, Rathjens to Panofsky, Oct. 7, 1960 and Nov. 23, 1960, Bethe to Rathjens, Oct. 26, 1960.
350 scientists testify: See especially Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Pt. I, Mar. 1969; Hearings, Senate Armed Services Committee, Authorization for Military Procurement & R&D, FY 1970, Pt. 2, 1969.