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I must also thank the four professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where I happily attended graduate school in political science, who first plunged me into the bizarre discourse on nuclear strategy: William Kaufmann, George Rathjens, Jack Ruina and Kosta Tsipis. Kaufmann plays a major role in this book, Rathjens and Ruina minor ones; I hope that my respect for them has not tarnished the objectivity with which I have tried to tell the story of which they are a part.

Many long months went into the writing of this book, and I am forever indebted to those who helped along the way. My literary agent, Raphael Sagalyn, perused the entire manuscript, offering friendly encouragement and cogent criticism at every step, dispelling every nasty stereotype I once held of agents. Jonathan Coleman provided crucial support at an early stage of the project. My editor, Alice Mayhew, and her associates, David Masello and Ann Godoff, supervised the project with exceptional intelligence, insight and care. Later on, the copyeditor, Patricia Miller, checked facts and consistently with impressive diligence. Marion Osmun of Touchstone was helpful on the paperback edition. Throughout, many friends listened to my tales from the typewriter with welcome patience and convincing fascination. And for all that and much more, I thank Brooke Gladstone, best friend, wise counsel, sharp eye and sensitive ear, who was always there to show me the other half of the sky.

FRED KAPLAN
Washington, D.C.
November 1982

INDEX

Aaron, David, 370–72

ABM (anti-ballistic missile), 234, 320–24, 343–55

—Chinese A-bomb as rationale for, 347–48

—defeat of, 344

—development of, 343–44

—futility of, 322, 347

—and McNamara, 345, 346–48

—national debate over, 349–55

—Nike-X missile, 345–48

—Nike-Zeus missile, 343–45

—operations research and, 353–54

—opposition to, 349–50

—Safeguard missile, 350–55

—as SALT bargaining chip, 354

—Sentinel missile, 350

—Spartan/Sprint missile, 345

—Wohlstetter/Rathjens debate on, 351–55

ABM Treaty (1972), 354

Absolute Weapon, The (Yale Institute of International Studies), 29–32, 34, 47, 85, 190, 235, 259, 340–41, 371

Acheson, Dean, 82, 137–40, 183, 387

—in Cuban missile crisis, 305

—militaristic views of, 139

—in 1961 Berlin crisis, 293–94, 299, 301

—on NSC-68, 140

Agnew, Harold, 362

Air Force, U.S., 10, 40, 44–45, 85, 103–6

—Atlas program accelerated by, 116

—city destruction policy as weakness of, 236–37

—coercive strategy revived by, 356–60

—counterforce strategy and, 245, 315–16

—early planning in, 40

—first-strike capability and, 331

—hardened shelters resisted by, 167

—Kaufmann monograph and, 195

—MIRV deployment by, 364

—MX proposed by, 385

—Navy rivalry with, 232–46

—NU-OPTS strategy studied by, 358–59

—SIOP and, 263–69

see also Strategic Air Command, U.S.

Air Force Development Planning Office, 115

Air Force Intelligence, 41–42, 109

—on Bison bomber production, 156–60

—budgetary pressure on, 160–61

—CIA estimates challenged by, 159–60

—civilians vs. military in, 212

—Discoverer photos and, 287–88

—end of deterrence predicted by, 155

—Soviet air base data collection by, 209–11

—Soviet missile force estimated by, 161–66, 168, 242, 287–88

—Target Programs office of, 209–12

Air Force Project RAND, 56, 59–61, 62

Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 114–16

—Albania, 271–72

America (magazine), 312

America’s Strategy in World Politics (Spykman), 20

Anderson, Orvil, 35

Annals of Mathematics Studies, The, 91

Arms and Influence (Schelling), 332

arms control, 27–29, 32, 313n, 331, 381n

arms race:

—counterforce targeting and, 244

—NAVWAG on, 234–35

—Prisoner’s Dilemma and, 66–67

—size of forces and, 234

Armstrong, DeWitt, 296, 302–3

Armstrong, Hamilton, 171

Army, U.S.:

—atomic weapons downplayed by, 182

—conventional defense favored by, 194–97

—Kaufmann monograph and, 194–97

—Nike-Zeus supported by, 345

—on Soviet ground power, 182

—on Soviet ICBM estimates, 288

Army Air Force, U.S., 36

—OR in, 52, 54, 56–61

Army Intelligence, 159, 165–66, 242

Arnold, Henry “Hap,” 43, 54–61, 111–12

Aron, Raymond, 338, 340

Arrow, Kenneth, 91

Assured-Destruction strategy:

—as deterrence strategy, 317

—development of, 317

—military weapons requests and, 318

ATD-751, 210–11

Atlas Missile Project, 111–16

—accuracy requirement for, 112–14, 116

—Convair requirements for, 112–13

—projected deployment of, 155

atomic bomb:

—as absolute weapon, 29

—defenses against, 25–26

—diminishing returns from, 31, 108

—naval strategy and, 25–26

—number and use of, 34–38, 46–48

—political implications of, 26

—protection of, 31–32, 47

—strategic consequences of, 25–27, 30–38

—surprise attacks and, 27

—target selection for, see targeting strategy

—wars shortened by, 25

see also nuclear weapons; strategy, nuclear

Atomic Bomb and American Security, The (Brodie), 27, 30

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 82, 84

Atwood, Harry, 54–55

Augenstein, Bruno, 112–16, 237

Aurand, E. P., 268

B-1 bomber, 389

B-29 Special Bombardment Project, 57

B-36 bomber, 232–33

B-47 bomber, 255

B-52 bomber, 106, 255

Baldwin, Hanson, 34

Barlow, Ed, 208, 216

basing, bomber:

—Ad Hoc Committee recommendations on, 105–6

—location dilemma in, 90–91, 97–102

—post-strike support from, 107

—Soviet H-bomb and, 105–6

—vulnerability in, 86, 92–94, 97–102

Baxter, James Phinney, III, 128–29, 136

Beaufre, André, 284, 338, 340

Bell, David, 254, 345

Berlin airlift (1948), 291

Berlin crisis (1958–59), 291–92

Berlin crisis (1961), 293–304, 378

—allied responses planned in, 302–3

—Berlin Wall begun in, 298

—border crossings closed in, 303

—civil defense and, 309

—ending of, 303–4

—mobilization plans ordered in, 297–98

—nuclear war as option in, 298–301, 304

—Soviet conventional force advantage in, 295

—U.S. contingency plan for, 299–301

—U.S. simulation war game on, 301–2