I must also thank the four professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where I happily attended graduate school in political science, who first plunged me into the bizarre discourse on nuclear strategy: William Kaufmann, George Rathjens, Jack Ruina and Kosta Tsipis. Kaufmann plays a major role in this book, Rathjens and Ruina minor ones; I hope that my respect for them has not tarnished the objectivity with which I have tried to tell the story of which they are a part.
Many long months went into the writing of this book, and I am forever indebted to those who helped along the way. My literary agent, Raphael Sagalyn, perused the entire manuscript, offering friendly encouragement and cogent criticism at every step, dispelling every nasty stereotype I once held of agents. Jonathan Coleman provided crucial support at an early stage of the project. My editor, Alice Mayhew, and her associates, David Masello and Ann Godoff, supervised the project with exceptional intelligence, insight and care. Later on, the copyeditor, Patricia Miller, checked facts and consistently with impressive diligence. Marion Osmun of Touchstone was helpful on the paperback edition. Throughout, many friends listened to my tales from the typewriter with welcome patience and convincing fascination. And for all that and much more, I thank Brooke Gladstone, best friend, wise counsel, sharp eye and sensitive ear, who was always there to show me the other half of the sky.
INDEX
Aaron, David, 370–72
ABM (anti-ballistic missile), 234, 320–24, 343–55
—Chinese A-bomb as rationale for, 347–48
—defeat of, 344
—development of, 343–44
—futility of, 322, 347
—and McNamara, 345, 346–48
—national debate over, 349–55
—Nike-X missile, 345–48
—Nike-Zeus missile, 343–45
—operations research and, 353–54
—opposition to, 349–50
—Safeguard missile, 350–55
—as SALT bargaining chip, 354
—Sentinel missile, 350
—Spartan/Sprint missile, 345
—Wohlstetter/Rathjens debate on, 351–55
ABM Treaty (1972), 354
Absolute Weapon, The (Yale Institute of International Studies), 29–32, 34, 47, 85, 190, 235, 259, 340–41, 371
Acheson, Dean, 82, 137–40, 183, 387
—in Cuban missile crisis, 305
—militaristic views of, 139
—in 1961 Berlin crisis, 293–94, 299, 301
—on NSC-68, 140
Agnew, Harold, 362
Air Force, U.S., 10, 40, 44–45, 85, 103–6
—Atlas program accelerated by, 116
—city destruction policy as weakness of, 236–37
—coercive strategy revived by, 356–60
—counterforce strategy and, 245, 315–16
—early planning in, 40
—first-strike capability and, 331
—hardened shelters resisted by, 167
—Kaufmann monograph and, 195
—MIRV deployment by, 364
—MX proposed by, 385
—Navy rivalry with, 232–46
—NU-OPTS strategy studied by, 358–59
—SIOP and, 263–69
—see also Strategic Air Command, U.S.
Air Force Development Planning Office, 115
Air Force Intelligence, 41–42, 109
—on Bison bomber production, 156–60
—budgetary pressure on, 160–61
—CIA estimates challenged by, 159–60
—civilians vs. military in, 212
—Discoverer photos and, 287–88
—end of deterrence predicted by, 155
—Soviet air base data collection by, 209–11
—Soviet missile force estimated by, 161–66, 168, 242, 287–88
—Target Programs office of, 209–12
Air Force Project RAND, 56, 59–61, 62
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 114–16
—Albania, 271–72
America (magazine), 312
America’s Strategy in World Politics (Spykman), 20
Anderson, Orvil, 35
Annals of Mathematics Studies, The, 91
Arms and Influence (Schelling), 332
arms control, 27–29, 32, 313n, 331, 381n
arms race:
—counterforce targeting and, 244
—NAVWAG on, 234–35
—Prisoner’s Dilemma and, 66–67
—size of forces and, 234
Armstrong, DeWitt, 296, 302–3
Armstrong, Hamilton, 171
Army, U.S.:
—atomic weapons downplayed by, 182
—conventional defense favored by, 194–97
—Kaufmann monograph and, 194–97
—Nike-Zeus supported by, 345
—on Soviet ground power, 182
—on Soviet ICBM estimates, 288
Army Air Force, U.S., 36
—OR in, 52, 54, 56–61
Army Intelligence, 159, 165–66, 242
Arnold, Henry “Hap,” 43, 54–61, 111–12
Aron, Raymond, 338, 340
Arrow, Kenneth, 91
Assured-Destruction strategy:
—as deterrence strategy, 317
—development of, 317
—military weapons requests and, 318
ATD-751, 210–11
Atlas Missile Project, 111–16
—accuracy requirement for, 112–14, 116
—Convair requirements for, 112–13
—projected deployment of, 155
atomic bomb:
—as absolute weapon, 29
—defenses against, 25–26
—diminishing returns from, 31, 108
—naval strategy and, 25–26
—number and use of, 34–38, 46–48
—political implications of, 26
—protection of, 31–32, 47
—strategic consequences of, 25–27, 30–38
—surprise attacks and, 27
—target selection for, see targeting strategy
—wars shortened by, 25
—see also nuclear weapons; strategy, nuclear
Atomic Bomb and American Security, The (Brodie), 27, 30
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 82, 84
Atwood, Harry, 54–55
Augenstein, Bruno, 112–16, 237
Aurand, E. P., 268
B-1 bomber, 389
B-29 Special Bombardment Project, 57
B-36 bomber, 232–33
B-47 bomber, 255
B-52 bomber, 106, 255
Baldwin, Hanson, 34
Barlow, Ed, 208, 216
basing, bomber:
—Ad Hoc Committee recommendations on, 105–6
—location dilemma in, 90–91, 97–102
—post-strike support from, 107
—Soviet H-bomb and, 105–6
—vulnerability in, 86, 92–94, 97–102
Baxter, James Phinney, III, 128–29, 136
Beaufre, André, 284, 338, 340
Bell, David, 254, 345
Berlin airlift (1948), 291
Berlin crisis (1958–59), 291–92
Berlin crisis (1961), 293–304, 378
—allied responses planned in, 302–3
—Berlin Wall begun in, 298
—border crossings closed in, 303
—civil defense and, 309
—ending of, 303–4
—mobilization plans ordered in, 297–98
—nuclear war as option in, 298–301, 304
—Soviet conventional force advantage in, 295
—U.S. contingency plan for, 299–301
—U.S. simulation war game on, 301–2