—ABM advocated by, 346
—ABM war game of, 320–21
—Assured Destruction attacked by, 324
—atomic weapon use planned by, 183
—Berlin crisis contingency plans of, 296
—counterforce strategy as weapons rationale in, 316
—Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan of (1956), 196
—limited nuclear option of, 370–71
—McNamara’s questions for, 273
—National Strategic Target and Attack Plan (NSTAP) of, 267–68
—SIOP-62 and, 269–70
—on Soviet SLBMs, 320
—targeting questions for, 264
—war plan of, 277–79
Joint Intelligence Committee, 39, 44–45, 93
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 277–79
Joint Strategic Operational Plan (JSOP), 277
Joint Strategic Survey Committee (of JCS), 22
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), 269, 365
Jones, Ed, 107
Jones, T. K., 379, 388
Jordan crisis (1970), 370
Kahn, Herman, 76, 101, 119, 123, 129–30, 207, 219–31, 237, 328, 377–78, 384
—background of, 220
—civil-defense program advocated by, 225–26, 309
—on counterforce targeting, 222
—Credible-First-Strike Capability advocated by, 223–25
—“Doomsday Machine” of, 223
—escalation theory of, 223
—free-market system and, 229–30
—as Gaither Committee consultant, 129–30, 225–26
—interwar deterrence plan of, 223–24
—multi-option war plan advocated by, 223–25
—nuclear strategy studied by, 222–27
—on post-nuclear war society, 227–30
—public lectures by, 226–28
—SAC and, 222–23
—Soviet nuclear blackmail threat seen by, 224
—style of, 222, 226–27
—systems analysis and, 221–22
Kaplan, Abraham, 69
Kaufmann, William, 50, 123, 144, 186–200, 217–20, 226, 237–46, 367
—on arms race, 244
—Assured Destruction strategy and, 326
—background of, 186–89
—“bonus” strategy as seen by, 219
—Clausewitzian outlook of, 199–200
—as consultant to Schlesinger, 372–74
—counterforce study at RAND by, 217–19, 237–45
—in Kennedy administration, 253, 256–58, 260–62, 272, 283–85, 294–97
—on limited war, 197–200, 326–27
—McNamara’s Athens speech written by, 283–85
—on massive retaliation, 190–92
—1961 Berlin crisis and, 294–97, 299, 302–3
—on Polaris, 237–39
—at Princeton, 189
—at RAND, 189, 201–4, 217–19, 238–47
—reserve force advocated by, 218–19
—on Soviet reaction to counterforce strategy, 244
—strong conventional forces advocated by, 191–92
Kaysen, Carl, 35, 206, 249, 257
—fallout shelters studied by, 307–10
—in 1961 Berlin crisis, 296–300, 302
Keegan, George, 167–68, 288
Keeny, Spurgeon, 130, 209
Kellogg-Briand Pact, 13
Kennan, George, 33, 138–39, 195, 197
Kennedy, John F., 11, 248–52, 256–57
—Academic Advisory Group of, 249–50
—civil defense and, 307, 309–14
—Communist expansionism and, 292–93
—counterforce strategy and, 282
—counterinsurgency plans under, 328
—in Cuban missile crisis, 305
—defense appropriations supplement requested by, 297
—Khrushchev met by, 293
—massive retaliation rejected by, 328
—on missile gap, 248–49
—Nike-Zeus and, 345
—in 1961 Berlin crisis, 293–99
—on nuclear war, 284–85
—as RAND’s ideal candidate, 250
—SAC vulnerability decried by, 249
Kennedy, Robert, 282, 309–10, 328
Kennedy Administration, 248–62
—Berlin crisis options in, 295–304
—European nuclear arms opposed in, 338
—fallout shelters studied in, 307–14
—missile gap rejected in, 286–88
Kenney, George, 43
Kent, Glenn, 276–77, 320–25, 362
Kent, Sherman, 157
Khrushchev, Nikita, 135, 142, 160, 292–94
—on Berlin occupation, 292
—in Cuban missile crisis, 304–6
—Kennedy met by, 293
—1961 Berlin crisis and, 293–94, 304
Killian, James R., Jr., 127, 146–47
Killian Panel, 130–31
King, Ernest J., 18
Kirk, Grayson, 22
Kissinger, Henry, 249, 296–99, 302, 373, 380
—ABM deployment and, 350–51
—Foster Panel and, 369
—limited nuclear option and, 370–71
—massive retaliation opposed by, 366
—Soviet SS-9 missiles and, 351
Kistiakowsky, George, 115, 268–69
Klein, Burt, 206
Knorr, Klaus, 21, 188
Komer, Robert, 302
Korean War, 39, 81, 140, 177, 185–86, 193
Kosygin, Aleksei, 346
Laird, Melvin, 351, 353–54, 368–69
Lanphier, Thomas, 163–64
Lasswell, Harold, 25, 72
Latter, Albert, 221, 361–62
Latter, Richard, 221, 361–62
Lay, James, 126
Layman’s Guide to Naval Strategy, A (Brodie), 9, 18
Leach, Barton, 249
League of Nations, 12–13
Leites, Nathan, 17, 213, 338, 340
LeMay, Curtis E., 42–44, 57, 59, 68, 74, 148, 210, 280
—on bomber basing, 93
—counterforce targeting rejected by, 240
—Gaither Committee and, 132–34
—intercontinental bomber favored by, 106
—Japan bombed by, 42–43
—preemptive strike as policy of, 134
—SAC competence under, 43–44, 132–34
—SAC independence guarded by, 104
—on Soviet capabilities, 142–43
—Whiz Kids and, 255–56
Lemnitzer, Lyman, 270–74
Library of Congress, 34
Life, 310
Lilienthal, David, 24
limited war strategy, 197–200, 326–27, 330–32
—counterforce and, 218–19
—game theory and, 199
—management of, 198
—nuclear weapons in, 191, 198
—real-life problems in, 334–35
—stalemate as goal of, 198–99
Lindsay, Franklin, 152
Lipp, Jim, 76–78, 114, 207
Livermore Laboratory, 220–21
Lodal, Jan, 370–71
Loftus, Joseph, 209–13, 216–17, 219, 240
—at RAND, 212–13, 216–17, 219
—Soviet air base vulnerability studied by, 209–11
Los Alamos scientists, H-bomb opposed by, 83
Lovett, Robert, 82, 129, 137, 251
Luce, Clare Booth, 135
Lukeman, Bob, 276–77
Lutz, Robert J., 97, 104, 106
Lynn, Larry, 367
McCloy, John, 129, 146–47, 149–50
McCormick, L. D., 182
McElroy, Neil, 149–51, 168
McFarland, Earl, 163–64
McGarvey, Dave, 237, 240–43
McHugh, L. C., 312
McKinsey, J. C. C., 91, 97
McNamara, Robert S., 11, 250–62, 270–73
—Assured Destruction criterion of, 317–19
—Athens-Ann Arbor speech of, 283–85, 315–16
—background of, 250–51
—on causes of wars, 336
—counterforce strategy and, 262, 274, 281–83, 315, 319, 325–26
—in Cuban missile crisis, 304
—damage-limiting strategy of, 318–19, 321–26
—disillusionment of, 336–37
—DPMs of, 281–82, 315–20, 325–26, 363–64
—on effects of “Rolling Thunder,” 335
—first-strike capability and, 316