—“General War Offensive Package” of, 272–73
—ICBM production increased by, 306
—limited war strategy and, 327
—NcNaughton and, 333, 337
—Minuteman program reduced by, 325
—MIRV and, 325–26, 363–64
—missile gap rejected by, 286–88
—Nike-X opposed by, 346–48
—Nike-Zeus endorsed by, 345
—in 1961 Berlin crisis, 297–99
—“96 Trombones” of, 273–79
—on SIOP-62, 270–72
—on Soviet SLBMs, 320
—Vietnam War and, 329–30, 336–37
—vulnerability lessened by, 273–74
—world growth and development supported by, 337
—WSEG-50 and, 258–59
McNaughton, John, 302, 332–35
—on failure of “Rolling Thunder,” 335
—McNamara and, 333, 337
—Vietnam War plans of, 333–35
Makers of Modern Strategy (Earle), 17
Malenkov, Georgi, 105
Marshall, Andrew, 92, 123
—counterforce and, 205–7, 209, 212–17, 219, 222, 226, 372, 384
—in Defense Department, 372
—Gaither Committee and, 213
—in Kennedy campaign, 250
—in Reagan administration, 387
Marshall, George C., 178
Martin, James, 367–69
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 56–57, 126
Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack (Killian Panel), 131
Merriam, Charles, 13
Military Policy and National Security (Kaufmann), 197–200
Millikan, Clark, 115
Minuteman missiles, 255, 257
—inflexible programming in, 280
—modification of, 280–81
—reduction of, 325
—vulnerability of, 351–54, 361
Minuteman II missiles, 325
Minuteman III missiles, 363–64
MIRVs (Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicles), 325–26, 351, 354, 360–64
—as counterforce weapon, 363–64
—Soviet target shape and, 362
—technology developed for, 362–63
—vulnerability from, 361
missile gap, 155, 161–73, 248–49, 286–90
—as “deterrence gap,” 169–73
—lack of evidence for, 155, 162–66, 287–90
—Wohlstetter on, 171–73
missiles:
—defenses for, see ABMs
—support equipment for, 164–65
—see also specific missiles
Mitchell, Billy, 35–36, 54–55
MK-12 warhead, 363
Morgenstern, Oskar, 66
Morse, Philip, 355, 390
Mosley, Phil, 171
Murphy, Charles, 140
“Must We Shoot from the Hip?” (Brodie), 207
MX (Missile Experimental), 385–87
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE):
—1956, 156–60
—1957, 155, 161
—1959, 161, 164–65
—1960, 287–89
—1969, 351
National Policy Implications of Atomic Parity (NAVWAG-5), 234–36
National Security Council, 125–27, 140
—Army strength and, 196
—civil defense studied by, 126–27
—Gaither Report and, 149–50
—NSDM-242 and, 372–73
—Planning Board of, 126
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242, 369–70, 372–73
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) No. 3, 366–67
National Strategic Target List (NSTL), 264, 267
NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Naval Warfare Analysis Group (NAV-WAG), 234–36
—on arms race, 234–35
—conventional forces supported by, 235
—SAC dominance denounced by, 234
Navy, U.S.:
—A-bomb denounced by, 232–33
—“Admirals’ Revolt” in, 232–33
—Air Force rivalry with, 232–46
—atomic weapons acquired by, 182, 233
—Brodie’s books used by, 17–18
—mutual deterrence policy of, 236
—Pacific Command (PacCom) of, 275–76
—Polaris project of, 131, 233–38, 244
—Soviet ground power and, 182–83
—on Soviet ICBM estimates, 288
—see also Office of Naval Intelligence
Neumann, Franz, 72
Newman, James R., 228
Newsweek, 312
New York Herald Tribune, 50
New York Times, 9, 34, 76, 153, 195, 312, 337
“Next Ten Years, The” (Brodie-Hitch-Marshall), 207
Nitze, Paul Henry, 136–41, 152–53, 183, 185–86, 195, 197, 249, 285, 326, 332–33, 387
—in Committee on the Present Danger, 379–80
—on counterforce strategy, 300–301, 379
—in Defense Department, 252–53, 275, 279
—J. Dulles disliked by, 185
—on flaw in cities targeting, 377–78
—and Gaither Report, 136–41, 145
—limited war strategy and, 327
—massive-retaliation speech rejected by, 185–86
—military buildup recommended by, 140
—in 1961 Berlin crisis, 299–303, 378
—NSC-68 and, 139–41
—nuclear blackmail feared by, 377
—nuclear debate controlled by, 379–81
—in Reagan administration, 386
—SALT II opposed by, 377–78, 381
—on Soviet military intentions, 139–40, 377
—writing skill of, 138
Nixon, Richard M., 152–53, 366–67, 369
—ABM system under, 350–55
no-cities strategy, see counterforce strategy
Norstad, Lauris, 38, 45, 49, 145
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):
—American strategy for, 338
—counterforce and, 217–19
—independent nuclear forces for, 283–85
—IRBMs deployed by, 291
—joined by West Germany, 291
—McNamara speech to, 283–85
—1961 Berlin crisis and, 294
—U.S. nuclear shield and, 182, 283–85
—U.S.-supplied nuclear weapons for, 202
NSC-68, 140
Nuclear Targeting Policy Review, 383–84
nuclear war:
—controlled response in, 273–74
—deaths from, 125–26
—food after, 229–30
—post-war conditions, 227–30
—protracted, 383–84
—rational control of, 327
—strategies for, see strategy, nuclear; and specific strategies
—two-way nature of, 48, 274
nuclear weapons:
—controlled use of, see counterforce strategy
—proliferation of, 202–3
—see also specific weapons
Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (NUWEP), 369
“Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?” (Brodie), 191
NU-OPTS project, 356–60, 368
—dissent to, 359–60
—operational defects of, 359
—targeting in, 358–59
Odeen, Philip, 369
Office of Civil Defense Mobilization (OCDM), 307
Office of National Estimates (ONE), 157, 159
Office of Naval Intelligence, 18–19, 165–66, 242
Ofstie, Ralph, 232
Oliver, Edward P., 128, 216–17
On Thermonuclear War (Kahn), 227–28, 230–31, 328, 377
Operational Code of the Politburo, The (Leites), 76
operations research, 52–57
—reality as test of, 355
—in World War II, 53–54
Operations Research, 353–54
Operations Research Society of America (ORSA), 353–55
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 63, 81, 84
Packard, David, 350, 353, 379