Panofsky, Wolfgang, 344–45
Parrish, Noel, 239–40, 243, 245, 261, 282
Patterson, Robert, 58
Paxson, Ed, 78, 86–91, 206
—bomber design attempted by, 88–90
—style of, 86
Pearl Harbor, Japanese attack on, 17, 92, 109
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Wohlstetter, R.), 92
Pentagon Papers, 337
Perkins, James, 128, 171
Perle, Richard, 387–88
Plesset, Ernst, 74–78, 81–84, 111, 115, 123, 191, 220
Polaris A-3 missile, 343–44
Polaris submarine, 131, 233–38, 244
—SIOP and, 263–68
—Whiz Kids’ support of, 255
Power, Thomas S., 68, 102, 166, 236, 245–46, 262
—counterforce briefings and, 246
—McNamara briefed on SIOP-62 by, 270–72
—SIOP and, 266–69
—Soviet ICBM force estimate and, 287
—style of, 245–46
Powers, Francis Gary, 286–87
Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship (RAND), 60
Presidential Directive (PD)-18, 383
Presidential Directive (PD)-59, 383–84, 389
Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 344–45
Prim, Robert, 128
Princeton Center of International Studies, 50, 186, 189, 193, 201
Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, 16–17
Princeton University Press, 9, 16, 17, 18, 227
Proctor, Ed, 157–59
Project East River, 126
Project Vista, 81, 84
Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s (RAND), 121, 125, 129–31, 144, 166–67, 209
Quade, Edward S., 88, 206
Quarles, Don, 150–51
Rabinowitch, Eugene, 24
Radford, Arthur W., 175–76, 180, 183–84, 194, 196, 232–33
—on atomic weapon use, 196
—on New Look policy, 183–84
Ramo, Simon, 115, 117
RAND Conference of Social Scientists, 70, 72
RAND Corporation, 10–11, 50–52, 58–124
—air base location studied at, 90–94, 97–110
—Air Force-Navy conflict and, 237–46
—atmosphere at, 51, 62
—basing briefings by, 103–4
—bomber design study at, 88–90, 98
—cuunterforce studied at, 204–9, 212–19, 240–44
—Douglas Aircraft and, 58–61
—economic division of, 63, 68, 70–73, 203
—Fourth Annual Report of, 91
—game theory at, 67–68, 91, 214
—H-bomb briefings by, 81–82
—H-bomb consequences researched by, 74–81, 108
—ICBM research at, 111–24
—as independent non-profit corporation, 61–62
—Kennedy campaign and, 249–50
—legacy in 1980s, 386–89
—missile gap discussed at, 169–70
—new generation of strategy at, 357–58, 390
—NIEs withheld from, 170
—NU-OPTS strategy studied at, 357–60
—origins of, 52, 58–59
—physics division at, 74–76, 220–21
—publicity eschewed by, 170
—quantitative analysis dominant at, 121
—SAC vulnerability studied at, 117–21
—simulation games at, 201–2
—social science division of, 63, 68–70, 72–73, 76, 201–2, 228–29
—strategic community at, 123–24
—Strategic Objectives Committee at, 207–9, 222, 378
—Strategic Offensive Forces study of, 216–17, 237
—systems analysis at, 86–91
—Uniform Random Drops Model at, 241
—Vietnam War debate at, 360
Raskin, Marcus, 299–300, 307–10
Rathjens, George, 269, 351–55
Rationale for NU-OPTS (Schlesinger), 358
Raymond, Arthur, 56–59, 61
Reagan, Ronald, 386–89
Reagan Administration:
—Committee on the Present Danger and, 386
—counterforce strategy in, 386–87
—defense spending in, 389
—nuclear strategy of, 387–90
—nuclear war conceivability in, 388–89
Reedy, George, 135
Reentry Body Identification Group, 343
Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security (Bissell-Nash-Nitze), 137–38
Reporter, The, 38, 193
“Requirements of Deterrence, The” (Kaufmann), 186, 193–97
Revised Development Program for Ballistic Missiles of Intercontinental Range, A (RAND), 116
Rinehart, John, 135
Rockefeller, Nelson, 127, 307, 309
Roper, Elmo, 152
Rosten, Leo, 68–70, 72
Rostow, Eugene, 379–80, 386
Rostow, Walt, 279, 328–29, 346
Rowe, David, 22
Rowen, Henry, 97–104, 106, 240, 250, 252–53, 256, 262, 275, 283, 285, 294, 384
—Assured Destruction strategy and, 326
—limited war strategy and, 327
—1961 Berlin crisis options and, 296–99, 302–3
R-290, see Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s
Ruina, Jack, 345
Rumsfeld, Donald, 380
Rusk, Dean, 297
SAC Intelligence:
—SIOP and, 267–68
—Soviet missile forces estimated by, 288–89
SALT I, 354, 377
SALT II, 377, 380–82
Samuelson, Paul, 249
satellites, reconnaissance, 286
Saturday Evening Post, 255, 257
Saturday Review of Literature, 28
Schelling, Thomas, 302, 330–33, 358
—arms control and, 331
—limited war advocated by, 330–32
—on Vietnam War escalation, 334–335
—war and bargaining as seen by, 330–31
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 195, 249, 298, 312
Schlesinger, James R., 357–59, 368–69
—Committee on the Present Danger and, 379
—counterforce feasibility doubted by, 357–58
—as Defense Secretary, 372–79
—flexibility and selectivity supported by, 374, 376
—graduated reprisals strategy and, 358
—NSDM-242 supported by, 372–73
—on perceptions in international relations, 376–77
—refined first-strike capability sought by, 375–76
—style of, 357
—targeting strategy change publicized by, 373
Schriever, Bernard, 103, 115–16
Schulman, Hyman, 374–75
Scientific American, 228, 349
Scoville, Herbert (Pete), Jr., 162, 269
Sea Power in the Machine Age (Brodie), 16–17
“Security Policy for Postwar America, A” (Rye conference), 22
Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (RAND), 106
Selin, Ivan, 365–67
Senate, U.S., 12, 349
—ABM funding by, 354
—Armed Services Committee of, 352
—Foreign Relations subcommittee of, 352
—missile gap and, 168–69
sensitivity analysis, 170
Shils, Edward, 24–25, 28, 50
Shoup, David, 270
simulation games, 201–2
Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 262–72
—civilian casualties from, 365
—first Planning Conference for, 266–67
—increasing Soviet strength and, 364–65
—“minimum number” of targets in, 267–68
—multiple bombing of targets in, 268–69
—origin of, 263–66
—weapons requirements exaggerated in, 268–69
SIOP-62, 269–72
—Albania in, 271–72
—China in, 269–70
—fallout anticipated from, 268, 271
—Plan 1-A of, 271
SIOP-63, 279
Skifter, Hector, 128, 130
SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), 320