The design like that of the Tiger was more about over engineering and craftsmanship than designing a tank that could be quickly and easily produce in vast numbers.
One example is that of suspension with a torsion bar as opposed to the more traditional leaf spring design. Torsion bar suspension gave a better ride but offered no tactical advantage. The Panther also had complicated interleaved road wheels leading to added manufacturing costs and maintenance issues. This meant the Panther could never be produced in the numbers required just like the Tiger and it would always be outnumbered.
In September 1942, Hitler demanded that armoured production reach 1,400 vehicles per month by spring 1944, including 600 Panthers. The Adolf Hitler Panzer Program put forward by Albert Speer’s Ministry of Armaments and War Production in January 1943 was only 1,200 armoured vehicles per month. Infuriated, Hitler summoned Speer for a meeting at which he increased the production objective to 1,500–2,000 vehicles per month. This was comparable to Soviet or American production. Again, the complex designs and continued bombing of factories in Germany meant this target was never met. However, Hitler did manage to double tank production as greater priority was given to armoured vehicle production. In 1942, 6,180 vehicles were produced and in 1943, 12,013 vehicles were produced.
Reliability dogged the Panther with around one-quarter of the Panther tanks deployed in the panzer regiments being operational at any given time. Teething problems with any new system is commonplace, but the Panther was worse than average. One example was the Panther’s AK 7-200 transmission. It had been designed for mass production and in doing so compromises had been made to speed up production. The original MAN proposal had called for the Panther to have a planetary gearing system in the final drive, like that used in the Tiger I. A shortage of gear-cutting machine tools and that the Panther was intended to be mass-produced numerous compromises were made against the designers wishes. The compromises effectively weakened the transmission.
Multigeared steering that permitted the Panther to pivot turn by running the tracks on one side in one direction and the other in the opposite direction. This meant the Panther could turn on its own pivot. However, this just added to the already badly overstressed transmission as this high-torque method of turning could cause failures of the final drive and caused premature stripping of the third gear. The more serious transmission problem was the final drive, which had a nominal life expectancy of 1000 miles. In practice, this was sometimes as low as 100 miles. Another factor was the difficulty in getting to the transmission for repairs, which necessitated a full strip down of the front portion of the tank just to get to the transmission. The single-teeth spur gears tended to strip more readily than the more robust double herringbone design used on other tanks such as the American M4 Sherman. To replace the transmission, the mechanics had to unbolt a heavy rectangular plate from the hull roof above the radio operator. The mechanics would need to unbolt the transmission from the hull and drive shafts, before a crane was used to lift it out of the tank. Before a new one was lowered in and bolted down. This could take nearly a day for a skilled team of mechanics.
Although, some shortcomings were slowly addressed over the Panthers service life particularly in 1943. One example being the Panther’s engine compartment that had been designed to be waterproof. This had led to engine overheating due to poor ventilation in early Panthers. Fuel connectors on the early Panthers were non-insulated, leading to the leakage of fuel fumes into the engine compartment. This led to engine fires in the early Panthers. Extra ventilation was added to draw off these gases. Although this only partly solved the problem of engine fires. To reduce this problem, the coolant circulation inside the motor was improved and they added a reinforced membrane spring to the fuel pump. The Panther had a very solid firewall to protect the crew from an engine fire.
The Panther’s operational rate rose from a very low 16% at the end of July 1943 nearly double but still poor 37% by December 1943. An improved version, confusingly called the Panther Ausf. A, entered production in August 1943. This version standardized improvements that had been gradually introduced into the Panther Ausf. D and included an improved turret with a new commander’s cupola. Additional changes continued to be incorporated into the design through 1943 and into 1944. These improvements began to influence the availability rate of the tanks deployed on the Eastern Front, going 37% percent in February 1944 to 78% by the end of May 1944.
The German tank industry was spared from major strategic bomber attacks through 1943, and none of the Panther tank plants were significantly bombed until summer 1944. This aided in Panther production although the goal of 600 per month was never reached. However, the Allies realised that Panthers and Tigers were powered by Maybach engines, the Maybach plant was struck by the RAF on the night of April 27 and 28, 1944. This halted Maybach engine production for five months. Thankfully, a second source of engines from the Auto-Union (now Audi) plant at Siegmar was secured. To aid in production the Panther design was simplified. Such as a simplified side armour plate design, which also increased side armour protection from 40 to 50mm. Many small changes were also introduced, including redesigned hull crew hatches, a new traversable driver’s periscope mounting, and an improved power train cooling system. The Panther was one of the best tanks of WWII and its design helped post-war American, British and Russian tank designs. Its delicate transmission and the lack of certain alloys due to war shortages was the main reason its impact in battle was not as big as it could have been.
General Heinz Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of the Panthers in July 1943:
Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days. By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the front line. 25 Panthers had been lost as total writeoffs (23 were hit and burnt and two had caught fire during the approach march). 100 Panthers were in need of repair (56 were damaged by hits and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown). 60 percent of the mechanical breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair service… On the evening of July 11, 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total write-offs and 131 were in need of repair. A slow increase in the combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to July 10) attests to the heavy fighting.
CHAPTER NINE – Counter Attack
June 1943
The Panthers and Tigers along with German infantry were eager to counter attack. They were determined to drive the Soviets back. The Panther crew had faith in their tank with its high-velocity cannon and good, sloped armour protection. Crews felt further reassured having four Panthers and six Tigers to push home the counter attack. They would still not have the numerical advantage though. As soon as it was dawn and the smallest glimmer of light began to appear on the gleaming white horizon – crews made final preparations. The Panther crew closed their hatches and the commander slid down into the turret before closing his hatch. He made use of his periscope to survey the area in front. Looking at the landscape and trying to see both areas that were good for cover and areas that an enemy tank may use to conceal itself. The early morning mist gave the tanks a little bit of cover as they moved forward into their attack positions. The gunner kept his eye on the gun sight triangle to line up with a target. As the Panther bounced up and down on the rough terrain. The loader behind him was holding the next round ready to load. T-34s had been spotted but had not yet come into sight. Finally, a T-34 popped out of the early morning mist about 1000 yards away. The commander rotated the turret onto the target and gave the gunner final control of moving the gun onto the target. Once the triangle reticule was on the target the shot was all lined up. The T-34 appeared on ground below the Panther just to its left and its distinctive shape was unmistakable. The gunner placed the triangle on the turret as the lower part of the tank was concealed by dead ground. The panther gunner fired. The round burst out of the Panthers breach. The Panther bucked gently, as the muzzle brake and hydraulic dampers absorbed the gun’s recoil. The long 75mm gun could achieve the same velocity as the 88mm on the Tiger, but with a muzzle brake and damper system the recoil did not make the Panther move about very much. The AP round hit the T-34 in the turret. Before the Panthers shell case had dropped into the anti-gas box. The T-34 got a shot off after seeing the muzzle flash from the Panther. The Panther had managed to partly conceal itself at the edge of the village. The shot missed but the Panthers shot knocked the T-34s turret clean off. A second T-34 came into view and the Panther gunner aimed a shot at the front corner trying to hit the front sprocket and disable the tank or get a round into the crew compartment. The round took the front sprocket clean off. It travelled several yards ripping off some track links. The T-34 moved a couple of yards’ further forwards before grinding to a halt. The T-34 had now presented its much weaker side armour to the Panther. The next round the Panther fired went straight into the middle of the side hull, towards the rear blowing the engine cover clean off. The force of the impact had compressed the diesel tanks causing an explosion that blew apart the engine and rear panels. The bright orange flame shot into the air and began to consume the tank and its crew. One of the crew flew out from an escape hatch completely on fire; he disappeared down the side of the tank. From behind the burning T-34, another two T-34s appeared, one of the other Panthers scored a direct hit straight into the ammunition storage area causing a massive explosion that flipped the tank onto its side. As the crew escaped, rounds from the Panthers MG cut them down before they got very far. Two T-34s had been taken out in a matter of minutes. This was just the start of a Red Army offensive. There would be more on their way, now they knew the Panthers position. This village for some reason seemed to be of great importance to the Soviets.