Field Marshal Manstein, who had been allowed to get away from the Caucasus, during February to March 1943, inflicted a crushing defeat on Soviet forces, retaking Kharkov and Belgorod. The Germans did not have enough firepower for Kursk, hence the Kursk Bulge, a projection going deep into the German front. Within that bulge, a powerful Soviet force was concentrated, and the Germans were out to get the Soviets in revenge for Stalingrad by encircling and routing them.
After June 1941, the Germans did not prepare any other offensive operation as thoroughly as they did Operation Citadel. Preparations continued for almost four months; the troops received a substantial amount of modern hardware and equipment, including Tiger and Panther tanks, Elefant self-propelled guns, FW-190 fighters, Ju-87 bombers.
Preparations were made amid the utmost secrecy, but that secret was known to everyone. The axis of the upcoming German strike was far too obvious. Soviet intelligence services merely confirmed the German plans. Soviet troops prepared for a counteroffensive operation just as thoroughly. The Soviets had never built such strong, deeply layered defensive installations.
It is a military-science axiom that an attacking force should have at least a 4 to 1 superiority over a defending force. At Kursk, in the summer of 1943, the Germans did not have any superiority at all. The Soviet Central and Voronezh Fronts had a 20 percent to 50 percent superiority over the opposing Centre and South Groups while there was also a whole reserve front – the Steppe Front, making Soviet superiority over the Germans more than twofold. To cap it all, they knew exactly when the German offensive was to begin.
In such conditions, Operation Citadel was a suicide mission for the Germans. It is worth mentioning that Hitler was well aware of that, but the German generals were resolved to take their revenge for the Stalingrad humiliation.
The offensive began on July 5, 1943. In less than a week, an armoured contingent of Tigers, Panthers, and Elefants, escorted by Ju 87s, despite fierce resistance by Soviet forces, breached all three defence lines of the Voronezh Front commanded by Gen Vatutin.
By July 12, the Germans gained operational depth. In order to rectify the situation, which was getting desperate, the Soviet command mounted a counter attack with the assets and forces of the Fifth Guards Tank Army under Gen Rotmistrov.
This would become the historic battle of Prokhorovka. It consisted of several separate smaller battles, the total number of Soviet tanks reaching 660 with the Germans having no more than 420. Due to the number of tans involved, Prokhorovka cannot be regarded as the largest tank battle in war history. Even during the Battle of Kursk there were more wide-ranging engagements, while in late June 1941 over 1,500 tanks on both sides had been involved in a battle in Western Ukraine.
The Soviets lost around 500 vehicles while the Germans lost around 200. With such Soviet losses, it was difficult for the Soviets to claim victory. As Rotmistrov himself recalled later, “when he learned about our losses, Stalin flew into a rage. After all, according to the Supreme High Command plans, the tank army was designed to take part in a counteroffensive, near Kharkov, but now it had to be reconstituted and reinforced.
The supreme commander decided to dismiss me from command and all but have me court-martialled.”
To analyse the battle of Prokhorovka, Stalin gave orders to set up a State Defense Committee commission, which judged the operation a classic failure.
Manstein’s victory, however, proved hollow. German losses were enormous even though they were smaller than Soviet losses. The Germans had no assets left to exploit their success. Gen Model, who attacked the Kursk Bulge from the north, moving toward Manstein, became stuck in the defence lines of the Central Front commanded by Gen. Rokossovsky.
On July 12, he was attacked from the rear, when Soviet Western Front troops began an advance on Orel. Finally, British and American troops landed on Sicily causing Hitler to panic. The subsequent course of the war showed that the allies did not have a chance on the Italian Front, but in July 1943, Hitler ordered troops to be redeployed from the Eastern Front to Italy. By July 17, 1943 Manstein began to retreat. The Germans ‘achieved a defeat,’ showing that they were still superior fighters while the Soviets ‘suffered a victory’ since the battle had from the start been hopeless for the Germans.
Everything could have been different at Kursk had the Germans attacked head on instead of the base of the bulge, where Soviet forces were expecting them. By attacking head on the Germans would have come across virtually no defensive lines. This would have meant they would have reached the rear service positions of both the Central and the Voronezh Front on the second day of the operation. This was exactly what Manstein wanted to do, and Marshal Zhukov recognized the danger after the war. Hitler was also inclined to support that plan.
But being products of the classical Prussian military school, Wehrmacht generals refused to break canons. They did everything properly and lost. After that, the Germans, having lost their elite units, were unable to attack successfully until the end of the war while the Soviets took another step to victory, once again paying an exorbitant price for that.
CHAPTER ELEVEN – Stuggered
January 1944
The crew of the Sturmgeschütz (StuG) IV had a young Danish driver who volunteered at the age of seventeen to join the Waffen SS. He was one of several Danish teenagers who had volunteered. They were intent on holding back the Soviets whom they hated politically. After his initial training the young driver was posted to an armour unit in Germany. The tank he had been allocated too was the StuG IV a self-propelled anti-tank gun based on the chassis of the Panzer IV chassis with a 75mm gun. Its high reliability with quite good armour protection and low profile made it easy to conceal. Along with the driver the StuG had two gunners’ and a commander all of German origin.
The crew had been sent to the Eastern Front. They loaded their StuG onto a rail car before making the long journey to their intended area of operations. Rail transport was used extensively to move armour to their area of operations. The StuG once unloaded and moving under its own power passed long lines of refugees fleeing the fighting in Russia. Some hated the Soviets as much as the Germans and wanted to get into areas liberated by the British and American forces. The StuG got itself dug into position by digging a large shell scrape to conceal itself. As well as two other StuGs on the left flank. There was a column of five Tigers ready to push forward. The commanding position the StuGs had placed themselves in offered a commanding view. Just behind them was a mortar team. The StuG crews made final preparations ready for the battle. The crew tried to get a few hours’ sleep on the hard, cold floor of the StuG. However, at low temperatures on a cold and hard metal floor it was hard to get comfortable.
As dawn drew near a heavy artillery barrage courtesy of the Red Army begun. The rounds impacted close to the StuGs sending shockwaves that were strong enough to rock the tank on its suspension. As well as artillery, the Soviets had Katyusha rocket launchers firing up into the dawn sky like a deadly firework display. Out of the gloom at the foot of the plain several IS-2 tanks came into view. These were formidable tanks and more than a match for the Tigers let alone the StuGs. The IS-2 had infantry soldiers hitching a lift huddled behind the main turret. The StuGs opened up their shells doing very little damage other than displacing the infantry riding on the rear. A total of eight IS-2s advanced at full pace firing on the German armour. A Tiger was knocked out almost instantly from a 122mm round that penetrated the left hand front corner of the Tiger. Killing three of the crew instantly as shrapnel flew around the interior of the tank inflicting fatal wounds. Rounds started to hit the StuGs but luckily, they did little damage initially as they were deflected by its armour. The StuGs concealment made them much harder to hit, especially in their weaker areas. The StuGs 75mm rounds continued to hit the IS-2s but still did not inflict anything more than very minor damage. The 88mm on the Tigers was having more luck. One hit from an 88mm round jammed the IS-2s turret and another blew another IS-2s track off. The Soviet infantry following the IS-2s and were much easier targets for the various MG gunners to cut down. Rounds from the IS-2s kept coming at quite a rate. Although the D-25T gun even with a semi-automatic breach could only fire up to two rounds a minute, which was slower than the Panther and the Tiger. Another issue for the IS-2s was that they only carried 28 rounds. This was due to limited space and size of the 122 mm rounds and using a separate shell and powder charge.