Stalin knew he had to deter any German attacks until the Red Army was ready to take on the German’s on a more even footing. The Red Army’s tanks corps had been disbanded in November 1939 only to be re-formed and double in size after the German victory in France. These corps would be equipped with the new KV-1 and T-34 tanks to replace the T-26 and BT series tanks. Over 5,000 of these new tanks were ordered and had to be ready to fully equip the Tank corps by mid-1942. However, Stalin realized the Germans were expanding their panzer divisions and wanted another 11,000 tanks to be produced and form an even larger Tank corps as quickly as possible. With plants operating at fully capacity this was unlikely to be met by late 1943. The reorganization and expansion of the Tank Corps led to disarray in June 1941.
Stalin like Hitler had made three assumptions. The first being that adequate warning of an impending German assault. Giving the Red Army time to prepare and deploy. The red Army also assumed it could hold its own against the Germans with adequate training, logistics and preparation. The third Soviet strategic assumption was that industrial mobilization was the key to victory and that campaigns would be decided by the side that had the greater ability to sustain its forces in protracted operations, not by fancy manoeuvres. Stalin’s misunderstanding meant the first assumption undermined the second assumption. This error led to the destruction of most of the pre-war tank force within the first three months of the German assault. However, unlike Hitler the third assumption did come to fruition and in turn enabled the second assumption to come to fruition. In this sense, Stalin and the Red Army ended up in a better tactical position. The Soviet numerical superiority acted as a counterweight to the superior panzer tactics.
Hitler had deployed four panzer groups for a total of seventeen panzer divisions and 3,106 tanks for Operation Barbarossa. In addition, two independent panzer battalions, Pz.Abt. 40 and Pz.Abt. 211, were deployed in Finland with 124 tanks (incl. twenty Pz.III). The 2 and 5. Panzer-Division were refitting in Germany after the Greek Campaign in April 1941 and were in reserve. Germany was in essence committing all of its Panzer divisions to Operation Barborossa. By mid-1941 the Germans were producing around 250 tanks a week.
The Red Army by June 1941 would deploy 9,500 tanks. The Germans based their assumptions and put together a handbook about Soviet tanks for the panzer groups, which described the various models of the T-26, T-28, T-35 and BT-5/ 7 in detail. The handbook also included information about a new Soviet heavy tank equipped with 60mm-thick armour and 76.2mm main armament that had been used against the Finns in December 1939; this was the SMK prototype, which the Germans mistakenly labelled as the T-35C. What was not fully realised was the existence of the KV-1, also trialled at the same time as the SMK. Only one SMK was ever made as it proved to not be a very good design after being used in the War in Finland. Although Kinzel was aware that the Soviets had fielded a prototype heavy tank eighteen months prior to Barbarossa. He felt though that existing anti-tank weapons would be able to defeat it.
Another issue was that German planners had no appreciation for the Soviet military philosophy of echeloned attack and defence, which meant that defeating the Red Army in a single campaign would prove far more difficult than the French Army in 1940. The entire essence of the so-called Blitzkrieg was to use concentrated armoured formations in short, powerful jabs to dislocate an enemy’s defence by isolating their best forces.
This would lead to the surrender of the forces cut off and surrounded. However, Stalin and his Red Army had no intention of surrendering. Especially when they realised Hitler wanted to exterminate them. They may as well fight to the death rather than become POWs and be killed any way. This so called ‘war of annihilation’ made it impossible for Hitler and his Wehrmacht to succeed against the Red Army. This was without factoring the harsh weather and terrain that the Germans had not foreseen or even planned for. The Red Army had already learnt these painful lessons about the limitations of mechanized units in forested terrain and winter conditions during the 1939–40 Russo-Finnish War. Another larger area that the Germans left unconsidered was the crossing the mass of Rivers in the Soviet Union. Although, the German had some amphibious tanks to aid in getting across rivers. However, the bridging capabilities of the 1941–42 panzer divisions were rather rudimentary –a Brüfckenkolonne B or K could construct a 50-meter long pontoon bridge in about twelve hours that could just support a Pz.III medium tank, but the Pz.IV and later Tiger and Panthers needed proper bridges to get across significant water obstacles. The Germans lagged behind the Allies in assault bridging, having nothing like the British Bailey bridge. When bridges or fording sites were not available, armoured operations came to a full stop.
CHAPTER SIX – Eastern Front
During the war on the Eastern Front both sides tended to claim every enemy tank hit as a ‘kill’, but a good percentage of hits either bounced off the armour or failed to penetrate. Based upon post-battle analysis of both sides’ records, the Germans appeared to have on many occasions exaggerated their tank ‘kills’ by up to 200 per cent and the Soviets by 500 per cent. Tanks are complex weapon systems that require several sub-systems and the crew to function properly in order to provide the vehicle with its key characteristics: firepower, protection, mobility and communications. Tank crews vary in size, with 4–5 being the normal size for a full-strength crew. Combat and noncombat casualties along with disease and sickness in winter months could reduce crews both in size and fighting ability. This was true of either a German or Red Army crew. It was essential that each member of the crew performed their designated task to the best of their ability for the tank to achieve its full capability. A poorly-trained loader might be the lowest man in the tank crew hierarchy, but his inability to reload main gun rounds quickly in combat could easily lead to his tank losing a gunnery duel against a faster opponent. The tank driver’s ability to manoeuvre over rough terrain and use cover and concealed approaches is critical for the crew’s survival. The driver needed to fully understand the tanks limits on different kinds of terrain.
Here is a diary extract from Unteroffizier Erich Hager, a Panzer IV driver in the 6 Panzer Regiment 39. This extract records his actions not far from Venev on the Eastern Front:
Now the fun starts… 42-tonner on fire. Great to watch. A bit further on another 2 down. We attack 13 tanks. One tank destroyed. LKWs on fire. Lots of Russian infantry destroyed. Run over by the tanks. Then the best bit. We attack two 42-tonners and start a real hare hunt. He couldn’t turn his turret after the first direct hit and took off. We were after him with force, 20 meters behind him. Half an hour the hunt went on for until he lost a track and fell into a ditch. We fired 30 shots into him. Nothing got through. That day our vehicle fired 110 rounds… Have no more rounds.
The 42 tonner relates to the KV-1 tank and LKW is short for the German expression Lastkraftwagen meaning truck in English.