“As I said: demagogue!” Kold said contemptuously.
Wyden meanwhile continued:
“And now let’s have a look. I am ready to be the first to recognize that such an act demands a lot of courage. People can be different, and we can’t exclude the idea that among us there are those who would subject such a brave employee to pressure. But this is only correct in such situations. In my opinion, if an employee comes to the chief with similar doubts, you have to take them seriously. If someone comes to you, led by conscience, you have to postpone other matters and talk to such a person very seriously, and you need to understand the details as far as his concerns are proved.”
“And was it really acceptable to express doubts about the correctness of conducting intelligence activities to the higher administration?” The Lawyer was deeply interested, but Kold caught the ironical notes in his voice and guessed this was a game:
“Indeed! I suspect Mr. Wyden will tell us about it now.”
Meanwhile a new question was heard from the screen. The young newswoman asked:
“I remember that in 2007, when you headed the NSA, there were other whistleblowers, similar to Kold. Did these people address you with the doubts before making them public?”
“It’s as if they overheard us!” the Lawyer cheered up.
Wyden leaned into the microphone and without a trace of uncertainty said:
“Actually, I left the NSA in 2005, and those events in 2007-08 happened after my departure. In my time, I didn’t face any complaints, except for some connected with the solution of some technological problems in the NSA. So I had no knowledge of any processes that could lead to the appearance of whistleblowers.”
“So that just indicates that they work badly,” Kold shrugged his shoulders.
Meanwhile on the screen, Wyden was getting excited and began to gesticulate, supporting each statement with a wave of his hand:
“In such cases, you need to understand who exactly bears responsibility for the incident. That does not necessarily mean you find the guilty person. You need to get employees to be frank with you so they tell you in detail how everything occurred. You want to help people to comprehend a situation, to draw lessons for yourself out of it, so you have the chance to prevent a repeat of similar situations in the future or, at least, to considerably reduce their probability. To talk about Kold, then here you need to know the details to reveal the entire scope of his relations, and you need to talk to all people who communicated with this young man. What, in their opinion, pushed him to such actions? You’d need to talk to his chief. Was there something in Kold’s behaviour that could lead to some suspicions? Perhaps he did something unexpected? Perhaps there were some signs indicating that something is wrong with him? And after that you need to carry out a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the damage caused.”
Kold burst out laughing, this time quite sincerely, without holding back. The Lawyer realized that it must be very amusing for Kold to listen to what a person of such caliber as Wyden broadcasts for the whole world.
And that, meanwhile, continued:
“Let me designate three main areas in which the damage was done. First, Mr. Kold revealed our capabilities to potential opponents. He told them what we can do and what we won’t do, and this itself can be very dangerous. Secondly, it will damage American companies which cooperated with the NSA. They will suffer damage though everything that they did, performed by American laws and protected the United States. Thirdly, if in the world there are still governments or individuals or information sources which would like to cooperate with the USA, then on what basis will they believe our assurances that we are able to keep secrets? All this has caused us damage.”
“Isn’t that too much for a loony loner, Mr. Wyden?” Kold whispered, looking at the TV. His face at the same time acquired quite a spiteful expression.
“Maybe time to switch off?” the Lawyer asked.
“No, it’s interesting,” Kold said abruptly, without turning his head. It was clear that he had become really engaged in the press conference. A new question was posed:
“What is happening to the programs Kold made public – for example, the BRISM program for data collection? Have they been curtailed, or is the NSA going on with them, do you think?”
Wyden passed his hand over his bald head as if in confusion, but at once he found the right words:
“I see no reason why any of those programs which he revealed – let’s say, the BRISM program for collection of metadata – should be stopped. They are legal, they meet a need, and they are effective. But their efficiency is the element that suffered most from his ‘revelations’. Besides, now our opponents know what we can do and what we won’t do, it’s about what restrictions are imposed by our legislation and our policy. Most likely it will allow our opponents to protect their communication systems from the intelligence services of the USA as they attempt to intercept their messages.”
Straightaway, the journalist threw a new bit of firewood into the fire on which Wyden was to be roasted:
“In spite of the fact that BRISM has a very broad span and actually turned the USA into one big database with access to Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, it, nevertheless, ‘missed the boat’ with the online correspondence of the Barayev brothers on the eve of the explosion during the Chicago marathon. Do you, perhaps, scatter networks too widely?”
Wyden for a second seemed to lose control and through the kind paediatrician mask another face appeared – stern, domineering and with the prickly, cold, shrill look, which is necessary for a professional intelligence agent. However, by the time he began to answer, control had already been restored:
“Actually, the Barayevs weren’t identified by means of one of these programs because BRISM isn’t intended for the detection of the type of communication which the Barayev brothers used on the eve of Chicago marathon explosion. I mean that BRISM is intended for tracking foreigners. Confidence in the NSA is necessary because the people we want to watch are foreigners or have potential value as foreigners. And we must prove it in at least the most general form in the American courts before insisting that one of the internet companies helps us with it.
“It seems that the journalists are well prepared for this briefing,” Kold noticed.
The Lawyer grinned.
“Most likely they had the benefit of helpful consultants from certain services. By the way, I’ve long wanted to ask – how was your communication with the representatives of these departments?”
“Practically non-existent. I am not the carrier of any important information. All the data which I can publish is there, on remote servers, and will become property of the public anyway. Already practically nothing depends on me.”
“Nothing at all?”
“I don’t want to talk on this topic now,” Kold evaded the question and turned to the TV. The next question came out:
“President Obama declared that surveillance programs have allowed us to prevent 50 terrorist attacks. Taking into account that these programs started soon after 9/11, how many terrorist attacks were prevented due to information collected by programs similar to BRISM which couldn’t be obtained by other means?”
“He won’t answer that,” Kold quickly told.
Wyden answered carefully:
“Yes, that is a good question and I don’t want to be evasive, but I am forced to be. I don’t know how correctly I can answer your question about the number of terrorist attacks prevented only by means of these programs. Usually, when we talk about the success of one or another intelligence operation, we cannot claim that this success was provided by means of only one program. One of the main achievements of U.S. intelligence over the last ten years has been the fact that we could connect various flows of information, each containing separate data. We connect this separate data to give an informative picture. It’s as if you have splinters of colored glass – separately none bears any significant information, but connected together they can create a very informative mosaic.”