“Bottom lines. First: whoever mobilizes faster gains an advantage. Second: if ground forces stalemate, the next step is vertical escalation. Third: if China weighs in, things get hairy fast. That’s when a conflict could spread.”
A chill harrowed Dan’s back. It sounded like the Europe of 1914. Split between hostile blocs, with interlocking alliances meant to deter, but that had actually only pulled one country after another into war, like shackled-together slaves being dragged helplessly overboard to drown.
But Mills was passing around another slide. “The air order of battle clearly favors India. The Pakistanis emerged from a sanction regime two years ago. They’ve taken delivery of new Chinese fighters, but not enough to counterbalance the Indian air force’s MiGs.
“As to how a conflict might go…” The blond lieutenant half shrugged, rolling his eyes toward the black-painted overhead.
“Go ahead and speculate, Matt,” Dan told him.
“Yessir… Well, if a flare-up lasts longer than a couple days, the Indians will achieve air superiority. But it’d be bloody. Meanwhile, both air forces would be unable to support their armor, which each side depends on to gain ground.
“Depending on how things kick off, there might be limited air strikes against command and control, training areas, or nuclear weapon storage facilities. The risk here, again, is escalation.”
“India will push back,” Singhe put in. Dan wondered how attached she was to what had been, after all, her parents’ home.
Noblos put in, “Actually, either side has the capability to escalate. You’ve left that out.”
“We’ve seen that dynamic in a number of recent conflicts,” Staurulakis said.
Mills nodded. “Correct. But the danger isn’t escalation, in and of itself.”
The civilian scientist said, “It isn’t? Yes it is.”
“No sir. Beg to differ. What’s really dangerous is when the inferior side — in this case, the Pakistanis — run out of counter-escalatory responses. If they lack air power to respond to an Indian deep penetration, the next step up’s their ballistic missile forces. There’s been some indication this is their plan, if they lose the air war. India has no defense again conventional TBMs. So their only step left on the escalatory spiral would be nuclear.”
Mills waited, but no one else commented. He nodded, then passed around the final slide. It was headed COMPARATIVE NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES and showed that both Pakistan and India possessed airdropped bombs and theater-range missiles, though India was working on an ICBM, mainly to deter China’s growing arsenal.
“That’s about all I have,” the operations officer concluded.
“All right, thanks,” Dan said. He tried to fake a strength he didn’t feel. “Now, if you’ll all recall, we got a DIA appreciation after we exited the Gulf that spoke to this issue. They said India was abandoning its defensive orientation along the western border. Exercise Divine Weapon tested its new strategy: to rapidly destroy Pakistan’s military, without a lengthy period of mobilization or warning.
“I don’t know if anyone here is familiar with the opening moves of World War I, but the Germans had something called the Schlieffen Plan. They depended on speed and shock to occupy territory, and encircle and destroy the French.
“But the plan was brittle. When the German army didn’t hit hard enough, the French and British wrecked the whole strategy.
“The Pakistanis have held counterexercises, attempting to block any Indian blitzkreig. But they also drilled own-force protection procedures on a tactical nuclear battlefield.” He let that hang, then added, “So we anticipate a race to mobilize, then a series of escalatory — counter-escalatory moves. Karachi’s not ruling out a nuclear counterstrike if the ground battle goes against them. It’s an unstable situation. And we’re going to be within range of both sides.”
Staurulakis spread her hands on the glass surface of the tracer. “Captain, what exactly do they expect us to do there? Any insight, from your time in DC?”
He couldn’t stifle a sardonic grin. “I don’t get much insight into anything in Washington, XO. Our orders are clear as mud. Station ourselves in a position to intercept, then stand by. We have three geometries to worry about. First, that of nuclear deterrence. Second, our own geometry vis-à-vis what we’re guessing to be the most likely launch sites.”
“And third?” Mills prompted.
“That, I guess, is political… what message having us here is supposed to convey. If I had to guess, that might be something like reducing Pakistani confidence that they can carry through a nuclear first strike on Indian command and control.
“Uncertainty’s always been a big part of deterrence. And it’s in the U.S. interest to keep anyone from using nukes first… because as soon as someone does, it becomes that much easier for the next country.” He hesitated, thinking about that in the context of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. What if no one had ever used such weapons? Would the world be safer, or more dangerous? Then shook his head and went on. “Of course, that assumes we come down on India’s side, if the balloon goes up. But let’s see if there’s a geoposition where we could intercept launches by both sides.”
“That’d be a strategic node,” Mills ventured.
Dan nodded tiredly, taking his point: that such a location, if it existed, would be easy for both sides to compute. Most likely, Savo was already getting built into the target set for both countries. If taking her out meant their missiles would have a better chance, it would only be logical to make her the first target. “Yeah, we’ll talk own-ship defense, too. But first, the geometry. Bill? Why don’t you kick off. As the resident expert.”
Dr. Noblos sat back on his stool, arms crossed, tilting his nose at the overhead. He looked like a large gray heron. “It isn’t an attractive situation,” he observed.
“Tell me more,” Dan said, though he didn’t like the guy’s attitude. Never had, actually.
Noblos closed his eyes, as if bored with explaining the obvious to dunderheads. “Assume we pick up a launch as it clears our radar horizon. We’ll have less than eighteen seconds to lock, track, evaluate, and fire. We might get a few seconds more downcuing from Obsidian Glint. But the handoff procedures aren’t synchronized yet, and I don’t have much confidence in the contractor.
“The Defense Support Program satellites… all you have is text from the joint tactical ground station. You’re still not on automatic distribution from the Space and Missile Defense Command Operations Center. AWACS… we’re on the ragged edge for Rainbow, out of Saudi. They might pick up an ascending booster out of western Pakistan, but India’s out of their range.”
Dan said, trying to keep his temper, “So, all in all, our probability of a successful intercept?”
“Negligible,” Noblos said, not without relish.
Dan turned to Wenck. “Donnie, your take?”
Wenck agreed their response time would be counted in seconds, but seemed less pessimistic than the physicist. “Depends on the launch site. I’m guessing, for both sides, back a good distance, out of range of tacair. So… I calculated the baskets.”
He keyboarded on a notebook, and like magic, the center LSD at the far end of CIC changed to show two pulsating hoops hanging in space. “I ginned this up with the UYQ-89 TBMD-scenario planning module. Not accurate down to the decimal point, but it illustrates the choices… which ain’t great. I’m mainly looking at airfields here. Figure they’ll hit them first. There’s three down south, inside our footprint. This up here, Uttarlai, that’s right on the hairy lips of our effective range. You can see here, the target body launch site, our interceptor platform position on a UTC grid, and the oval overlay is where that generates reasonable engagement conditions… defined as an intercept-slash-kill probability of intercept above 20 percent.”