The experience of the crew of HMS Marlborough, as the sole British dreadnought to be hit by a torpedo, is instructive. The following narrative was taken from the report of her commanding officer, Captain George P Ross, and her gunnery officer, Lt Cdr G C C Royle. The latter’s report begins: 6.10pm Sighted British battle cruisers engaging enemy’s ships. 6.12 Red 7, cruiser, four funnels, one mast (disappeared in smoke and mist before fire could be opened). 6.15 After deploying to port. Battleship, two funnels widely separated, two masts (probably Kaiser class) estimated range 10,000yds, rangefinders could not get a range. 6.17 Opened fire. Seven salvoes were fired in 4 minutes; 5th and 7th were clearly seen to hit. In the 5th salvo a deep red flame could be seen and salvo struck, in the 7th salvo a large volume of grey smoke appeared. 6.21 Ceased firing, as enemy was hidden by cruiser on fire (Roon class). 6.24 Green 98, a cruiser, 3 funnels (Roon, one funnel gone). Range by rangefinder 10,500yds. 6.25 Opened fire. 5 Salvoes were fired. Hits could not be distinguished for certain, as two or three ships were firing at same object. 6.27 6-inch guns opened fire at same object. It was during this firing that right gun of ‘A’ turret was severely damaged and put out of action, cause not known for certain, but probably due to premature. 6.29 Checked fire. There was a pause of ten minutes, during which the ship was altering course, and enemy was hidden by smoke. 6.39 Object a battleship of Kaiser class. Range 13,000yds; one salvo was fired, and enemy turned away and disappeared. 6.42–6.54 Ship was altering course, and enemy’s movements were very difficult to follow. 6.54 Marlborough was hit by a torpedo or mine in Diesel Engine Room. The shock was sufficient to shake off switches on lever power board, and some fuses in telephone circuits. These were very quickly replaced, and all control instruments were found to be in step.
The captain’s narrative takes up the story:
At 6.54 p.m. on the 31st May, the ship was struck by a torpedo in the Diesel Engine Room. At the same time a periscope was observed by witnesses about 1,000 yards on the starboard beam. No track of this torpedo was observed, though looked for by several observers immediately after the explosion.
The explosion caused a list to starboard of seven degrees, and flooded the Diesel Engine Room, Hydraulic Engine Room, and water was reported to be entering ‘A’ boiler room, the biggest leak being between the framing of the watertight door to the lower bunker 100–111, and the bulkhead to which it is secured, which had parted. I then telephoned orders to draw fires in ‘A’ boiler room. Speed was now reduced to 17 knots.
Marlborough continued in the line, and at 7.0 p.m. three torpedoes were reported on the starboard beam and bow. Course was immediately altered to starboard and then to port; two torpedoes passed ahead and one astern of the ship.
The T.B.D. Acasta, lying disabled, was then passed one cable on the port beam. At 7.0 p.m. fire was reopened on a disabled enemy ship, range 9,800 yards, four salvoes were fired, and the third and fourth were observed to hit. Ceased fire at 7.07 p.m.
At 7.10 p.m. fired a torpedo at a disabled German ship with three funnels. This may have been the same ship. At 7.12 p.m. opened fire on battleship of Markgraf class, one point before the starboard beam, distant 10,200 yards, steering south. Fourteen salvoes in six minutes were fired at this ship, and the sixth, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth were observed to hit. The speed was now 15 knots. Ceased firing at 7.18 p.m.
At 7.19 a T.B.D. flotilla was sighted attacking on the starboard bow, opened fire at them with range 11,000 yards. Course was altered away two points to S.S.E., and at 7.22 the flotilla scattered in a dense cloud of funnel smoke, two boats being hit. At 7.24, altered course to S.E. by S., and fired a torpedo at a battleship of the Markgraf class. At 7.33 three torpedoes were observed on starboard beam and bow, course was immediately altered to starboard and then to port, one passed ahead, one astern, and the other very close astern or under the ship.
Ship was steadied on course S. by W., and at 7.52 to S.S.W. At 8.0 p.m. course was altered to West and speed to 17 knots, a report also was made to the Commander-in-Chief that Marlborough’s maximum speed was reduced to 17 knots.
At 8.20, altered course to S.W., 9.0 to S. 4 E., and 9.15 to S. 7 W. At 10.5 p.m. there was gunfire on the starboard beam and again at 10.40, abaft the starboard beam, distant about 8 miles.
At 11.44 p.m. gunfire heavy on starboard quarter, and again at 00.10 a.m. about 7 points abaft starboard beam. A very heavy explosion was observed, evidently a ship blowing up.
At about 2 a.m. 1st June, Commander Currey reported to me that the water was gaining, and that he and Engineer Commander Toop considered that it was dangerous for the ship to steam any longer at a speed of 17 knots, so with great regret I immediately informed you that speed must be reduced.
Speed was then reduced to 15 knots, and Marlborough hauled out of line, the Revenge, Hercules, and Agincourt proceeding at 17 knots.
At 2.15 a.m. speed was reduced to 13 knots and Fearless ordered alongside port side. Engines were stopped at 2.30 a.m. Fearless came alongside, embarking you and your staff.
At 3.0 a.m. I proceeded N. 4 E., and later on the Fearless joined as escort. A Zeppelin was sighted at 4.0 a.m. passing astern and steering to the Eastward. Two common and two A.P. shells from 13.5-inch guns and twelve H.E. shell from H.A. gun were fired, and the Zeppelin was observed to dip suddenly, but proceeded on its course.
Orders were now received from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to Tyne or Rosyth via M channel, so at 4.30 a.m. course was altered to S. 38 W., 14 knots. Owing to the deep draught of the ship I decided to proceed to Rosyth.
At 9.30 a.m. two submarines were observed, bearing west about 8 miles off and steering towards Marlborough with conning towers showing. Five minutes later they dived, so course was altered away from them, course being resumed at 10.50 a.m. to S. 56 W. At 10.52 a.m. an oily patch was observed about 2 miles astern, and the track of a torpedo overhauling the ship, the torpedo passed along the port side, two cables off. At 11.10 a.m. course was altered to westward, and at 1.45 p.m. Commodore (T) with Harwich Flotillas was sighted bearing S.E. T.B.D.s Lark, Lance, Lysander, and Lassoo, and shortly afterwards Laforey, Lookout, Lawford and Laverock joined as escort. At 4.0 p.m. T.B.D.s Ness and Albatross joined.
At 8.0 p.m. the wind was freshening from the S.W., force 5, and by 10.0 p.m. W.S.W., force 6, with a rising sea.
About 10.0 p.m. the water was rising in ‘A’ boiler room through the suction of the ash expeller pump and submersible pump continually choking and the canvas hose of the ejector bursting. At midnight the water was still gaining, and was now about 4 feet below the grating around the top of the boilers. Commander Currey reported that matters were serious below, and asked that a salvage tug might be signalled for. I then altered course to S.W by W. reduced, to 10 knots, and steered for the lee of Flamborough Head, which was distant about 50 miles, stationed the Fearless one and a half cables to windward of the fore bridge as the sea was breaking over the starboard side of the upper deck. At the same time I informed the Commander-in-Chief of the state of affairs, and asked the S.N.O., Tyne, to send tugs to meet me off Flamborough Head. I also warned destroyers to be prepared to come alongside lee side.
The Laforey and Lookout then asked if they could be of use in laying an oil track ahead of Marlborough. At 2 a.m. Lance’s division was ordered to lay oil track ahead, and to windward of Marlborough. This proved most successful, and I was very grateful to the destroyers for the suggestion. My wireless messages were intercepted by the Admiralty and a signal was received from the Admiralty to proceed to the Humber. In the meantime in ‘A’ boiler room, Stoker Petty Officer Ackerman was sent down in a diving dress and cleared the suctions of the pumps, and at 1 a.m. the water was stopped from rising. Speed was increased to 12 knots at 3 a.m.