The Americans were left to ponder on what might have happened to their fleet if they had been caught out at sea. It is likely that many more ships would have been sunk, in deep water, with extremely heavy loss of life. Finally, of course, the elimination of virtually all of the American battleships in the Pacific theatre forced the US Navy to rely on their aircraft carriers, luckily absent on 7 December, which would ultimately bring about the utter defeat of the Imperial Japanese navy.
THE HUNTING OF FORCE Z
The Bismarck action in May 1941 had highlighted the danger of torpedo hits on the vulnerable stern area of even the most heavily protected of ships. This drawback had been noted on Britain’s very first ironclad battleship, HMS Warrior, back in 1860. Commentators had noted the beautiful lines of the new ship, while severely criticising her fine clipper bow as adding useless weight but nothing to her fighting abilities, but more importantly, her traditional frigate stern, which left the single propeller and steering gear with no protection at all. These flaws were to come home to roost with a vengeance in Britain’s last class of battleship, the King George V class of 1940.
Much has been written on the wisdom or otherwise of Churchill’s despatch of the new battleship HMS Prince of Wales, already blooded in the Bismarck encounter, to the Far East, supported only by the unmodernised battlecruiser HMS Repulse and a handful of destroyers. The new aircraft carrier, the Indomitable, which was allocated to the small squadron, had run aground in the West Indies, and although not seriously damaged, was never to join up with Force Z under Admiral Tom Phillips at Singapore. As none of the destroyers had a high-angle anti-aircraft gun capability, the ships’ only effective defence against air attack came from the sixteen 5.25in DP guns on Prince of Wales.
Despite warnings from General Chennault, who had been sent to command the Chinese air force in its struggle with Japan, the Western democracies ignored completely the dramatic increase in combat potential of the latest Japanese army and navy aircraft, such as the Mitsubishi A6M ‘Zero’ fighter. According to aviation pundits, Japan’s air forces consisted of underpowered copies of outdated Western designs. Moreover, her bomber force was handicapped by the ‘natural’ short-sightedness of the bomb-aimers, typically portrayed as wearing thick pebble-glass spectacles (see also Part II, Chapter 14).
Churchill’s underestimation of the fighting capacity of the Japanese, which paralleled his dismissal of the Turks in the lead-up to the Gallipoli campaign a quarter of a century earlier, was matched by Phillips’s over-confidence in his force’s ability to fight off sea and air attacks, without the need for air cover. Significantly, at the same time as he despatched Force Z to its fate, Churchill sent two hundred brand-new cannon-armed Hurricane fighters to the Soviet Union, leaving the defence of Singapore and Force Z to a handful of squadrons flying the underpowered Brewster B-339 Buffalo fighter.
The scene was set for high drama and a disastrous engagement, which simultaneously rang the death-knell of the battleship, and also began the train of events which would ultimately bring about the fall of the British Empire in the Far East.
In order to fulfil its intended role as a deterrent, it was important that the appointment of Admiral Phillips and the despatch of Force Z was fully reported in the press. The Japanese therefore had adequate time to prepare a warm reception for them. In particular, the 22nd Air Flotilla was moved to the airfields the Japanese had seized from the Vichy French in Indochina, within striking distance of Singapore. The Genzan and Kanoya groups, flying Mitsubishi G3M twin-engined bombers, were well-practised in attacks on warships. To support them, Admiral Yamamoto also despatched the new G4M bombers of the Kanoya group.
When news arrived of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Phillips sortied Force Z to intercept a Japanese invasion force reported to be en route for Malaya. He was spotted by a patrolling submarine, the transports were ordered to scatter to the north in the Gulf of Siam, two Kongo-class fast battleships plus a force of cruisers were detailed to intercept Force Z, and the 22nd Air Flotilla Groups at Saigon and Thu Dâu Môt with their total of eighty-six bombers were alerted.
On the morning of 10 December 1941, when Force Z was returning to Singapore, having failed to find any invasion forces, they were set upon by the highly trained Japanese aviators not far off the Malayan coast. At 1113 first blood went to G3M high level bombers, which closely straddled Repulse with 250kg (550lbs) bombs and scored one hit amidships.
Then at 1141 nine Mitsubishi G3M torpedo bombers commenced an attack on the port side of Prince of Wales, but one aircraft turned away and attacked Repulse. Approaching at 150 to 180 knots, the eight remaining planes descended to 30-35m (100-115ft) and at ranges from 1500m down to as close at 600m (1640-650yds) dropped their 18in torpedoes, set to run at a depth of 4-6m (13-20ft). This kind of attack was not what Prince of Wales’ anti-aircraft gunners had experienced from single Italian torpedo planes in their brief sortie into the Mediterranean.
Moving at maximum speed, the flagship turned to port to comb the torpedo tracks. But there is a fatal period of time before the helm of a large ship moving at speed takes effect, and at the same time her speed is reduced. Nevertheless, moving at 24 knots Prince of Wales avoided the first seven torpedoes. But the last torpedo struck the ship far aft on her port side, just above the outer port propeller shaft, at about 1144, and set in motion a train of events which would lead inexorably to her loss.
The explosion tore a large rent in the hull, but it also damaged the shaft supports for the outer port propeller shaft. With the shaft revolving at high speed, the supports fractured and the propeller began to turn out of centre. This led to the watertight glands in the bulkheads, through which the long shaft passed, coming adrift from their bulkheads, allowing water to flood into the ship through the shaft alley. The port outer engine was initially shut down, but the water flow continued to free rotate the propeller. When the turbine was restarted, the rear section of shafting, 17.7in (45cm) in diameter, came apart at an internal coupling. At this point, the rear part of the shaft, with the broken brackets and the stern tube broke away from the hull, destroying many already compromised internal bulkheads. In its passage the shaft damaged the port inner propeller, which led to its turbine also being shut down.