Of the eighty-seven torpedoes launched by the Japanese ships during the engagement, four hit the Perth and six the Houston. The torpedoes which struck the transports and the minesweeper are believed to have been launched by Mogami but it is possible some may have come from Fubuki. Both Allied cruisers sank with heavy loss of life. The Shinshu Maru was salvaged and repaired, only to be damaged by submarine torpedo on 3 January 1944 and sunk by aircraft two days later.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was obliged to apologise to the army for sinking their landing ship. Honour thus being satisfied, the army then amended their records to record that the Shinshu Maru had been sunk by a ‘Dutch torpedo boat’.
USS PORTER
A different type of blue-on-blue torpedo launch involved the large destroyer USS Porter (DD-356) on 26 October 1942, during the Battle of Santa Cruz. The Porter was assigned to Task Force 16, as part of the escort for the carrier USS Enterprise. After helping the carrier fight off attacking Japanese planes, Porter’s crew observed a Grumman Avenger torpedo bomber returning from a strike on the Japanese carriers. Low on fuel, the plane ditched near Porter and Lt Cdr Roberts conned his ship to pick up the crew.
Unfortunately, on hitting the water the Avenger’s torpedo left the aircraft and its engine was activated. It was obviously damaged in the crash, as it apparently made two circular runs, the crew believing they had spotted two torpedoes, fired from a Japanese submarine. On the second circular run it hit Porter in the forward engine room, killing eleven men and wounding nine others, of whom four more died later from their injuries. Another destroyer, USS Shaw, arrived to offer assistance but broke away to hunt a suspected submarine contact. Finding none, she returned to pick up Porter’s survivors.
After the end of the war, Japanese records were searched for information on the submarine which could have fired the fatal torpedo, but no such entry was found. The US Navy was therefore left with the probability that the Porter had been sunk by the Avenger’s torpedo.
IRONBOTTOM SOUND AND THE TOKYO EXPRESS
In the desperate night-time combats for control of Guadalcanal and the surrounding islands, which lasted from August 1942 until February 1943, the torpedo was to be the dominant weapon, responsible for most of the nearly fifty wrecks littering the seabed that became known to the Americans as ‘Iron Bottom Sound’.
The US Navy had withdrawn the torpedo tubes from its cruisers in the 1930s, because of the potential fire and explosion risks during surface and air attacks, and to concentrate on gun action. The Japanese were well aware of the hazards, but because they felt they had a winning weapon in the oxygen-fuelled 24in Type 93 torpedo, their cruisers retained their tubes.
The Americans relied on overwhelming firepower from their cruisers’ turret guns, unaware of the potential of the Japanese torpedoes, which in addition to their high speed, were wakeless. And they were launched by compressed air, giving no warning powder flash at night, as did American destroyer torpedo tubes. Despite possessing radar, in their early encounters the Americans failed to make full use of this crucial asset, and too often the Japanese captains hugged nearby islands, giving false radar returns. For their part the Japanese, lacking radar at the time, had trained extensively in night-attack tactics. Their lookouts were supplied with excellent night optical aids, and they practised the use of flares dropped by their cruisers’ floatplanes. The scene was set for some dramatic confrontations.
Just two days after the Americans landed on Guadalcanal, the Allied warships were soundly defeated in the first of four major naval confrontations. On the night of 8/9 August, Japanese Admiral Mikawa passed down the ‘Slot’ with five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and one destroyer.
His forces fell upon the unprepared and divided Allied cruisers and destroyers guarding the invasion transports. They illuminated the southern force, disabling HMAS Canberra with gunfire — she was later scuttled — and hitting USS Chicago with two torpedoes. The second failed to explode, but the hit on the bows caused a whiplash through the ship’s structure that put her main fire control director out of action.
The Japanese swept on and came upon the northern force. On board the US cruisers, their captains were all asleep. At 0144 Mikawa’s ships fired a salvo of Type 93 torpedoes, illuminated the US cruisers and opened heavy gunfire. Quincy was hit by two torpedoes from Tenryu, and was badly damaged. Then she was hit by a torpedo from Aoba, and sank by the bow at 0238. Meanwhile, at 0155 two torpedoes from Chökai struck USS Vincennes. She sank at 0250. Since he did not know that Admiral Halsey had pulled his carriers away from close air support, Mikawa turned to withdraw, to clear the area before his ships could come under air attack at dawn. En route to their base the heavy cruiser Kako was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine S 44, small consolation for the Allies who had lost so many heavy cruisers.
Also known as the Battle of Cape Esperance, this encounter took place took place on the night of 11/12 October. A Japanese bombardment force under Rear Admiral Gotö consisting of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers was covering a reinforcement run by two seaplane carriers, which were to unload artillery and other heavy supplies for the Japanese troops attempting to retake Guadalcanal. In a confused action, thanks to American use of radar the Japanese cruiser force was surprised by the four cruisers and five destroyers of Rear Admiral Scott. At 2349 the heavy cruiser Furataka was hit on her torpedo tubes by an American shell, which set her on fire, and nine minutes later a torpedo launched from American destroyer Buchanan hit her in the forward engine room. At 0006, two torpedoes narrowly missed the heavy cruiser USS Boise. The crippled Furataka eventually sank at 0228.
The Japanese had lost their admiral, mortally wounded on the bridge of Aoba, and his chief of staff ordered the bombardment force to break off action and retreat northwards. Although this part of their mission had failed, while the battle was raging the Japanese seaplane carriers had successfully unloaded their cargo.
The encounter reinforced the Americans’ confidence in their own ships’ heavy firepower, while lulling them into a false sense of security regarding the Japanese Type 93 torpedoes, which would feature prominently in the following action, as well as the overwhelming Japanese superiority in close-quarters night-fighting.