So, in short, sexual tension (whether recognized by the person or not) may relate to the production and appreciation of sexual humor.[45] But why is any of this—interesting though it may be—relevant to asexuality? It is relevant because sexual humor and the way it functions may reveal something about asexuality and vice versa; that is, asexuality may reveal how sexual humor functions. For example, are asexual people immune to sexual humor, because they, presumably, have so little sexual tension? Or, to put it in another way, do asexual people “get” sexual humor on a deep level, or on any level? And does this present a sneaky way of finding out whether asexual people are truly sexual (deep down)—to see if they laugh at a sexual joke? If they do laugh, does this not imply that there is some sexual energy/motive being discharged or released? Got you! You laughed. You must be sexual!
Did you laugh at the Viagra joke at the beginning of this chapter? (Or, if you had heard it before, did you laugh the first time you read it, or the first time someone told it to you?) Let’s analyze the reasons why someone might or might not laugh at this joke. Of course, there are differences among people in how much they laugh in general, and so, of course, some of the individual differences in humor appreciation have to do with basic variations in personality and temperament (e.g., happiness, gregariousness, jolliness). But let’s take this out of the equation for now, and concentrate on the account of humor appreciation and susceptibility put forward by Freud and company—namely, that it often has to do with the release of, or is at least facilitated by, sexual tension. Given the sexual content of this joke, a straightforward interpretation driven by this theory would say that those who have tension about their sexuality are more likely to laugh at this joke.
However, even if we accept the tension-reduction model of humor, we also need to realize that other elements are important for this joke to be effective. In particular, besides tension, a person also must cognitively “get” the joke. So, the individual must understand how the detail and the punch line create and then resolve (even in a bizarre way) the conflict posed by the story. Thus, in addition to an effective use and release of tension, the humorist must provide a satisfactory and meaningful resolution to the puzzle or situation raised in the joke. To accomplish this, the information in the joke or story must be relevant (i.e., “meaningful”) on some level to the individual, or at least have some connection to activities that the individual is familiar with, so that he or she ultimately can “get” the joke.
Interestingly, the satisfactory resolution provided by the punch line (if a person does “get it”) usually involves some kind of incongruity. In other words, it may involve holding two seemingly contradictory ideas together simultaneously, or some unexpected twist—thus, a bit of a surprise ending or a clever reversal of fortune. Yet this incongruity or twist usually still resolves the conflict or drama in some meaningful way, even if bizarrely so. And the person who appreciates this humor must get (on some level) that a resolution, incongruous as it may be, has occurred.
Incongruity forms the basis of a number of theories of humor. One modern theory of humor that incorporates incongruity as a main concept is the “benign violation” model (McGraw & Warren, 2010). In this view, for something to be funny, it must break a norm or a rule, but it must do so benignly. The incongruity lies in the fact that we must hold two contradictory ideas in mind simultaneously: first, that a norm is being violated (which is bad), but, second, that this violation is only a gentle or benign one (which is not so bad). There is a saying in comedy, attributed to the Irish novelist Kate O’Brien, that captures the essence of this theory: “If it bends, it’s funny; if it breaks, it is not funny” (1-Love-Quotes.com, n.d.).
The appeal of the benign-violation theory comes in part from its consistency with the proposed evolutionary origins of humor in benign physical violations such as play fighting, which can also be seen in animals (Gervais & Wilson, 2005). The proponents of this theory argue that humor has a positive personal and social function in daily life; specifically, humor “provides a healthy and socially beneficial way to react to hypothetical threats, remote concerns, minor setbacks, social faux pas, cultural misunderstandings, and other benign violations people encounter on a regular basis” (McGraw & Warren, 2010, p. 1148). These theorists also argue that humor (e.g., laughter) is an important form of social communication, signaling that (benign) violations of social rules are often acceptable. In short, humor allows us to know that bending the social rules may be okay.
Another appeal of the benign-violation theory in the present context is that it suggests an additional reason why sexuality so often provides the content of humor: because it is fraught with rules, norms, and taboos. Thus, engaging in sex, regardless of the circumstances, will likely violate a social and moral guideline somewhere!
The importance of incongruity models of humor, such as benign-violation theory, cannot be overstated. Indeed, the ubiquity of some form of incongruous resolution in jokes makes benign-violation theory an appealing theory of humor in and of itself, even independent of tension theories; in fact, it is sometimes seen as a competing theory to tension-reduction models of humor (Smuts, 2009, April 12). However, these two theories of humor are perhaps more appropriately considered complementary, as they concentrate on two different elements of our mental/psychological life—cognitive and emotional, both of which are usually brought to bear by psychologists in explaining complex human behavior (see also the discussion in chapter 2 on the A, B, C, and Ds of sex). Incongruity models are “cognitive,” dealing primarily with how we process information and knowledge. Thus, these theories concern our thoughts and their organization in the mind; how, for example, one bit of information is linked to another and how readily accessible it is to our consciousness. In contrast, tension-reduction models are more emotional in nature. They deal with our emotions and arousal. Sometimes these two elements are called the “cold” (cognitive) versus “hot” (emotional) elements of psychological life. So, let us assume that both elements—some level of hot (i.e., tension) and some level of cold (i.e., incongruity of ideas)—are important in humor.[46]
Okay, back to the Viagra joke and a more “cognitive” analysis: On a simple cognitive level, if you did not know that a penis becomes stiff and erect, that an erection is aided by Viagra, and that erections are often grasped (as in manual stimulation by a partner or in masturbation by boys and men themselves), then you would not “get” the joke. Since the man needs to grasp his own penis in this situation, knowledge of (and perhaps particularly the experience of) masturbation is also likely relevant. Now, if something is personally relevant, it is also likely to have some psychic tension associated with it. After all, most people—if not all—are a bit tense about and/or embarrassed by their masturbation experience, or at least were at one time in their lives. This raises an important point about how cognitive and emotional elements of mental processing operate in real life: they typically relate to and reinforce one another. Thus, if one has a cognitive “understanding” of the key elements of this joke (e.g., public masturbation), then one is also likely to have an emotional connection to these same elements.
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However, most modern theorists do not buy all of the elements of a classic tension-release model. Humor is not necessarily “cathartic” in the therapeutic sense; that is, it does not necessarily reduce the tendency to engage in future behaviors related to the tension (Ferguson & Ford, 2008; Martin, 2007). For example, research shows that sexist humor does not decrease the tendency to engage in sexist behavior soon afterward; sometimes the opposite occurs, and sexist humor may even lead to complex domineering behaviors (Hodson, Rush, & MacInnis, 2010). Thus, a straightforward catharsis model of humor based on sexual or other tension may not be correct. One alternative but related explanation for this kind of humor is that there may be a pleasantness associated with being able to release the tension of a repressed or suppressed impulse or motive, but such humor does not reduce our tendencies to engage in this impulse; it just releases us from the unpleasantness of not being able to express it. For example, modern social psychologists talk about disparagement humor of groups as releasing “negative intergroup motives” (Hodson, Rush, & MacInnis, 2010, p. 661).
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Indeed, many modern theorists argue that humor is complex and multifaceted, and one usually needs both elements, especially when actual laughter occurs. Humor, broadly defined, does not always make us laugh; perhaps tension release is even required for actual laughter to occur. We may receive a rather pleasant feeling and perhaps a smile from, for example, a clever witticism, twist, or incongruity; yet it is still humor, even though it does not evoke the deep release of a joke that causes a belly laugh. But when humor does make us laugh, there is usually some level of tension involved and released.