Lenin's argument amounted to these five points: (1) the revolutionary movement was on the rise all over Europe; (2) the imperialists (the Germans and the Allies) were ready to make peace in order to join forces and strangle the Russian revolution; (3) there was undeniable evidence that Kerensky and company were preparing to surrender Petrograd to the Germans; (4) a peasant revolt was developing, and the Bolsheviks already had the people's confidence; and (5) obvious preparations were underway for a second Kor- nilov attempt. Zinoviev objected: "We are told (1) that the majority of the Russian people are with us and (2) that the majority of the international proletariat are with us. Alas, both assertions are false and that is the heart of the problem."
In fact, that was not the problem. All of Lenin's arguments proved false: (1) his hopes for a world revolution were misplaced; (2) the Germans and the Allies continued the war for another full year; (3) Kerensky had no intention of surrendering Petrograd; (4) the peasants had begun dividing up the land, but this was far from being a "peasant revolt"; (5) and no one was dreaming of a "second Kornilov attempt." Lenin was right about only one thing: power was available for the taking, and no one was willing to defend the government. Kerensky and his ministers persisted in seeing the right as the only enemy, and naturally this eliminated any type of support from the right. The weakness and indecision of the Provisional Government irritated the "moderates" and "centrists." Bukharin proudly remembered that "on the door to my apartment was written 'Bukharin, Bolshevik.' But nobody dared to raise their little finger to me. Of course it was really stupid on the part of the bourgeoisie not to have finished us off at that time."79 Bukharin was certainly right to call it stupidity, except that in the fall of 1917 power was not in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Power was in the streets and everyone agreed that "things had to change," even if for the worse. Pierre Pascal, a member of the French military mission, noted in his diary in September that the "corps of pages voted for the Bolsheviks," and in October that "yesterday Mr. Putilov told me he had voted for the Bolsheviks."80
Lenin found the greatest resistance in the Central Committee of his own party; his comrades feared failure and wondered what they would do upon taking power. He answered them: 'The seizure of power is the business of the uprising; its political purpose will become clear after the seizure."81 He freely quoted Napoleon: "On s'engage et puis—on voit."
For over sixty years Soviet historiography has maintained the legend that the October revolution was a meticulously planned operation, a classic model of "the art of insurrection." This legend is not in keeping with the facts. Moreover, in the legend, the leaders of this perfect operation keep changing. First it was Lenin and Trotsky. On the first anniversary of the revolution, Stalin referred to "the Central Committee of the party, headed by Comrade Lenin," as the inspirer of the insurrection but stressed that "all the work of practical organization of the insurrection proceeded under the direct leadership of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky."82 Trotsky himself contributed a good deal to the legend of the splendidly organized insurrection. Later on, in the 1930s, Stalin portrayed himself as the leader of the insurrection, while acknowledging that Lenin had provided some help. Since the mid-1950s, Lenin has been the only recognized leader.
But doubts regarding the reliability of the legend could not be better founded. Suffice it to say that to this day Soviet historians disagree about the date on which the October revolution began. Some suggest it was the morning of October 24; others say the evening of that day; still others argue for October 22, the day the Petrograd Soviet assumed control over all military units in the capital.
On October 10 the Central Committee had voted for insurrection. But at its next meeting, on October 16, everyone insisted it was necessary to wait because delegates from various parts of Petrograd spoke of the lack of combativity, especially in the workers' districts of Vyborg, Narva, and Vasilevsky Island. Krylenko, the representative of the Petrograd Military Organization (PMO), reported indifference among the soldiers. Only Lenin kept urging and arguing, dragging the Central Committee on toward power.
Trotsky seemed to be everywhere, speaking at countless meetings, rousing the workers and soldiers with his revolutionary appeals. The other popular Bolshevik speakers, Lunacharsky, Kollontai, Volodarsky, also kept up an endless round of speeches. The Central Committee was waiting for power to fall into its hands like ripe fruit, but Lenin insisted on the need to seize it, and no later than October 20.
The existing forms of authority were collapsing. The peasant soldiers of the Petrograd garrison wanted one thing: to go home and take part in the distribution of land. The government did not know what it wanted. It did not know which forces were on its side, and above all it did not seem to recognize its enemies. Petrograd was full of rumors about a Bolshevik plot, rumors which reached their peak in October. On October 17 Gorky's newspaper, Novaya zhizn (New life), which had a circulation of 10,000 among Petrograd workers and which stood very close to the Bolsheviks,83 published an editorial warning the Bolshevik party against an uprising that would bring ruin to the party, the working class, and the revolution. On October 18 it published the famous letter from Zinoviev and Kamenev in which Lenin's close comrades declared that an armed insurrection, just a few days before the Second Congress of Soviets, would be an unacceptable action threatening the proletariat and the revolution with catastrophe. Lenin's indignation upon reading this letter is well known; he called its authors traitors and "strike breakers" because they had given away the secret of the insurrection to the bourgeoisie. In reality, it had not been a secret to anyone for a long time. Lenin himself had given it away in articles, letters, and public proclamations printed in the Bolshevik press.
The question of armed insurrection was openly debated in the legal press, but the most typical sign of the decomposition of government machinery was that the authorities did not seem to consider these discussions important. Kerensky refused to call in reinforcements from the front. Out of sheer curiosity a city official called the apartment of Maria Ulyanova, Lenin's sister, and learned that Lenin was in Petrograd, but no one attempted to arrest the leader of the impending insurrection.
In an interview with the American ambassador, David Francis, Foreign Affairs Minister Tereshchenko described the government's state of mind with desperate frankness. The interview took place on October 24. "I expect a Bolshevik action tonight," said Tereshchenko. "If you can crush it," said the ambassador, "I hope it happens." "I think we could," Tereshchenko replied, "but I hope it happens anyway, whether we crush it or not. I'm tired of this uncertainty and tension."84