The Soviet attitude toward Japan and Germany was not consistent. The Japanese aggressors should be fought by all possible means, said a Comintern directive to the Chinese Communists. By contrast, the German Communists were advised to join Nazi organizations, such as the Arbeiterfront, and fight there for higher wages and better conditions.
Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov represented the public line of Soviet policy, with his calls for "collective security" and resistance to aggression. The behind-the-scenes policy was indicated by Molotov, the Soviet premier and Stalin's close collaborator, in a speech on foreign policy in 1935 which dealt mainly with Soviet—German relations. The documents of the German Foreign Ministry, captured by the Allies at the end of World War II and published in London during the 1950s, show that secret negotiations between Stalin's agents and the Hitler government began as early as 1933. Evgeny Gnedin, a counselor at the Soviet embassy in Berlin in 1935—1936 and after that a journalist and head of the press department at the Moscow Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, states that Stalin's confidential spokesman in secret talks with the German ambassador to Moscow was none other than Karl Radek.109 Gustav Hilger, a German diplomat who had worked in Moscow since the revolution, referred to the 1934—1935 period this way: "We noticed in many Soviet leaders a deep and unchanging nostalgia for the olden days of Soviet—German collaboration."110
In the summer of 1935, in talks with the German economic minister, Hjalmar Schacht, the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, David Kan- delaki, began to explore the terrain, under Stalin's direction, for a possible Soviet—German agreement. In 1936 Kandelaki was able to meet with Goe- ring. After Germany and Japan signed the anti-Comintern pact in September 1936, Stalin again assigned Kandelaki to probe the possibilities for an agreement. Krivitsky wrote that Stalin at that time reported to the Politburo: "In the near future a pact with Germany will be signed."111 However, two and a half years passed before Stalin's prediction came true.
On July 18, 1936, General Francisco Franco led a rebellion in Spain against the Republican government. Stalin waited until October 4 before sending a telegram to Spanish Communists expressing support for the Spanish Republic. The Soviet Union gave limited support to the Republican side in Spain and pursued cooperation with the "democracies" in a moderate way. More than ever Soviet policy functioned on two levels. All aid to Spain was channeled through the Comintern; on the official level a low profile was maintained. Germany and Italy openly sent regular units to support Franco, while the Soviet Union sent only a few advisers. The recruitment of volunteers for the International Brigades went on among Communists and antifascists all over the world, but not in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the NKVD operated extensively in Spain. From 1937 on the main enemy in Spain bore the name "Trotskyites" or "Trotskyite accomplices." The practice of eliminating foreign Communists, which had begun among those living in the Soviet Union, was extended to Spain. Those who thought they had escaped the terror in Moscow found their executioners had caught up with them. Stalin had no need for revolution, nor was he interested in such things as "the emancipation of the working class." His own kind of revolution was all that interested him, one which placed people in power who would be as obedient to him "as a corpse."
The terror, the "meat grinder," as Khrushchev called it, dealt a serious blow to Soviet foreign policy. An astounded world looked on as one after another leading government figure was sentenced to death in the Moscow trials. People concluded that the Soviet state was afflicted with an incurable illness. The decapitation of the Red Army gave rise to serious doubts about its fighting capacity. Among the reasons for Anglo—French "appeasement" in relation to Hitler was lack of confidence that the Soviet army would be able to fight.
The changes that took place in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, along with the victories of the fascist states, had a curious effect on the Russian emigre "diaspora." Above all, the emigr6s were forced to acknowledge the undeniable: their hopes for a collapse of the Bolshevik regime were in vain. The West had no desire to intervene, and no internal force had been able to overthrow the regime, nor had it collapsed as a result of the disputes inside the party or the economic disasters. The recognition of these facts logically led a section of the emigre community to accept the Soviet government. The ideas of the changing landmarks tendency and the Eurasians took the form of a movement for a "return to the homeland."
The arguments of the emigres who wished to return to the Soviet Union (the "returners," vozvrashchentsy, as they were called) were described as follows by I. Bunakov-Fondaminsky, one of the founders and editors of the emigre publication Sovremennye zapiski (Contemporary notes) and coeditor with Georgy Fedotov of Novy grad (New city). Soviet foreign policy was becoming more nationalistic, that is, protective of national interests; the army was acquiring discipline; individual landownership was becoming stronger (a reference to the private plots peasants were allowed to have around their homes); the school system was being reorganized; and respect for the family and for one's country was being encouraged among the youth. Bunakov summarized the thinking of the "returners" this way: "Underneath the Red flag, the USSR is becoming nationalist Russia—we must return to the homeland."112
Bunakov, for his part, argued against the "return to the homeland" movement. It made no sense, he said, because a new wave of emigration was soon going to start, of those who would want to think for themselves. "By educating the people, the Bolshevik government is unavoidably laying the groundwork for its own destruction." The youth, when it had developed and matured, would ask "even more important questions, about the individual, about freedom, about God. At that point the conflict with Bolshevik ideology will become inevitable." The new wave of emigr6s, Bunakov predicted, would want to "think about things they had never thought through before, give shape to their new realizations, and set up a radio station to send waves of free thought back to the homeland from abroad."113
The emigr6s reacted in contrasting ways to the successes scored by the fascist states. Some were attracted to national socialist and fascist ideas: a corporatist state, a strong leader, hostility toward democracy, anti-Semitism, and chauvinism. The realization, however, that Nazi Germany represented a danger to Russia split the emig^s into "defensists," who believed that in the event of war they should support Stalin, and "defeatists," who believed that the overthrow of the Soviet government, even with Hitler's help, would be the lesser evil.
The NKVD played a sinister role in emigr6 political life, continuing the worthy tradition of the Cheka and GPU. Walter Krivitsky recalled meeting a man named Furmanov, the head of Soviet counterintelligence work connected with the White emigr6s.114 In any future history of the Russian emigre community, Furmanov should have a prominent place, along with his predecessors and successors. Operation Trust dealt a terrible blow to the monarchist wing of the Russian emigration, in particular to the association of former officers, the Russian Union of All Military Men, or ROVS (Rossiisky Obshche-Voinsky Soyuz). The "organs" of the Soviet security police paid special attention to those organizations which "actively" engaged in anti-Soviet work, especially those which sent agents into the Soviet Union. This "activism," which Georgy Fedotov called the "senseless heroism of the blind," ended in the virtual destruction of the ROVS, and it caused heavy losses to another organization, the National Union of Russian Youth, formed at a congress of youth and student organizations in 1930, which later became the NTS (Natsionalno-Trudovoi Soyuz), or National- Labor Alliance of Russian Solidarists.