"Stalin has been obsessed with the idea of an agreement with Germany since 1933," a Soviet diplomat named Gelfand, who defected to the United States from a post as counselor at the Soviet embassy in Rome, told a British diplomat, N. Butler, in a confidential interview.25
Hitler became chancellor in January 1933. Three months later, in the first half of May, a group of senior officers headed by General von Bock- elsberg visited Moscow. Defense Commissar Voroshilov, in his speech welcoming the German military delegation, stressed the Red Army's desire to continue its longstanding friendly relations with the Reichswehr.26
At about the same time Stalin read the Russian translation of Mein Kampf. Although he might not have been completely convinced from this reading that Hitler harbored anti-Soviet intentions, since a goodly share of Hitler's remarks might have been dismissed as propaganda, Stalin nevertheless felt obliged to take some measures. The special relationship with the Reichswehr was ended, and its installations on Soviet territory were closed down.27
Still the question of future relations between Germany and the Soviet Union remained undecided. The Soviet leadership continued to hope that after an initial period of tension during the Nazi consolidation of power it would be possible to reestablish the previous rapport between the two countries. On August 16, 1933, Abel Enukidze, secretary of the USSR Central Executive Committee, expressed this view openly to the German ambassador, von Dirksen. "The National Socialist reshaping [of Germany]," he said, "could have favorable consequences for German—Soviet relations." Enukidze was quite blatant in his attempt to point out common lines of development and analogous traits between German national socialism and Soviet communism.28
In late 1933 and early 1934, that is, right when the Soviet government was deciding to orient its foreign policy toward "collective security," it made persistent overtures to Germany, one after another, urging a renewal of friendly relations.
On November 6, 1933, Deputy Defense Commissar Tukhachevsky said to von Twardowsky, counselor at the German embassy in Moscow, "In the Soviet Union the Rapallo policy remains the most popular." It would never be forgotten, he added, that the Reichswehr had helped to train the Red Army in very difficult times. The Red Army would heartily welcome the renewal of such collaboration. All that was needed was to dispel the fears of a hostile policy by the new German government toward the Soviet Union. 29
In a meeting with Mussolini on December 4, 1933, Litvinov said, "We want to have the best possible relations with Germany. However, the USSR fears an alliance between Germany and France and seeks to parry such a move by making its own rapprochement with France."30
On December 13 Litvinov reiterated this to Nadolny, the German ambassador in Moscow: "We will not instigate anything against Germany. ... We have no intention of intriguing against her."31 This theme was developed by both Litvinov and Molotov in speeches before a session of the Central
Executive committee of the USSR on December 29, 1933.32 The session was held shortly after the Central Committee of the party had passed a resolution favoring a policy of collective security in Europe.33
Although in 1934 the Soviet Union made an official turnabout in foreign policy, even joining the League of Nations in September and becoming a very active member, Stalin secretly continued the old orientation toward Germany. Defense Commissar Voroshilov and Chief of Staff Egorov, in conversation with German officials in January 1934, repeatedly stressed the Soviet desire for the best possible relations with Germany.34
Stalin pursued the same line in his report to the Seventeenth Party Congress in February 1934. He was quite cautious in his assessment of the situation in Germany. He noted that "fascism of the German type... is wrongly called national socialism—wrongly because the most searching examination will fail to reveal even an atom of socialism in it."35 As to the first part of the name, suggesting nationalism, Stalin had no comment. Instead he began to revise the party's traditionally unfavorable attitude toward nationalism in general, including Russian nationalism. It was not long after this that the "comments" by Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov on Soviet history textbooks were written. This shift in attitude toward the historical past occurred simultaneously with the beginning of a revised attitude toward fascism, particularly the German type.
Stalin considered the Nazi party an instrument of the big industrialists and the Reichswehr. He did not grasp the relatively autonomous character of the fascist movement. Believing that the Reichswehr had complete control of the situation, and being intent on a renewal of military collaboration with Germany, he never understood the danger nazism represented.
"We are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany," he said to the Seventeenth Party Congress. "But fascism is not the issue here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy has not prevented the USSR from establishing the best relations with that country."36 The door remained open for an entente with Germany.
According to Walter Krivitsky, head of Soviet military intelligence in Western Europe, Stalin regarded the events of June 30, 1934, in Germany (the "Night of the Long Knives," when Hitler murdered his former cohorts, among them Ernst Roehm) as the end of the "party period" and the beginning of the "state period" of the Nazi regime.37 Shortly after June 30, Krivitsky reports, "the Politburo decided at all costs to induce Hitler to make a deal with the Soviet government." After the Night of the Long Knives, Stalin concluded that "Hitler represented the organized state power standing above the nation," the kind of organized power Stalin valued so highly. Only one problem remained—to convince Hitler that Russia was Germany's logical ally.38
Although the Soviet press had been carrying on a campaign in favor of collective security and against the aggressive, expansionist aims of the Nazis, Radek, himself the director of the press campaign, explained with cynical candor to Krivitsky: "Only fools can imagine we would ever break with Germany. What I am writing here is one thing—the realities are something else. No one can give us what Germany has given us. For us to break with Germany is simply impossible."39
Radek was probably referring not only to military collaboration with Germany but also to the important technical and economic assistance received from that country during the First Five-Year-Plan. It is certainly true that foreign economic assistance, including German, played a decisive role in Soviet industrialization.
The Soviet Union began presenting proposals to Germany, one after the other—for example, that the two powers provide joint guarantees to the Baltic states; that they join together in an "Eastern Pact" that would guarantee the security of all participating countries; and so on. Hitler rejected all these proposals.
At the same time, the policy of collective security, that is, rapprochement with France and England, was pursued more intensively. Stalin's new hope was that fear of encirclement would prompt Germany to improve relations with the Soviet Union.
Kalinin, the official head of state (president of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets), told the new German ambassador, Schulenburg: 'The outcries in the press should not be given too much importance. The German and Soviet peoples are linked by many different ties and depend on one other in many ways."40