Hitler was preoccupied with a similar concern. His generals clearly stated their opposition to a two-front war. The overall strategy of Nazi Germany was to defeat its adversaries one at a time, while seeking to prevent a political or military alliance among them. The worsening of Polish—German relations and the relative military weakness of Britain and France made Hitler more receptive to the idea of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
In the middle of June Stalin decided to try talking with the Germans again, but to be more explicit this time. On June 15 Astakhov met with Draganov, the Bulgarian envoy to Berlin, and explained to him that the Soviet Union had to choose among three possibilities: a pact with France and Britain; prolongation of the Anglo—Franco—Soviet talks; or an agreement with Germany. The latter possibility would correspond most closely with Soviet wishes, he said, and he proceeded to outline for Draganov the substance of a Soviet—German agreement. He noted in particular that the Soviet Union refused to recognize Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia; in other words, he made it clear that one of the bases for a future agreement would be the "return" of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. He also said that the one obstacle to an agreement was the Soviet fear of a German attack through the Baltic countries or Romania. If Germany were to declare that it would not attack the Soviet Union or would agree to a nonaggression pact, the USSR would probably refrain from making a pact with Britain. However, Astakhov continued, since the Soviet Union did not know Germany's real intentions, there was much to say in favor of prolonging the talks with Britain, in order to maintain a free hand. Draganov, as Astakhov surely expected, informed the German Foreign Ministry of this conversation without delay.70
On June 15, while Astakhov was meeting with Draganov, the British and French governments were conveying to the Soviet government their responses to its proposals. They agreed to a mutual assistance pact but refused to sign a military convention simultaneously because the time period was too short. They suggested instead that there be consultations between the three countries' general staffs.71
The British government wished to prolong the negotiations because at that point it was making a deep probe of German intentions. Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, saw Goering on June 9 and told him that if Germany wanted to initiate peace talks with Britain, it would meet with a "not unfriendly response."72 From June to August 1939, British—German talks of an unofficial character began, were broken off, and began again several times.73 However, Germany's demands, especially the demand that the Near East be viewed as its "natural economic sphere," were absolutely unacceptable to Britain. The positions of Germany and Britain were irreconcilable in another respect: the Nazis aspired to unrestricted supremacy on the European continent.
Stalin did not understand that this was a favorable moment for the Soviet Union, although he constantly harped on the theme, derived from Lenin's theory of imperialism, that the contradictions between the rival capitalist powers were irreconcilable.
It was thus that in the summer of 1939 both Britain and the Soviet Union found themselves interested in prolonging negotiations on a mutual assistance pact. In so doing, they left the key decisions on the fate of the world in the hands of Hitler's Germany, which desired the outbreak of war as quickly as possible.
On June 28 Molotov again made the point to Schulenburg that the normalization of political relations with Germany was possible and desirable.74 Schulenburg replied that Germany would welcome such normalization. Molotov expressed his satisfaction; he was particularly pleased that Germany regarded the 1926 neutrality pact between the two countries as still in effect.75
On July 22 commercial talks between Germany and the Soviet Union started again, with a high-ranking German official, Julius Schnurre, in attendance. The next day, the Soviet government suggested to Britain and France that talks be held in Moscow between representatives of the armed forces of the three countries. Britain and France accepted the proposal on July 25. The government of Neville Chamberlain nevertheless attempted to stall the talks. The British military mission did not arrive in Moscow until August 11, and it came with instructions not to make any specific commitments that might under certain circumstances tie the hands of the British government. The delegation was instructed in particular not to discuss the Baltic states or the positions of Poland and Romania.76 So unencouraging were the instructions from the British government to its military mission, in fact, that the British ambassador in Moscow wrote to Lord Halifax to inquire whether his government actually desired progress in the negotiations.77
Stalin's mistrust of Britain's intentions deepened. Probably by this time Soviet intelligence already knew that Germany had set August 26 as the date for the attack on Poland.
Hitler, for his part, was worried about the military talks in Moscow. So was the German high command, whose strategic conception was to subdue Poland with a blitzkrieg, limiting the fighting to that one front.
On July 27, Schnurre stated clearly to Astakhov and Babarin, the head of the Soviet delegation at the trade talks, that a gradual normalization of political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union was possible and desirable. Astakhov objected to this gradual approach; the matter was urgent, and the Soviet Union felt an imminent threat from the direction of Germany, all the way from the Baltic to Romania. Astakhov wanted to know whether Germany had long-range political aims in regard to the Baltic states, and he underscored the seriousness of the Romanian question. He also stated outright, the first time for a Soviet diplomat, that Danzig should be returned to Germany and that the question of the Polish corridor should be resolved in Germany's favor.78 In this conversation the main outlines of the future Soviet—German pact began to emerge.
On July 29, Schulenburg received orders from Berlin to meet with Molotov to confirm Astakhov's and Babarin's statements. The telegram especially underlined the point that no matter how the Polish question might be resolved, by peaceful means or otherwise, Germany was ready to ensure Soviet interests and to reach an agreement with the Soviet government.79 On August 3, Ribbentrop met with Astakhov in Berlin.80 The same day Molotov met with Schulenburg in Moscow. Both sides sought to clarify exactly what their respective obligations would be under the indicated agreement. Schulenburg told Molotov that from the Baltic to the Black Sea there were no conflicts of interest between the Soviet Union and Germany, that the anti-Comintern pact was not directed against the Soviet Union, any more than Germany's nonaggression pacts with the Baltic states, and that Germany's demands on Poland did not affect Soviet interests. Molotov restated what the Soviet side wanted from Germany and expressed his distrust of Germany's intentions, but more importantly, he left no doubt that the Soviet government was ready for a new relationship with Germany.81
It was thus that at the beginning of August, on the eve of talks between the military missions of the Soviet Union, Britain, and France, the situation was such that the Soviet Union was able to choose among three possibilities: to ally itself with Britain and France against the fascist aggressor, Nazi Germany, which was preparing to attack Poland; to guarantee its own interests by reaching an agreement with Germany and thereby open the door to a German attack on Poland and hence a general war; or to stay clear of any and all agreements and thereby hope to keep out of war.
Later assertions by the Soviet government that it had no choice in making its pact with Germany do not correspond to historical reality. In fact, Stalin was inclined toward an agreement with Germany for many reasons. Above all, he hoped to obtain from Germany the Baltic region, eastern Poland, and Bessarabia. Also, as an absolute despot, he was extremely hostile toward any form of democracy. He easily understood the psychology of his fellow dictator, Hitler. After all, the two had so much in common. They had learned a great deal from one another; they used analogous methods against their real or imagined political opponents; and there was a striking similarity between Soviet and Nazi propaganda.