On August 10, one day before the British military delegation arrived in Moscow, Astakhov met with Schnurre again and informed him that instructions he had received from Moscow stressed the Soviet government's desire to improve its relations with Germany. Astakhov explained that the USSR had entered into military talks with France and Britain, not with any special enthusiasm, but simply out of the necessity to protect itself from the German threat, which had forced the Soviet government to seek help wherever it could find it. The situation had changed once talks with Germany had begun. The outcome of the talks with Britain and France was uncertain, and it was quite likely that the question of alliances was completely open from the standpoint of the Soviet government. Astakhov's own meeting with Schnurre was undoubtedly an indication of this. At the heart of the discussion was the question of Poland, but neither participant wished to be candid on the subject; each sought only to present his government's position.82
The military talks with Britain and France began the next day in Moscow. During the most intensive phase of the negotiations, on August 14, Astakhov informed Schnurre over the phone that he had been instructed by Molotov to say that the Soviet Union was interested in discussing not only economic problems but also such matters as the press, cultural cooperation, the Polish question, and past Soviet—German political relations. Moscow was suggested as the site of the negotiations. 83
Thus, by mid-August the Soviet Union had decided in principle to make an agreement with Germany. In effect, the terms had already been formulated by Molotov and made known to the German government: the Baltic states, including Lithuania, were consigned to the Soviet sphere of interest, along with Bessarabia; and the Polish question to be solved "in Germany's favor." All that remained was to hear the German reply.
Astakhov left Schnurre on August 14, at about 2 PM. Seven hours later, Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg a telegram, telling him to communicate the following message to Molotov: First, the period when Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were in hostile camps was past. A new future was coming into existence. Second, there were no real conflicts of interest between Germany and the USSR. Germany did not harbor any aggressive designs toward the Soviet Union. In the area between the Baltic and the Black Sea there were no problems that could not be solved to the mutual satisfaction of the two great powers, in particular those of the Baltic states, Poland, southeastern Europe, and so forth. Ribbentrop announced a turning point in German—Soviet relations. He was ready to travel to Moscow at once to meet with Stalin and explain to him Hitler's view. He did not exclude the possibility of establishing a basis for further improvement in their relations.84
On August 16, Schulenburg communicated this information to Molotov, whose reaction was very encouraging. The Soviet government, he said, welcomed the German desire to improve relations and believed in the sincerity of Germany's intentions. He raised the idea of a nonaggression pact being signed during Ribbentrop's visit. He restated the Soviet demands: a nonaggression pact; German pressure on Japan to improve relations with the Soviet Union and put an end to the border conflict; and mutual guarantees in regard to the Baltic states.85
At that point the governments of Germany and the Soviet Union were in a hurry. They knew that ten days later Germany would invade Poland. Hitler needed support from the USSR, which shared a long border with
Poland. Stalin was eager to obtain what he wanted from Germany before the attack on Poland. In the Kremlin the draft of a nonaggression pact was hastily prepared.
On August 16, Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg a new telegram to deliver to Molotov. Germany would be willing to sign a twenty-five-year nonaggression pact with the USSR and jointly to guarantee the Baltic states. At the same time it would use its influence to help normalize Soviet—Japanese relations. Since a serious incident with Poland might occur at any moment, the telegram said, a rapid and thorough clarification of Soviet—German relations was desirable. The German foreign minister would be ready to go to Moscow at any time after August 18.86
On August 17, Molotov informed Schulenburg that the Soviet government was willing to forget the past and improve its relations with Germany. First, however, economic and credit agreements should be signed, with a nonaggression pact to be concluded shortly thereafter. In any event—and this was the most important part of Molotov's reply—a protocol should also be signed in which, among other things, the German statements of August 15 would be included. While agreeing in principle to Ribbentrop's visit, Molotov specified that a certain amount of time would be necessary to prepare for his arrival.87
The Soviets needed this delay to find a convenient pretext for breaking off the talks with the French and British military delegations. The pretext was furnished by the British, who, on the one hand, did not have formal authorization to sign an agreement and, on the other, had not been able to persuade the Polish and Romanian governments to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territories in the event of war with Germany. These could be used as grounds for breaking off the talks. However, had the Soviet government sincerely wished to reach an agreement with Britain and France, it could have waited a few days longer to learn the results of the French and British diplomatic efforts in Warsaw.
Such patience was no longer consistent with Stalin's plans. He had decided upon an alliance with Germany. The idea had long been ripening in his mind, and the time to realize it had come.
On August 17, a four-day suspension of the Anglo—Franco—Soviet talks was announced.
On August 19, the Soviet government formally agreed to Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, to occur during the week after the signing of the Soviet— German economic agreement. At the same time Molotov delivered to Schulenburg the Soviet draft of a nonaggression pact.88 It included a special clause: the treaty would go into effect only if a secret protocol were signed on foreign policy questions of interest to both parties.
The trade pact was signed on August 20. The next day Pravda noted in its lead story that the agreement "could be a serious step toward a further improvement of relations, not only economic but also political, between the USSR and Germany."89
At 3 PM on August 21, Schulenburg delivered a telegram to Molotov in which Hitler announced his agreement in principle with the Soviet draft treaty and the secret protocol. Hitler warned that a crisis in German—Polish relations could break out at any time and insisted that Stalin meet with Ribbentrop on August 22 or 23 at the latest.90
Stalin's reply was positive. He agreed to meet with Ribbentrop on August 23. In his answer to Hitler he expressed the hope of seeing the establishment of peace and cooperation between the USSR and Germany.91
The same day, August 21, after the British and French delegations announced that they had received no replies from their respective governments, Voroshilov, who was chairing the talks, announced their adjournment for an unspecified period, until Paris and London produced their answers. But all this mattered very little. Stalin had made up his mind. The double game was at an end.
Neville Chamberlain's game of double-cross also came to an end. For him, it ended in defeat, for at that point Britain faced the certainty of war with Germany.