On the evening of August 23, at the Kremlin, the Soviet—German non- aggression pact was signed. Hitler did not accede to all of Stalin's demands; nevertheless, the pact went further than the usual promises to renounce aggression and resolve differences through peaceful means. The two parties also agreed (in article 4) not to participate in any alliance aimed directly or indirectly against the other signatory. Treaties of friendship or alliance often include such clauses.
Germany promised to try to persuade its ally Japan to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union. The USSR agreed to supply Germany with food and strategic raw materials in return for industrial equipment.
The additional secret document signed at the same time as the non- aggression pact left no doubt that this ten-year treaty was a political alliance, establishing the two powers' spheres of influence in Europe.
The preamble to the agreement stated that in strictly confidential conversations the representatives of the two states had discussed "the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe." The Soviet Union and Germany agreed that in the event of political and territorial "rearrangement" in the Baltic region (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania would be considered the border between the spheres of German and Soviet influence. In that case Vilnius would be returned to Lithuania. In the event of changes in the Polish state, the border between the two spheres would go along the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers. This meant that the Baltic states and eastern Poland would be in the Soviet sphere. Germany also stated that it had no interest in Bessarabia, meaning that it would go to the Soviet Union.92
This secret agreement, never published in the Soviet Union, became known only at the Nuremberg trials. Even now the Soviet government conceals from its people the real nature of the Stalin—Hitler pact. This was the first but not the last secret agreement to be reached between Germany and the USSR in 1939-1941.
On the evening of August 23 a party was held in the Kremlin to celebrate the signing of the pact. As the German guests were leaving, Stalin addressed Ribbentrop "with words to this effect," according to Hencke, one of the Nazi officials present: 'The Soviet government takes the new pact very seriously. He [Stalin] could guarantee on his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner."93
Stalin also warned the Germans against underestimating the strength of their adversaries, England and France. "England," he told Ribbentrop, "despite its weakness, would wage war craftily and stubbornly," and he expressed the opinion that the French army was a factor to take into serious account.94
For Stalin, the pact with Germany was the culmination of many years of effort. In an August 31, 1939, report to the Supreme Soviet on the reasons for the nonaggression pact, Molotov said first of all that Russia and Germany had suffered the most from World War I. He stressed that the Soviet government had long desired to improve its political relations with Germany. Recalling that Hitler had extended the 1926 neutrality pact in 1933, he added: "Even before this the Soviet government considered it desirable that a major step be taken on the path of improved relations with Germany, but circumstances were such that this did not become possible until now." These words clearly expressed Molotov's regrets that the pact had not been reached earlier (and remind us of the Kandelaki initiative). Molotov also regretted that the Soviet—German agreement was limited to a nonaggression pact.
It is true that in the present case this is not a mutual assistance pact, as was discussed in the talks with France and Britain, but only a nonaggression pact. Nevertheless, given the present circumstances, it is difficult to overestimate the international importance of the Soviet—German pact. ... It is a turning point in the history of Europe, and not only of Europe.94 (Emphasis added.)95
It truly was a turning point in the history of Europe and of the world. By signing the pact with Germany, the Soviet Union opened the door to war. It was no coincidence that the same session of the Supreme Soviet passed a law on compulsory conscription, replacing the previous law on universal military service.96 The very name of the new law testified to the fact that a qualitative change had occurred in the Soviet government's attitude toward war and peace. The time had come when a war in Europe would be beneficial to Soviet interests, just as the policy of collective security, buttressed by the Comintern's popular front tactic, had served those interests until then.
With the conclusion of the secret agreement with the Soviet Union, Germany was protected against a major conflict on its eastern front. The way was clear for an attack on Poland.
On August 24, Pravda called the Soviet—German pact an "act of peace," which would undoubtedly contribute to "an easing of tensions in the present international situation." A week later, on September 1, Germany invaded Poland and World War II began.
On September 3, Ribbentrop asked Molotov whether the Soviet Union would not find it desirable to move against the Polish army and occupy the Soviet sphere of influence. Stalin did not want the Soviet Union to be identified with the German aggression. He preferred to wait and present to the Soviet people and the world the Red Army's entry into Poland as an action intended to protect the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population from German aggression. This was why Molotov said in his reply that the Soviet Union agreed with Germany that the right moment was absolutely necessary for taking concrete action, but that moment had not yet arrived. Hasty action could only "hurt our cause," he said, and contribute to the unification of "oar adversaries." The text of this document is very important, for in speaking of "our adversaries" and "our cause" Molotov implied—the first time for the Soviet Union—that the Soviet government had the same adversaries and objectives as Nazi Germany.97
At that point Stalin felt the time was right for Soviet troops to enter Poland. All reservists up to the age of forty-five, especially technicians and medical personnel, were called up. Hospitals were improvised in school buildings, many goods disappeared from the stores, and rumors spread that rationing was about to begin.98 The Soviet population, particularly in the western regions, felt the winds of war.
The swift advance of German troops through Poland took the Soviet government by surprise. It had expected military operations to last longer. This was a major lesson in modern military strategy. Future events were
to show that it was a lesson the Soviet leadership never fully grasped.
In Berlin the Soviet delay in entering Polish territory was viewed with growing concern. Such action represented the only way of testing the practical value of the German—Soviet pact. The German press agency distributed a statement by General von Brauchitsch, commander-in-chief of German land forces, implying that an armistice between Germany and Poland would be signed at once and that therefore military action on Poland's eastern border would be unnecessary. This statement sought to prod the Soviets into action. Meanwhile, the Soviet government was seeking to justify a move against Poland in the eyes of the Soviet people. On September 10 Molotov told Schulenburg with undisguised cynicism that "the Soviet government wants to use the continuing advance of German troops to explain that Poland has fallen and that, consequently, the Soviet Union is forced to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians 'threatened' by Germany." This action would provide respectability in the eyes of the masses and would remove the impression that the Soviet Union was acting as an aggressor."