According to Marshal Shaposhnikov, head of the Soviet General Staff, in his remarks to the British and French military delegations in Moscow in August 1939, the Soviet Union could at that time have mobilized against Germany 120 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions, 5,000 pieces of medium and heavy artillery, 9,000—10,000 tanks, and 5,000—5,500 bombers and fighter planes.124
Given this unfavorable relationship of forces for Germany, the Soviet thesis of an immediate danger from Germany after its attack on Poland does not stand up.
Another official thesis of Soviet historiography is true, however: Germany was able to go to war against the Soviet Union only after taking over most of continental Europe and adapting the economic resources thus acquired to the German war effort.125 But this refutes the thesis of a German threat in 1939. In September 1939, even if Germany had waged war against Poland under conditions of political isolation, there was no danger that it would have gone on to attack the Soviet Union at that time.
The official Soviet argument suffers from another weakness: at the time of the Stalin—Hitler pact there was no real danger of war with Japan. As we have seen, there were major clashes with Japan on the Mongolian border in the summer of 1939. But Japan got the worse of the encounter and chose to reconsider its "grand strategy," turning its eyes instead to the Asian and southern Pacific colonies of the European powers. Even in 1941, when the Soviet Union found itself in serious difficulties, Japan concentrated its attention on southern Asia and the Pacific, so that the Soviet government decided to withdraw entire divisions from the Far East to the Soviet—German front.
The official Soviet argument insists on the danger of a two-front war.126
One reason for this is that for nearly ten years the Soviet leadership was hypnotized by the idea that war with Japan was likely—in view of Japanese expansionism in Manchuria and China.127 (Japan's policy reversal in 1939 apparently did not register, and so the preconception remained unaltered.)
The truth is that all of the rationalizations for Stalin's decision to make a pact with Hitler were invented after the fact to justify Soviet policy and whitewash the military-political leadership.
The Soviet—German pact actually was motivated in part by the idea of setting the capitalist powers against one another. The Leninist doctrine that contradictions between capitalist states should be exploited to further the cause of socialism made any policy justifiable as long as it promoted war between the imperialist powers.
Which side to choose to try to achieve this end? Germany offered certain long-term advantages, and of more immediate importance, it offered eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia.
Another consideration drew Stalin to the pact with Hitler.
Stalin was sure that Germany would not risk attacking France and Britain unless it felt safe on its eastern front. In signing the pact with Hitler, Stalin knew quite well that war in Europe would inevitably follow. In his report to the Supreme Soviet on August 1, 1940, Molotov said with satisfaction: "This agreement, which our government will abide by scrupulously, has eliminated all possibility of friction in Soviet—German relations while Soviet measures are taken along our western border, and at the same time it has provided Germany with a calm certainty in the east."128
The official press echoed these words: 'This agreement and the economic and practical pacts between the USSR and Germany which followed it have provided Germany with a calm certainty in the east. They also provide it with substantial assistance in solving the economic problems it faces" (emphasis added—A. N.).129 This undoubtedly referred to the agreed-upon Soviet deliveries of food and strategic raw materials.
Stalin needed a war in Western Europe for one other reason. Despite his boasts about the strength of the Red Army, he knew the situation was very serious. The best military cadres had been eliminated, the arms industry was not yet producing up-to-date weapons, agriculture was still in crisis, and civilian industry was functioning by fits and starts. The Soviet Union needed time to prepare for a major war. Stalin assumed that the pact with Germany would buy time, that Germany would be bogged down in positional warfare on the western front, as it had in World War I, that bloody battles like those of the Marne and Verdun would weaken France, Britain, and Germany alike. Then the Soviet Union's moment would come. Soviet policy during 1939—1941 flowed from this perspective. Military production targets were scheduled to ensure readiness for war no earlier than 1942.
Contrary to the predictions of Hitler s strategists, the war in Poland lasted six weeks, not two. Despite its lack of modern armament, its isolation, and the inertia of its French and British allies, the Polish army, fought the invader with extraordinary courage. Hitler's armies were not able to take Warsaw completely until September 28. Even after the Red Army's treacherous attack in their rear, the Poles fought on for another two weeks, with battalions of workers coming to the aid of the regular Polish army. The last center of resistance, on the Hela peninsula, held out until the early part of October. Then a reign of terror settled over Poland.
Shortly after this victory Hitler launched a "peace offensive" toward Britain and France. His condition for making peace was the recognition of German hegemony over Europe; in effect he was asking for the capitulation of the Western powers. The Soviet Union supported this "peace offensive." Stalin and Molotov declared that Britain and France were the aggressors, that Germany was only defending itself. A campaign was launched in the Soviet press to persuade the United States not to intervene in Europe and not to support Britain and France.
In April 1940 the German army occupied Denmark and Norway. On May 10, 1940, it launched its offensive on the western front. The same day, Molotov told the German ambassador that he had no doubt of Germany's success.130
The campaign in Western Europe ended a month and a half later with the capitulation of France, the evacuation of the British expeditionary force from Dunkirk to the British Isles and the occupation of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg by German troops. The entire western part of the continent was in German hands. Britain alone continued the war against Germany, but its situation was extremely grave.
The speed with which France was defeated came as a total surprise to government leaders around the world, including Stalin. His expectation of protracted positional warfare in the West turned out to be wrong, and his conception of World War II as a repetition of the "first imperialist war" proved hopelessly outmoded.
Molotov conveyed to the German ambassador in Moscow the Soviet government's warmest congratulations on his army's "brilliant successes" in France.131 But the real mood in the Kremlin was anything but cheerful. A decision was made to incorporate the Baltic states and Bessarabia into the USSR without delay. This was done during June and July 1940. Stalin's haste reflected his uncertainty over Germany's next move. The fall of France had decisively shifted the balance of forces. The international position of the Soviet Union had worsened considerably, and the Soviet—German accords of 1939 were no guarantee against German attack.
In late June and early July 1940, the new British government of Winston Churchill made several moves in the direction of improving relations with the USSR, but no positive response came from the Soviet government, mesmerized as it was by the German victories.132