Molotov arrived in Berlin on November 12. He listened quietly to the speeches of Ribbentrop and Hitler, who explained that Britain had been defeated and would never set foot on the European continent again. Molotov agreed with Hitler that both powers had greatly benefited from their collaboration. He stressed that Germany had been protected on its eastern flank and that this had been a major factor in the victories of the Reich in the first year of war. He added, however, that not all problems had yet been solved, in particular the questions of Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. The German minutes of the meeting (the Soviet version has never been published) state that Molotov agreed with the Flihrer's observations on the role of America and England. "Soviet adherence to the Tripartite Pact," he said, "seemed perfectly acceptable in principle, as long as it participated as an equal partner, not just a passive object." If this condition were accepted, he saw no obstacle to Soviet participation "in this joint effort" (emphasis added—A. N.).147 But he asked for further clarification, particularly of the Asian area.
Molotov reproached the Germans for not responding to Stalin, who had asked that Southern Bukovina be added to the Soviet sphere. He further insisted on the withdrawal of German troops from Finland and cessation of anti-Soviet propaganda in that country. Hitler promised all of this but at the same time warned Molotov to avoid another war with Finland. Molotov asked German agreement to a Soviet guarantee of the integrity of Bulgaria, such as the German one given to Romania. Hitler had no objection, as long as Bulgaria itself asked for such a thing. He also said that he shared the Soviet point of view on the need to change the agreement to include the Turkish straits and to authorize free passage of Soviet warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.
Molotov listened without commenting when the proposed agreement on the division of the world into four spheres of influence was outlined. On November 14 he returned to Moscow. Twelve days later the Soviet answer was sent to Hitler. The USSR accepted the German proposal to divide the world into spheres of influence but with certain changes: the Soviet sphere should extend south of Baku and Batum, that is across Turkish territory, into northern Iran and Iraq. The USSR should have the right to establish a military base on the straits, Turkey should be invited to join the Tripartite Pact, and territorial guarantees should be given to Turkey jointly by Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. If Turkey refused, the three powers would take appropriate military and diplomatic measures to safeguard their interests.
In addition, the Soviet government, while agreeing to respect German economic interests in Finland, insisted that Germany immediately withdraw its troops from that country. It also asked that Japan renounce its claims to coal and oil deposits on the northern Sakhalin island and that Bulgaria become part of the Soviet sphere and sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union.148
These were the conditions the socialist Soviet Union proposed for agreeing to the Nazi plan to divide up the world. Later official claims that the Soviet government had rejected the Nazi proposals do not hold water. Molotov wrote to the Germans several times after that, asking for their answer to the Soviet counterproposals. All in vain. Hitler had decided on war against the USSR. On December 18, 1940, Plan Barbarossa was adopted in its final form.
A month earlier King Boris of Bulgaria had arrived in Berlin to discuss Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. (It formally joined on March 2, 1941.) On November 20, 1940, Hungary joined the pact. On November 23 Romania followed suit, as did Slovakia on November 24. Hitler had obviously decided to disregard Soviet views on such matters. Soviet protests were never answered. The irritation in Moscow over these developments took the form of erratic behavior. For example, the Soviet government spoke out against a rapprochement between Finland and Sweden (which could have had the beneficial effect of ensuring Finnish neutrality in the event of a Soviet—German war). It warned Finland that an agreement of this kind would annul the peace treaty it had signed with the Soviet Union. In other words, it threatened Finland with a new war. The result was that inside Finland the supporters of a rapprochement with Germany gained ground against the moderates.
Nazi Germany was clearly preparing for a new war, this time against the Soviet Union. But it decided first to take the Balkans and in that way isolate its two enemies, Britain and the Soviet Union.
In fact, the Balkan war was started by Italy, which on its own initiative, without consulting Germany, invaded Greece on October 28, 1940. In March 1941 Germany attacked Greece, saving Italy from a military disaster. The Reich then demanded that Yugoslavia join the Tripartite Pact. The Yugoslav premier agreed, but on March 27 he was overthrown in a popular revolt.
It was at this late hour, on April 5, 1941, that the Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty with Yugoslavia, which gave no practical aid to the besieged Yugoslavs but served as a kind of Soviet protest against Nazi expansion in the Balkans. The next day, April 6, Germany attacked Yugoslavia and quickly defeated its army. The Soviet Union did not lift a finger to help its "friend."
On June 18 Turkey signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. By this time Germany had completed its military buildup in Poland and Romania along the Soviet border. On June 20 German paratroops finished their operations in Crete against the British, who were forced to withdraw to Egypt.
The normalization of Soviet—Japanese relations was the only major success for Soviet foreign policy during this period. The fighting along the Mongolian border had ended in mid-September 1939, after the signing of the Stalin—Hitler pact. Germany's pact with the Soviet Union, the fall of France, the occupation of the Low Countries, the beleaguering of Britain— all this supported the views of the militarists in Japan, who advocated expansion to the south against the French, British, and Dutch colonies, not to the north and west, against the Soviet Union. Industrial and commercial sectors in Japan, interested in trade relations with the Soviet Union, especially those in the fishing industry, urged their government to sign a new fishing treaty with the Soviets. The old one had expired in 1939. Germany was also interested in seeing Japan expand southward, since this would distract the United States from Europe and force the British to disperse their forces to protect their empire.
The fishing pact was extended through 1942. On April 13, 1941, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on a visit to Moscow, signed a neutrality pact. This normalization of relations was very important for the Soviets at a time when relations with Germany were increasingly strained. The agreement was signed by the Japanese in spite of direct pressure on Matsuoka by Hitler and Ribbentrop, who hinted to him quite clearly that war against the Soviet Union was not far away. But since Japan had already chosen to expand southward, Matsuoka chose to guarantee its northern flank by signing the treaty. Thus the danger of a two-front war, both for Japan and for the Soviet Union, was greatly reduced.
DECEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION
The Soviet government had a vast international intelligence network at its disposal. Classified information on military and political matters found its way to Moscow through various channels: the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Commissariat of Defense, and the Comintern. The Soviet intelligence operations in Europe and Asia were among the best in the world, not only because they were staffed by steeled professionals, such as Richard Sorge, Lev Manevich, Rado, and Trepper, but also because they had a fairly broad base of support among Western Communists, antifascists, and left intellectuals, whose devotion to communist ideals and to the first socialist country in the world led them to assist the Soviet intelligence effort. As a result, Soviet information was exceptionally reliable.