The strongest emotional reactions against Soviet—German rapprochement came from Soviet youth. At Moscow University those who presented the official account of the new development, the teachers of Marxism-Leninism, encountered angry and sarcastic questions and comments. Their confused explanations provoked outbursts of laughter.
Thousands of propagandists were sent to offices and enterprises to explain that the rapprochement was not a tactical maneuver but a change of policy of historical significance. A two-volume edition of Bismarck's memoirs was hastily prepared. He had been a strong proponent of a German—Russian alliance. Professor A. S. Jerusalimsky, the best Soviet expert on German history, was assigned to write an introduction. Stalin himself read the proofs of the introduction and made a number of changes. The main idea was summed up in these words, clearly intended for Hitler: "Bismarck saw the main danger for Germany in a conflict with Russia. ... His policy was based on an understanding of the strength and invincibility of the Russian people."155
On government orders, Sergei Eisenstein produced a Wagner opera at the Bolshoi Theater. Before then the German composer had not been regarded with favor, to say the least. The periodicals were filled with articles about the traditional friendship between the Russians and Germans. Forgotten were the "dog knights" whom Eisenstein himself had caricatured in Alexander Nevsky.
All this was far from being mere facade. In all institutions connected with foreign affairs the dismissal of people of Jewish origin began—in the commissariats of foreign affairs and foreign trade, the navy, the press agency TASS, and the main Soviet publications. Foreign diplomats and correspondents in Moscow took note of this. Jews were also removed from positions of authority in international ports, airlines, and railways. For the first time since the founding of the Soviet state anti-Semitism was becoming official policy; until then it had been camouflaged by talk about internationalism.
On some occasions official approval of the Hitler government's anti- Semitic policy was openly expressed on the local level, especially in the Ukraine and Crimea. Anti-Semitism also increased in the personnel directorates of the Red Army.
An objective analysis of the events preceding the war totally shatters the myth of a well thought out foreign and domestic policy led by the party and the Soviet government. In reality the leadership floundered helplessly, revealing a total inability to assess developments in the complicated international situation.
We have already mentioned Stalin's mistaken assumptions on how the war between Germany and the Allies would proceed. Another major error was made in regard to the Balkans in the spring of 1941—the USSR overestimated the military capacity of Yugoslavia. Stalin signed a friendship and nonaggression treaty with Yugoslavia on the eve of Germany's invasion of that country, thus repeating his error in regard to Western Europe. He counted on a prolonged war between Germany and Yugoslavia. Under the treaty, if one of the parties was attacked, the other would nevertheless maintain "a policy of friendly relations." But Yugoslavia was defeated after a very short campaign. The Soviet Union did not provide any assistance and could not have done so, for the Soviet government was fully aware of its own unpreparedness for war, and it was badly frightened by Germany's quick defeat of Yugoslavia. The uncertainty of Soviet policy reflected this fear of Germany. The government did its best not to irritate the Germans, going out of its way to show them it was ready to make additional concessions if Germany demanded them.
To the mounting concern of the Soviet government, Germany made no new demands. In April the USSR said it was ready to agree to a final line of demarcation with Germany, extending from the Igorka River to the Baltic Sea. The Soviet government also accepted the proposals made by the Germans on this question.156 It continued to deliver raw materials and foodstuffs to Germany in the most scrupulous way, delaying its own buildup of strategic materials. German reconnaissance flights over Soviet border territory became more and more frequent, but orders were given not to fire on them. The Soviet side limited itself to diplomatic protests. In some instances German planes which landed on Soviet territory were immediately returned to the Germans even though rolls of reconnaissance film were found on board.157
According to memoirs of Soviet military leaders, Stalin still hoped at that late date to maintain peace with Hitler but feared some provocation by the German generals. Like Hitler, he was extremely suspicious of generals. He continued to regard all warnings from British and American sources as machinations aimed at starting a Soviet—German conflagration, at which the Western powers would warm their hands.
Stalin chose the occasion of Japanese ambassador Matsuoka's departure from Moscow to praise publicly Soviet—German "friendship." He appeared unexpectedly at the departure ceremony and greeted Schulenburg warmly: "We must remain friends and you must do everything for that." To Colonel
Krebs, the German military attach6, he said: "We must remain friends, no matter what happens."158
On May 5, 1941, Stalin was named chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (a position equivalent to prime minister in Western countries). This appointment put Stalin in a position to negotiate with that other premier, Chancellor Hitler, or at least that is one possible interpretation. That hypothesis is strengthened by the increasingly friendly gestures made toward Germany, such as the closing of the Moscow embassies of Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia (countries occupied by Germany) and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iraq, where a profascist coup had recently occurred.
Stalin had made no public speeches since March 1939. He was obliged to show his face at last, to try to raise the morale of the Red Army commanders, who were discouraged by the events of the preceding few years (the arrests of Red Army leaders, friendship with Nazi Germany, the poor showing in the war with Finland). On May 5 he addressed the graduates of the Red Army military academies. In a forty-minute speech he called for greater mastery of the art of war and an enhanced capability to repel aggression.
Soviet willingness to make further concessions to Germany was understood by certain high-ranking officials of the Reich. Schnurre, head of the foreign trade department, expressed the opinion in a confidential memo that the Soviet Union would respond to new economic demands by Germany, thus enabling the Germans to meet their strategic needs for additional food and raw materials.159
Hitler continued to ignore these overtures, and the disarray in the Soviet government increased, especially after Rudolf Hess's flight to Great Britain on May 10, 1941. Stalin was convinced that this flight was part of a plan Hitler had to reach an understanding with Britain against the Soviet Union. In reality Hess took his action without Hitler's knowledge. For Britain Hess's flight was confirmation that Hitler was determined to invade the Soviet Union but feared having to fight a two-front war. Hess suggested that Europe be divided into two spheres of influence, one for Britain, one for Germany, and that Soviet territory as far as the Urals should go to Germany. Knowing Germany's intentions and understanding that Hess spoke for no one but himself, Britain chose to inform the Soviets of the Hess affair. For Stalin this was one more confirmation of his suspicion that Britain and Germany were intriguing against the USSR; to him the British warnings were nothing but attempts by the British imperialists to provoke a war with Germany.
It was impossible to ignore the real situation, however. Germany was building up its troop concentrations on the Soviet border, as was widely reported by the world press and attested to daily by the commanders of the military districts along the border.
Little by little Stalin was losing hope that Hitler would suggest new talks, and his alarm over the Soviet lack of preparedness for war mounted accordingly. It was under these conditions that on June 14 TASS issued a communique referring to foreign rumors that Germany had made new demands on the Soviet Union, that talks were underway aimed at reaching a new and more solid agreement, and that both countries had built up their troops along their common border. TASS denied that Germany had made new demands; hence new talks could not have occurred. The Soviet side had respected the nonaggression pact and would continue to do so. The rumors concerning Soviet preparations for war with Germany were "false and provocative."160 This communiqu6 seemed to be an overture to Germany to clarify its intentions and initiate new talks, but again there was no German reaction. The TASS communiqu6 had a demoralizing effect on the Soviet military, since it seemed to deny that there was any danger of war.