With Trotsky's support, Lenin rejected the very idea of a coalition. "If you have a majority," he said to the supporters of a coalition government, "take power in the Central Executive Committee and carry on. But we will go to the sailors." In response Kamenev, Rykov, Milyutin, Zinoviev, and Nogin left the Central Committee, and Rykov, Teodorovich, Milyutin, and Nogin left the Council of People's Commissars, the Sovnarkom. In their declaration, they stressed that the only way to maintain a purely Bolshevik government was through "political terror."96
As always, Lenin managed to put down the revolt of his troops through blackmail; he threatened to resign and appeal to the "rank and file." Later, Kamenev and his supporters made a full apology and returned to the bosom of the Central Committee and government. Kamenev, the unrecognized father of future "Eurocommunism," proposed more than once while Lenin was still alive that measures be taken to soften Bolshevik rule. But each time he quickly abandoned his proposals. Historians justly reproach him for his weakness and indecision. But this lack of tenacity in defending his ideas is primarily explained by the fact that Kamenev, in every dispute with Lenin, soon realized that a weakening of Bolshevik rule would threaten the very foundations of the party. The Old Bolshevik Kamenev did not want to change the party's character.
In rejecting all attempts at compromise and all claims by the other socialist parties to even the sightest share of power, Lenin only confirmed what had been stated in Pravda the day after the seizure of the Winter Palace:
We are taking power alone, relying on the country's voice and counting on the friendly support of the European proletariat. But having taken power, we will punish with an iron hand the enemies of the revolution and the saboteurs.... They dreamed of a Kornilov dictatorship.... We will give them the dictatorship of the proletariat.97
For Lenin, the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party.
Soviet power spread over the country with no serious resistance. Only in Moscow, where Lenin had said victory would be sure and there would be nobody to fight,98 did the resistance last for eight days.99 In general, local garrisons and armed workers' detachments easily dealt with any attempts to stop the Bolsheviks from taking power. The assassination of General Dukhonin, the commander-in-chief at Mogilev, by the Red Guards of the new commander-in-chief, Ensign Krylenko, completed the annihilation of the old army.
The consolidation of Soviet power could not be considered complete until the problem of the Constituent Assembly was resolved. The decision to convene the assembly, freely elected by the citizens to determine the future political regime in Russia, had been made by the Provisional Government. "All the best people of Russia," wrote Gorky, "for nearly a hundred years had lived by the idea of a Constituent Assembly."100 Among the slogans the Bolsheviks had used to campaign against the Provisional Government was the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly. They accused the government of preventing the people, "the true master of the Russian soul, from pronouncing its sovereign word." On April 4 Lenin, who had barely arrived in Russia, said with indignation, "I am accused of harboring views in opposition to the quickest possible convening of the Constituent Assembly! I would call these charges delirious raving if decades of political struggle had not taught me to view honesty in an opponent as a rare exception."101
The elections to the Constituent Assembly, the freest elections in the history of Russia, took place after the October revolution. The composition of the assembly (SRs, 40.4 percent; Bolsheviks, 24 percent; Cadets, 4.7 percent; Mensheviks, 2.7 percent)102 determined the ruling party's attitude toward it, an attitude which was violently negative. Nevertheless, on January 5, 1918, the Constituent Assembly met. Bonch-Bruevich, head of the Sovnarkom's administrative service, a friend of Lenin, and head of "Room 75," the embryo of the Soviet repressive agencies, recalls a "humorous conversation" in the halls of the Tauride Palace the day before the first session of the Constituent Assembly. Lenin's laughing reply to a comrade who impatiently insisted on knowing when the Constituent Assembly was finally going to begin its deliberations was this: "Since we made the mistake of promising the world that this talk shop would meet, we have to open it up today, but history has not yet said a word about when we will shut it down."103 In order to teach the deputies to the Russian parliament where power lay, Bonch-Bruevich brought a "detachment of the most reliable sailors" to the Tauride Palace—200 sailors, or about one armed sailor for every two deputies, which was ample compensation for the absence of a Bolshevik majority. "I noticed," wrote Bonch-Bruevich, who was in the room with his sailors, "that two of them, surrounded by their comrades, were aiming their guns at Chernov." Bonch-Bruevich persuaded them not to kill the president of the assembly, adding that Lenin would not allow it. "Okay, since the Little Father doesn't want it, but it's too bad," said one sailor, speaking for everyone. At that time the "Little Father," as the sailors affectionately called Lenin, felt that it would be enough to disperse the Constituent Assembly. He gathered the members of the government and
after a quick exchange of opinions, the unanimous conclusion was reached that the talk shop was useless.... It was decided not to interrupt the proceedings, to give them a chance to jabber to their heart's content for a day, but not to allow the next day's session to take place, to announce that the assembly was dissolved, and to urge the deputies to return to their homes.104
Lenin lost all interest in the Constituent Assembly after it refused to acknowledge the primacy of the Bolshevik government and the decisions of the Soviet Congress. The historic announcement by the sailor Zhelez- nyakov, 'The guard is tired," ended the brief history of the Russian parliament. The guard's wishes became the fundamental law.
The left SRs, a splinter from the Socialist Revolutionary party, played an important role in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the consolidation of Bolshevik power. For a short time after the October revolution the Left SRs, led by Maria Spiridonova, Boris Kamkov, and Vladimir Karelin, maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality toward the new seat of authority. In November they entered the government and were given three ministerial posts, which allowed Lenin's government to present itself as a pluralistic one. At the Constituent Assembly the Left SRs blocked with the Bolsheviks.
On the eve of the gathering of the Constituent Assembly, Lenin played the role of judge, jury, and executioner for the first time. Bonch-Bruevich brought him "the first reports of sabotage," compiled by Room 75. Lenin read it all, verified it, checked the sources of the documents, compared handwriting, and arrived at the conclusion "that the sabotage movement really exists, that it is mainly directed from one center, and that this center is the Cadet party." He therefore decided to outlaw the party and brand its members "enemies of the people."105 A few days later, as president of the Sovnarkom, Lenin signed a decree to that effect. After chasing the Cadets out of the Constituent Assembly with the help of the Left SRs, Lenin was able to dissolve the parliament with little effort. A by-product of the decree outlawing the Cadet party was the murder in a hospital of two of the party's leaders, Shingarev and Kokoshkin, deputies to the Constituent Assembly.