On September 4, 1943, Stalin met with Metropolitan Sergii and two other high church officials. He approved the patriotic activities of the Orthodox clergy and faithful and authorized election of a "patriarch of Moscow and all Russia" and the gathering of a Holy Synod.85 In a special appeal to the priests of the occupied regions, Metropolitan Sergii of the Moscow Patriarchate warned against any collaboration with the enemy, which would be an act of "treason against the church and the motherland." He condemned Bishop Polikarp of Kiev for collaboration with the Germans.86
Thus, not only was the state reconciled with the church; it also acknowledged de facto that the church would be considered (when needed) an integral part of the regime. On September 8, Sergii was elected patriarch by a Council of Bishops, which adopted a major document entitled "Condemnation of the Traitors to the Faith and to the Motherland." It stressed that "every person guilty of treason to the cause of the church and who has gone over to the camp of fascism will be excommunicated as an enemy of the Cross, and if he is a bishop or other clergyman, will be defrocked."87 The war against Nazi Germany was thus proclaimed one of the goals of the Orthodox church.
Soon afterward, a theological institute with a two-year course of study was opened in Moscow, and one-year theology courses were authorized in the dioceses.88 Prayers for Stalin's health were organized in all churches. The metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia wrote fervently in the church magazine: 'The faithful see in our leader... the incarnation of all that is best and brightest, all that constitutes the sacred spiritual heritage of the Russian people, the legacy of their ancestors."89
This official reconciliation between Stalin and the church also meant that, from then on, the Soviet regime would support the patriarch and the authorities in their struggle against deviations from the Orthodox line, a kind of "general line" of the church. Soon afterward, many leaders of the New Church repented and were accepted back into the fold of the Orthodox church. The state now intensified its struggle against unauthorized sects all over the country, supporting the official church in every region, such as the Georgian and Armenian Orthodox churches.
As in the past, all church nominations had to be approved by state agencies. As far as privileges went, the high clergy were placed on the same footing as high state and party officials. When the first decorations were issued after the war, among the recipients were bishops of the Russian Orthodox church.
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WESTERN ALLIES
From the first hours of the German—Soviet war it became apparent that Hitler's hopes for the political isolation of the Soviet Union were unfounded. Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoglu was the only neutral to speak of it favorably. On hearing of the invasion, he said: "This is not a war, but a crusade. Yet even Turkey remained neutral and stayed out of the war.
The British reaction was different from that of the United States. In 1940—1941, the British empire had suffered defeat after defeat in its outlying regions: General Waveil's Near Eastern offensive failed and was followed by the pro-German coup in Iraq. The British were defeated in Greece and Crete, and a Spanish attack on Gibraltar seemed inevitable. In the naval war the British merchant fleet was suffering enormous losses, particularly in the Atlantic. It became much more difficult for Britain to supply itself with the raw materials and food it needed to survive.91 For the British, this was one of the worst periods of the war.
In the middle of 1941 both the Soviet Union and Britain inevitably had to face the choice of whether to make an alliance or not—the Soviet Union because of the threat of a German attack; Great Britain because of the very difficult situation in which it found itself after two years of war. A public opinion survey taken in Britain in April 1941 showed that almost 70 percent of those polled favored friendly relations with the Soviet Union. (In March 1939 it had been 84 percent.92) The British government had already shown its willingness to form an alliance with the USSR—by its warnings to the Soviet government on the impending German attack, by its attitude in the Hess affair, and by its agreement with the United States on measures to take in support of the USSR in the event of a German—Soviet war. Immediately after the attack of June 22, 1941, Churchill announced that Britain considered itself the ally of the Soviet Union and would render it all possible aid, stressing at the same time that he had been and still was an opponent of communism.93 His position was far different from that of the British military specialists, who believed that the Soviet Union would be defeated in a matter of ten days.94
On July 12, 1941, an agreement was signed in Moscow between Britain and the Soviet Union, both sides undertaking not to make a separate peace with Germany.95 On August 2 a military and economic pact was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States.96 And in October a tripartite agreement was concluded on the delivery of arms, military equipment, and strategic materials to the USSR.97 The flow of supplies soon began, and Allied tanks and airplanes played their part in the Battle of Moscow. Assistance to the Soviet Union was very important in late 1941 and early 1942, when the Germans had reached the outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad and were advancing steadily in the Russian southwest. The Soviet war industry, part of which had fallen into the hands of the Germans and the rest transferred to the east, was virtually paralyzed. U.S. and British arms deliveries were shipped through the dangerous waters of the Arctic Ocean, where German warships sent many Allied ships to the bottom. Allied seamen showed great courage in regularly bringing supplies through to Murmansk. A British air force unit was stationed there to carry out air reconnaissance and to protect the convoys as they approached Soviet shores.
From September 1941 to mid-June 1942 sixteen convoys were sent to the Soviet Union; they delivered over 3,000 planes, 4,000 tanks, 30,000 motor vehicles, and large quantities of other materials.98 In mid-June these deliveries were suspended because of heavy British losses from attacks by German warships. During the entire war the Allies sent the USSR 18,700 planes, 10,800 tanks, 9,600 guns, 401,400 motor vehicles, 44,600 machine tools, 2,599,000 tons of petroleum products, 517,500 tons of non- ferrous metals, 172,100 tons of wire and cable, 1,860 locomotives, and 11,300 flatcars. These contributions amounted to 12 percent of the armament produced in the USSR for use against the Germans." The Allies also sent foodstuffs, clothing, and so on, to the USSR, and American trucks rendered the Soviet army mobile.
On the political level, the U.S.—Soviet—British alliance, formally concluded in 1942, focused on the question of a second front in Western Europe—that is, an Allied landing in France.100 The political maneuvering over the question of the second front involved not only the exchange of opinions, demands, and promises between the leaders of the three countries but also well-organized public opinion campaigns in Britain and the United States calling for the immediate opening of a second front.
On the military level this was impossible. In 1941—1942 the Allies lacked both the necessary forces and the experience for a gigantic landing of this type. Also, the prevailing British strategic doctrine, which the Americans for a long time accepted, differed radically from that of the Soviets, who were willing to accept higher risks. The Soviet Union especially insisted that its military burden be lightened, and indeed that burden was far heavier than what the Allies bore.
In the summer of 1941, 70 percent of the German armed forces were concentrated on the German—Soviet front. In the first half of 1944, on the eve of the Allied landing, the figure was 63 percent and even after the opening of the second front, it was between 55 and 57 percent.101 The absence of a second front in Europe meant even greater Soviet military losses, and these were already monumental for many reasons—the general hazards of war, the criminal negligence, mistakes, and oversights of the Soviet government and high command, and the lack of combat experience. From mid-1943 on the Red Army's losses decreased significantly.