After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, a demonstration took place in Petrograd which encountered the bullets of the Red Guards.
The workers of the Obukhov Factory, the cartridge factory, and other factories took part in the demonstration. Under the red flag of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party, the workers of Vasilevsky Island, Vyborg, and other districts marched to the Tauride Palace. It was exactly these workers who were shot, and for all of Pravdcis lies, it cannot conceal this shameful fact.106
Gorky wrote this in an article entitled "January 9—January 5," which drew a parallel between the shooting of workers by the tsar's troops on January 9, 1905, and the shooting of workers by the Red Guard on January 5, 1918.
CHAPTER
FROM THE REALM OF
NECESSITY TO THE REALM OF FREEDOM,
1918-1920
THE SHAMEFUL PEACE
Nikolai Berdyaev was wrong in believing that of all tendencies, bolshevism was "the least Utopian and the most realistic," that it best corresponded to the situation existing in Russia in 1917.1 The Bolsheviks had an easy victory because they promised Utopia: everything for everyone, right away. 'The face of truth is terrible," wrote the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno. 'The people need myths and illusions; they need to be lied to. Truth is frightening, insupportable, deadly." The Bolsheviks offered the illusion of peace, land, and bread. The reality, however, was a new war, forced grain requisitioning, famine, and unprecedented terror.
Shortly before the October revolution, at his retreat in Finland, Lenin put down in writing his plan for transforming Russia. He called his Utopia State and Revolution. He considered this work so important that in a note to Kamenev he requested that if the author were killed the pamphlet be published at all costs. Basing himself on the doctrine of Marx and Engels and taking as a living model the Paris Commune, Lenin outlined the communist state which would emerge after the proletarian revolution. In this state there would no longer be an army or police, all officials would be elected, and the functions of administering the state would be so simple that anyone, even a cook or housekeeper, could learn them. Government officials would earn no more than skilled workers; Lenin gave great importance to this concept. The author of State and Revolution recognized that the victory of the proletariat would not immediately give birth to a communist society; a period of transition would be necessary, during which the dictatorship of the proletariat would replace the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. "The proletariat needs the state," Lenin quoted Engels, "not in the interests of freedom, but in order to hold down its adversaries." The dictatorship of the proletariat had two basic functions: to suppress the exploiters' resistance, and to provide leadership for the masses of the population. The first function seemed simple to him, since the repression of an insignificant minority would be the work of the overwhelming majority of the population, the working class. The second function presented no major problems either; people should submit to the "armed vanguard" until everyone could "become accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social intercourse... without coercion, without subordination."2
Immediately upon taking power Lenin ran into harsh reality, which put his Utopia to the test. First of all, the new government had to resolve the war problem, which had been fatal to the Provisional Government. Negotiations with Germany began at Brest-Litovsk in December. Prince Max von Baden described in his memoirs some of the peculiarities of these talks. His cousin, Prince Ernst von Hohenlohe, a member of the German delegation, was placed next to a Madame Bitsenko at the dinner table: "She earned this distinction by having murdered a minister." Anastasia Bitsenko had committed this act in 1905. The veteran terrorist represented the Left SRs in the delegation. The encounter at the dinner table between Hohenlohe and Bitsenko, and at the negotiating table between Leon Trotsky and General Hoffmann, was a confrontation between Utopia and reality. The majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee thought that if they simply announced the war was over they could calmly proceed to the building of communism. The Germans demanded reality, that is to say, territory: Poland, Lithuania, parts of Latvia and Byelorussia.
Bukharin, the spokesman for the Left Communists, an important grouping within the Central Committee, rejected in principle any compromise with the imperialists and preached a "revolutionary war" against Germany, explaining that it would ignite a "worldwide conflagration." Trotsky proposed the celebrated formula, "neither war nor peace," which was supported by the majority of the Central Committee. The Soviet government announced, through Trotsky, that it would withdraw from the war but not sign a peace treaty. Lenin, in the minority, argued the realities of the situation: we have no army, we are helpless, we must sign a treaty. His comrades and disciples had been blinded by Utopia. They failed to understand what was obvious to Lenin: Utopia could not be realized unless power was maintained. This last argument was Lenin's most important, convincing, and decisive one. When the Germans, taking advantage of Trotsky's announcement, began a new offensive and issued an ultimatum, Lenin demanded that it be accepted immediately. He explained, "If the Germans said that they wanted to overthrow Bolshevik power, we would naturally have to fight."3 In other words, power was worth fighting for, but not territory or other such "outmoded" concepts. In discussing Trotsky's refusal to sign the peace treaty, Bonch-Bruevich asks, "How can such a nonsensical attitude be explained?" He answers:
Generally it has been said that pseudo-patriotic and nationalistic prejudices played bad tricks on the negotiating commission; none of its members, including Trotsky, wanted to take upon himself the woeful responsibility of placing his signature on this humiliating peace treaty, which ignorant loudmouths might interpret as "betrayal of the homeland," a direct blow to Russia as a state.4
Lenin's fanatical self-assurance and belief in his Utopia allowed him to disregard such "pseudo-patriotic and nationalistic prejudices."
On March 3, 1918, the Soviet delegation signed a peace treaty at Brest- Litovsk, "a shameful peace," as Lenin put it, agreeing to German occupation of the Baltic states, parts of Byelorussia, and all of the Ukraine. The Soviet Republic agreed to pay an enormous indemnity to the Germans in the form of provisions, raw materials, and gold. But Lenin still held power. "The Brest-Litovsk peace," the Small Soviet Encyclopedia observes, "fulfilled the essential task of preserving the dictatorship of the proletariat."5
The Left SRs resigned from the government to protest the treaty, but they continued to support the Bolsheviks. Some officers and generals refused to recognize the unilateral peace, but the soldiers and peasants were opposed to war. Their support allowed Lenin to stay in power. The shameful peace did not, however, solve any internal problems. All existing conflicts were exacerbated.
On April 8, in a conversation with Lunacharsky, the people's commissar of education, Lenin presented an idea he "had been toying with for some time." In Campanella's City of the Sun the fronts of the houses were covered with frescoes that served to educate and instruct the citizens of that Utopian city. Lenin proposed that Lunacharsky select some slogans for a similar "monumental form of propaganda." Later Lenin picked his favorites from among the suggested slogans. He was especially fond of one: "The golden age is coming; people will live without laws or punishment, doing of their own free will what is good and just." Perhaps these words of Ovid had haunted Lenin as he wrote his State and Revolution. But the golden age did not come after the October revolution. Certainly, men began to live without laws, but nothing they did of their own free will was good or just.