Churchill's declaration about the right of the USSR to Lvov was a crucial turning point in the conference. It signified Britain's willingness to sanction the changes in the Soviet—Polish border made when Poland was divided by the Nazi—Soviet pacts of August 23 and September 28, 1939.
Still, Churchill wanted to get Stalin's pledge about the future Polish government. The most important thing, as he saw it, was not the territory but the form of government to be established on it. He was right, of course, in principle. But at this conference everything was important, both territory and power. Churchill proposed the creation of a Polish government without delay, right there at Yalta. Stalin feigned indignation: "I am called a dictator and not a democrat, but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse to create a government without the participation of the Poles themselves."113 Even the worldly Churchill was flabbergasted. In fact, Stalin and Churchill each made use of the ideological Achilles' heel and the particular language of his opponent. Roosevelt stood, as it were, above the battle. Juggling the very same terms and concepts, while each of the participants at the conference tossed in his own idea, was one of the methods of the political game at Yalta.
However, there was always the danger of "becoming too absorbed." For example, Churchill moved heaven and earth in order to get a more acceptable agreement about Poland from Stalin. Obliquely he tried to show Stalin that he was not hostile to communism. He recalled, for example, that despite his former conflicts with Gallagher, a Communist member of Parliament, he, Churchill, had sent condolences when Gallagher's two adopted children died. Churchill also explained to Stalin that opposition to communism in England was not based on disagreement over the principle of the relation between the individual and the state. During the war the interests of the individual were subordinated to those of the government. One needed only to add, "exactly as in the USSR." The apotheosis of Churchill's display of a benign attitude toward communism was his toast "to the proletarian masses of the world."114
In the end the Soviet point of view on the Polish question was the one adopted. It was decided that the London Poles would join the provisional government already existing in Poland, to form a national unity government. The Curzon line was recognized as Poland's eastern border, and the question of the western border was postponed until the following peace conference. The Poles agreed to hold elections as soon as possible, after which the Allies would establish diplomatic relations with the new government.
In the meantime, at the end of March 1945, the Soviet military authorities lured the chiefs of the Polish resistance into an ambush, making them believe that the Soviets wanted to negotiate. They were arrested, taken to Moscow, and tried (the so-called Trial of the Sixteen) in June 1945. They were sentenced to prison terms of various lengths, which they served in Soviet camps, three of them dying there, including General Leon Okulicki, head of the Home Army; one man who was not sentenced was later released to the authorities in the Polish People's Republic, where he died.
The historical meaning of the dispute over the future borders of Poland was understood and exposed by the Mensheviks in exile. An editorial of the party's organ observed the following, based on the example of what happened to Polish territory.
What was being decided and drawn up in advance was the fate of the future world order. Which one will set the precedent: annexation and invasion, or democratic peace? Will the most important Eurasian state, which claims to lead the international working-class movement and to be the bearer of the ideals of the future, successfully pass the test not only of strength (which it has already passed) but also of law and justice, at least in international relations? This is a problem of worldwide importance.115
Expansionist by nature, the Soviet system failed this second test. The conference decided that Germany would be occupied by the Allied troops and the nation would be demilitarized, de-Nazified, and democratized. These measures called for abolition of the armed forces, destruction of the German military machine, an end to Nazi influence in political life, and punishment of all war criminals.
The conference also stated that the Allies had no intention of harming the German people. This was an important declaration because the Nazis presented the Allied demands for an unconditional surrender as meaning the destruction of the German people in the event of defeat and used this prospect to frighten the population into continuing the war. Hitler's last hope was the outbreak of a conflict between the Soviet Union and its Western allies in the final stages of the war.
At Yalta a convergence of the ways of thinking, if not the ideologies, of Stalin and the Western leaders clearly took place. For example, in the discussion of Poland's western borders, there arose the question of where the Germans of East Prussia would go. According to Churchill, the issue was the forced resettlement of millions of people. Personally, Churchill said, he was not terribly shocked by such a prospect, but many in England would be. Giving East Prussia to Poland would mean resettling 6 million Germans. It could be done, Churchill admitted, but still there were persuasive arguments against it. Stalin solved the problem very simply: "When our soldiers arrive all the Germans will flee, and not one German will be left." Churchill responded that the problem then would be how to handle those who fled to Germany, adding: "Of course we have already killed six or seven million Germans and most likely will kill another million before the war is over."
Stalin: "One? Or two?"
Churchilclass="underline" "Oh, I'm not proposing any limitation. So there should be room in Germany for some who will need to fill the vacancy. I am not afraid of the problem of the transfer of populations as long as it is in proportion to what the Poles can manage and what can be put in the place of the dead in Germany."116
The three leaders repeatedly expressed their commitment to Allied unity.
The very thought that one of them would try to attain world supremacy was dismissed as preposterous.117 All three favored a better and more stable world. Roosevelt was moved to liken the relationship among the allies to the relations among members of a family.118
But what was each of them really thinking? Stalin knew that events would take a different turn after the war. Indeed, he did not hide this. Therefore he tried to accomplish everything he could at Yalta while he had the chance. The issue of the future of Germany quite probably bothered him most; after all, Eastern and Southeastern Europe were virtually recognized as in the Soviet sphere. However, a solution to the German problem did not depend on Stalin alone. Although he agreed in principle with the American and English proposal to dismember Germany, in actuality that solution contradicted his concept of a Soviet—German alliance and, more specifically, his plan to exploit German material and human resources for the restoration and development of the Soviet economy.
Reparations became a subject of heated discussion. Britain and the United States, recalling the experience with reparations after World War I, were extremely reluctant to open discussion of the problem. Churchill jokingly suggested solving the problem of reparations according to the principle, 'To each country according to its needs, from Germany according to its ability." But Stalin rejected this allusion to the principle of communism. He had a different maxim: 'To each according to his worth."119 Churchill explained frankly that England did not oppose confiscation of German factories by the Soviet Union, as long as England could still get German exports. Stalin calmly reassured him, "Of course the Russians will confiscate German factories as soon as they reach them."120