The new international organization, with its headquarters in Moscow and the expenses of its founding paid for by the Bolshevik party was awash in the glow of victorious revolution. It disdained to conceal its aims. In the first issue of the magazine Kommunisticheskii internatsional (Communist international) Grigory Zinoviev published an article, 'The Prospects for Proletarian Revolution," in which he made this prediction: "Civil war has flared up throughout Europe. The victory of communism in Germany is absolutely inevitable. In a year Europe will have forgotten about the fight for communism, because all of Europe will be Communist. Then the struggle for communism in America will begin, and possibly in Asia and other continents."
The Second Congress of the Comintern, in the summer of 1920, laid the basis for a bi-level foreign policy. The congress adopted the famous "twenty- one conditions" that had to be met by any party wishing to join the Comintern, to become a section of the Third International. The standard pattern for a Communist party was established. It would be a detachment of an international army engaged in the struggle for power. Among the conditions for admission to the Comintern were the following: the obligation to help the Soviet Republic in its struggle against counterrevolution, employing all legal and illegal means to this end (condition 13); the obligation to combine legal and illegal methods in fighting against the government of one's own country (condition 3); and the obligation to form an underground organization (condition 4).
The classic example of a bi-level foreign policy—aboveboard through the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and secretly through the Comintern— was Soviet policy toward Germany. The certainty of a revolution in Germany was one of the main arguments Lenin had used to justify the October revolution. The events of November 1918, when Germany might have become Communist but failed to do so, discouraged the Bolsheviks, but they did not give up hope. The Soviet government began to cooperate on the official level with the Weimar Republic, but activity aimed at the Sovietization of Germany never ceased. This activity increased sharply after the founding of the Comintern. A number of "specialists" on revolution— Radek, Zinoviev, Bela Kun, Maty as Rakosi—made preparations for the seizure of power by the German Communists. In April 1922 Germany and Soviet Russia signed a peace treaty in the Italian city of Rapallo. It provided for mutual renunciation of demands for war reparations, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and economic collaboration, including joint Soviet- German industrial and commercial firms. The Rapallo treaty broke the unity of the capitalist countries vis-&-vis Soviet Russia and freed both Germany and the Soviet Republic from diplomatic isolation. The obvious advantages of the Soviet—German treaty, the result of the Soviet government's own initiatives, did not prevent the Soviet leaders from continuing to use the Comintern and the KPD to foment revolution. In the fall of 1923, in fact, it seemed that nothing would stop the mighty forward stride of history.
"At the beginning of September 1923," a former Soviet diplomat wrote,
I passed through Moscow on my way to Warsaw. In Moscow everyone seemed fired up. The revolutionary movement in Germany was growing faster and faster. ... Comintern work was going ahead full steam. The future members of the Soviet government of Germany were being appointed. From among Soviet Russian leaders a solid group was chosen to become the nucleus of the future German Council of People's Commissars. The group included
economic experts... military men... Comintern figures... and several highly placed GPU officials.33
At that time Pravda published some verses about Germany in flames: "A cry in the wind: It is time! In the swirling snow, a slogan: Fire!" During this time official relations between the Soviet and German governments remained impeccable.
Relations with England provide another example of the Soviet dual policy. England began to seek a rapprochement with Soviet Russia in 1920. Trade talks began. Some trade was already underway "through various neutral countries that had established trade relations with Soviet Russia."34 Karl Radek noted that this situation helped Russia to grow stronger. The same Radek, at the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East in September 1920, called on the workers and peasants of Persia, Turkey, and India to rise up against British imperialism, promising in the name of the Soviet government to provide arms "for our common battles and common victories."35 Likewise at the Baku Congress Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern, called for a jihad, a holy war, against Great Britain. Zinoviev was a member of the Politburo, the top executive body of the Soviet state. "It is no secret to anyone," Lev Kamenev, another member of the Politburo, admitted, "that the Central Committee and the Politburo of our party direct the Comintern."36
The foreign policy of the young Soviet state was based on a principle enunciated by Lenin in December 1920: as long as capitalism and socialism exist they cannot live in peace.37 At the height of the debates over the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Lenin presented a resolution to the Seventh Party Congress. It stated that the Congress authorized the Central Committee to break any and all peace treaties and to declare war against any imperialist government or against the entire world if the Central Committee considered the moment ripe.38 The resolution was meant to placate the opponents of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, but it expressed the essence of Lenin's foreign policy. The proletarian state, the embodiment of progress, was always right in its relations with capitalist states, which were the embodiment of reaction. Whatever the Soviet state did was in accordance with the laws of history and therefore was entirely and completely justified.
THE RED TURNS RUSTY
The "step backward" Lenin took in March 1921 with the introduction of the NEP was conceived as a maneuver, a forced retreat. It was carried out on a moment's notice, a complete surprise to the ranks of the Bolshevik
party. Stalin suggested that the maneuver was a little late in coming: "Didn't we wait too long to abolish grain requisitioning? Did we really need such events as Kronstadt and Tambov to make us realize we could not go on living under war communism?"39
The realization that it was impossible to live under war communism forced the government to change its policy, to abandon Utopia temporarily and return to reality. But Utopia was not rejected altogether; hope for the miracle of world revolution was kept alive. It was necessary to arrange a certain coexistence between reality and fantasy, the belief that tomorrow or the day after it would again be possible to take two, three, many more steps toward the final goal of communism. The coexistence of reality and fantasy gave a special quality to Soviet life in the early 1920s. As one Soviet poet described it, 'The color of the times has changed. No longer Red, but rusty."40
For the second time in a few years a drastic reevaluation of values took place. Revolutionary ideas, which had reigned unchallenged since October 1917, sweeping aside all compromise or deviation from the ideal, suddenly seemed old-fashioned and out of place. The right to exist was restored to concepts that before March 1921 had been considered extinct or worthy of extinction.