The New Economic Policy removed the tourniquets that had totally cut off the country's blood supply. Denationalization of small businesses and of some medium-sized industries, legalization of private trade, and the beginnings of trade with foreign countries quickly restored circulation. People at the time commented on the miraculous opening of stores and the appearance in them of things people had once known but had forgotten even the look of. The hero of the novel Chevengur returns to his hometown:
At first he thought the Whites had taken [it]. There was a buffet at the train station where gray rolls were sold without a line and without ration cards. Near the station... there was a gray sign whose letters dripped because of the poor quality of the paint. The sign announced primitively and briefly:
Everything on Sale, To All Citizens! Prewar Bread!
Prewar Fish! Fresh Meat! Our Own Preserves!
... In the store the owner explained in a very concise and sensible way, to an old woman who had just come in, the meaning of these changes: "We've lived to see the day. Lenin tooketh away, and now Lenin giveth."41
The NEP opened the door to certain capitalist economic forms which coexisted with the socialist forms. It was possible to compare and make choices. The result was competition. The 1923 census revealed that 77 percent of wholesale trade was conducted by the state, 8 percent by cooperatives, and 15 percent by private individuals. In contrast, 83 percent of retail trade was in private hands and only 7 percent was state-controlled.42 The consumer could choose whether to buy from the government or from a private trader.
Money, which had lost all value during the revolution and civil war, reappeared on the scene. In principle it was supposed to have withered away. Besides, everyone had been issuing currency: the Soviet government, the White generals, municipalities, even factories. A numismatic catalog published in 1927 listed 2,181 types of currency that had circulated during the civil war. Mikhail Bulgakov wrote about "trillionaires," people owning trillions of rubles, in Moscow in late 1921.43 When the possibility arose of using this money actually to buy goods, it suddenly became a serious factor. On February 15, 1924, a series of monetary reforms ended with the introduction of a new unit, a ruble with fixed value. It was called the chervonets and was worth ten prewar gold rubles. Backed by government gold, it also had historical tradition behind it. A unit of currency of the same name had existed under Peter the Great.
The times became "rusty" because, alongside the hierarchy of values created by the revolution, old values were restored. For example, a class of capitalists was now sanctioned by the Soviet government, although they were allowed no political power. These were the so-called Nepmen. They lived like people on the slope of a volcano, never knowing what the morrow might bring. But they had money, for the moment, and with it the opportunity to buy anything they wished. In the cities gambling houses and cabarets opened for business; luxury cars and coaches, furs and jewelry made their appearance.
The NEP inevitably provoked discontent within the ruling Communist party. It seemed a complete betrayal of revolutionary ideals. The hurt and angry question, Is this what we fought for? began to be heard. Before and after October 1917 the debates among the party's leaders had been about how to take power and how to hold it. Now a new question arose: What should we do with the power? This immediately led to another: Who in fact was exercising power?
The simplest answer was the proletariat. That was the official answer. Lenin had another answer: the dictatorship of the party, the vanguard of the proletariat. There was a problem, though. Ever since the civil war had ended, the proletariat had expressed its discontent more and more insistently. Radek quoted with indignation the words of an independent worker in reply to a Communist agitator: "No, we are not trying to get freedom for the capitalists and landowners. We want freedom for ourselves, the workers and peasants, freedom to buy what we need, freedom to travel from one city to another, to go from the factories to the villages—that's the kind of freedom we need."44
The Bolshevik party was the master of the country. The party had been conceived and built as an army of professional revolutionaries. After it had achieved its aim of taking power, it did not wish to limit itself, to surrender part of its power to non-Communist government officials. The party wanted to be the government. Lev Kamenev, speaking at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, dotted all the is.
Those who speak against the party, who demand a separation of functions between the party and the government, want to impose on us the same division of powers that exists in other states. ... Let the Soviet government apparatus govern, they say, and let the party occupy itself with propaganda, with raising the level of Communist consciousness, etc. No, comrades, that would be too great an occasion for rejoicing for our enemies.45
The party did not wish the Soviet state to be like "other states." It wanted all the power in its own hands.
Certainly the party had all the power. "We have quite enough political power," Lenin said in a speech to the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922. 'The economic power in the hands of the proletarian state is quite adequate to ensure the transition to communism. What then is lacking?" By the time the Eleventh Congress took place, the party had been thoroughly purged as a result of a decision of the Tenth Congress a year earlier; in the intervening year 23.3 percent of the membership had been expelled. Still the party's leader was dissatisfied with the organization, even in its purged form. Lenin scolded the Communists for their lack of sophistication and questioned whether they were actually directing the machinery of state or being directed by it. He cited the lessons of history: "If the conquering nation is more sophisticated than the vanquished nation, the former imposes its culture upon the latter; but if the opposite is the case, the vanquished nation imposes its culture upon the conqueror." Lenin feared that his barbarians, having conquered Russia, were adopting the culture of those they had vanquished. He assailed the Communists for their lack of "sophistication," by which he meant knowledge of administrative methods for running the state and the economy.46
According to Lenin, during the year from the Tenth to the Eleventh Congress, "we showed quite clearly that we cannot run the economy." The reason for poor management, in Lenin's opinion, was "Communist conceit" (,komchvanstvo).47 Communist conceit was the arrogance of conquerors who were sure that everything they did was right and that all problems could be solved by force. This kind of arrogance was a sin in Lenin's eyes because it undermined party discipline. The heroes of the civil war wanted their reward; each behaved like a prince in his own domain. Former front-line comrades formed cliques and challenged the authority of the Central Committee. Lenin's tactic was to use one clique against the other, seeking to weaken them all and strengthen the Central Committee.
Aleksei Rykov described the situation to Liberman, a prominent specialist in the prerevolutionary lumber industry, who was invited to take charge of the nationalized Soviet lumber industry:
Here I am in charge of socialist construction at the head of the Supreme Economic Council. Lenin trusts me—yet it's so hard working with him! You can never rely on him 100 percent. I go see him, we talk things over, we come to an agreement, he tells me: 'Take the floor and I'll support you." But the moment he senses that the majority is against your proposal, he will betray you. ... Vladimir Ilyich will betray anyone, abandon anything, but all in the name of the revolution and socialism, remaining loyal only to the fundamental idea—socialism, communism.48