Being in power for a long time in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat has had a corrupting effect on a significant number of veteran party activists. This is the source of their bureaucratism, their extremely haughty attitude toward rank-and-file party members and toward the unaffiliated mass of workers; this is the source of their extraordinary abuse of their privileged position for their own material advancement. A Communist hierarchical caste has been created and entrenched.57
To party official Solts this "Communist hierarchical caste"—or, as Stalin put it, "order of knights"—had developed and taken shape as a result of being in power for a long time. Bukharin, the eminent party theoretician, saw deeper causes: "A certain stratum of Communist cadre could degenerate on the basis of their being the sole authority. ... Our form of government is a dictatorship; our party is the party that dominates the country."58
Zinoviev, not having the power of clairvoyance, proclaimed with pride at the Eleventh Congress:
We have a monopoly on legality. We have denied political freedom to our opponents. We do not permit legal existence to those who aspire to become our rivals. ... The dictatorship of the proletariat, as Comrade Lenin has said, is a very harsh thing. In order to assure the victory of the proletarian dictatorship there is no other way than to break the back of all opposition to this dictatorship. ... No one can foresee a time when we will be able to revise our opinion on this question.
The party's unlimited dictatorial power was the main cause of its degeneration. It transformed revolutionaries into veritable feudal lords, and it invited an influx of careerists and fortune hunters. In impotent rage Lenin demanded that corrupt Communists be "tried on the spot and shot, unconditionally." But it was precisely such people—without any ideals or convictions—who did best as members of a dictatorial party with a monopoly on power. Rosa Luxemburg's predictions were realized to the letter. A few months after the October revolution she had written:
[With] the repression of political life in the land as a whole, life in the Soviets must also become more and more crippled. Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. ... A few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Among them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading and an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions unanimously—at bottom, then, a clique affair—a dictatorship, to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, however, but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians.59
One year after the introduction of the NEP, at the Eleventh Party Congress, Lenin made a surprising admission. He said the Soviet state was "like a car that was going not in the direction the driver desired, but in the direction someone else desired; as if it were being driven by some mysterious, lawless hand, God knows whose. ... The car is not going in the direction the man at the wheel wanted it to go."60 These were the tragic words of a man who believed he had discovered the laws governing the motion of the vehicle of state, who thought he knew the direction in which it was going, but who suddenly discovered that the machine was out of his control. His response was to strengthen the hand at the wheel.
On Lenin's suggestion, the Central Committee that convened after the Eleventh Congress elected Joseph Stalin to a newly created position, that of general secretary. Lenin was confident of Stalin's abilities as a "driver." They had been thoroughly tested during the civil war.
In 1920, in his pamphlet Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, Lenin ridiculed the debates then going on about the dictatorial character of the Soviet state. To him it was "ridiculous and childish nonsense" to discuss whether there was a dictatorship of the party or of the working class, a dictatorship of the leaders or of the masses. This, he said, was "like discussing whether a man's left leg or right arm is of greater use to him."61 But he was dissimulating. He knew perfectly well that the right arm was more important and he said as much: 'To object to the necessity of a strong central power, dictatorship, and unity of will... has become impossible."62
The need for a strong right arm was felt especially after the civil war, when the struggles against the countless enemies of the revolution broke out with renewed force. The liberalization of the economy was accompanied by a new wave of terror. This was another "rusty" aspect of the times. In the Land of the NEP and the Cheka was the title of memoirs written by Boris Cederholm, an inmate of the Solovki labor camp and one of the first to escape to the West and tell about it. The NEP and the Cheka were two sides of the same coin in Soviet Russia in the first half of the 1920s.
One initial result of the NEP was a worsening of the situation for the working class, the class with hegemony, as the propagandists loved to say. The workers went on strike out of prerevolutionary habits which had not yet been broken. They demanded better conditions. On December 2, 1923, in a speech to Moscow Communists, Stalin referred to a "wave of strikes and unrest that spread through several regions of our republic in August of this year."63 But workers had also gone on strike in 1921 and 1922. The Smolensk Archive contains numerous reports by GPU agents on the workers' discontent over their miserable wages, late wage payments, food shortages, and the high cost of living, as well as reports on strikes at factories and workshops and on the railroads.64 The Smolensk GPU blamed the strikes on anarchist agitation. In Moscow the Mensheviks were blamed.
At the Eleventh Party Congress Aleksandr Shlyapnikov recalled that strikes by workers in Zlatoust and Bryansk had been denounced as the "work of monarchists." Everyone was blamed for strikes—anarchists, Mensheviks, monarchists—but worst of all, the workers themselves. At the Eleventh Congress Lenin laid the theoretical basis for blaming the Russian proletariat. He said that since "large-scale capitalist industry had been destroyed and the factories and shops had ceased to function, the proletariat had disappeared." Lenin did not hesitate to revise Marx. It was true that Marx had written that those employed at factories and plants constituted the real proletariat and that this had been true of capitalism as a whole for 500 years, but "for Russia today this is not true." In response to this argument Shlyapnikov taunted Lenin: "Allow me to congratulate you on being the vanguard of a nonexistent class."
In June 1953, when the workers of East Berlin went on strike and poured into the streets to protest low wages and high prices, the East German Communist party announced that the people had not justified the confidence placed in them by the party. Bertolt Brecht wrote a poem advising the party to dissolve the people and elect a new one. The Soviet leaders had employed this formula long before Brecht. Having led a revolution in the name of a class that did not exist, they set about creating the kind of class they needed. Contempt for the interests of those who are "not real proletarians" has become a Communist virtue and has been justified "theoretically." Soviet historians have come to the conclusion that the prerevolutionary Russian worker was not a "pure proletarian."65
During the discussion of the situation in the party which was permitted for a short time at the end of 1923, many participants complained, "In the eyes of the workers the party cells and many party members always act as defenders of management, of increased production quotas and all kinds of deductions or layoffs. All the Communist party members seem to think it is their duty at all costs to justify every injustice, even the most obvious, to the workers."66 If on the other hand certain individual Communists protested against management along with the workers, "our higher party bodies think that such Communists are not reliable."67