The struggle against the Orthodox church was made easier by the schism that persisted within it and by certain improprieties disclosed at the higher levels of the patriarchate. In December 1926, Metropolitan Sergii, executing the duties of the patriarch, was arrested. He was released in March 1927 and in July published a declaration which, to quote a historian, "transformed the church into an active ally of the Soviet government."171 The majority of the clergy and the faithful, this historian continues, understood that "this sin was necessary to save the church from destruction." A number of bishops were sent to penal exile on the Solovetsky Islands, and although they did not endorse Metropolitan Sergii's declaration per se, they urged that the unity of the church be maintained. In spite of this "spiritual and moral catastrophe for the Russian church,"172 religion continued to serve as a barrier to the degradation of society and the creation of the "new human being" the Soviet authorities wanted. Religion remained a traditional model, whose existence alongside the model of the new Soviet man allowed comparisons and a choice. But the party did not lay down its arms. "Have we suppressed the reactionary clergy?" asked Comrade Stalin in 1927. He answered: "Yes, we have suppressed them. The only trouble is that we have not yet eliminated them completely. Antireligious propaganda is the means that must bring to completion the job of eliminating the reactionary clergy."173 Stalin was explaining the situation to a delegation of American workers, but he failed to add that besides propaganda the job of elimination was being speeded along with the help of the GPU.
THE EMIGRES
During the "years of waiting" there was the other possibility for comparison. The window to the West remained open. Beginning at the end of 1922 trips abroad for a limited period of time became quite common. Soviet engineers, foreign trade officials, and Nepmen went abroad on business, and writers and artists went for professional reasons. It also became a common form of punishment to send party leaders who were out of favor on foreign assignments, commercial or diplomatic. For Russians the West had always been both attractive and repulsive. In the 1920s it seemed much more like home because of the large Russian emigr6 community.
The Soviet authorities even tried to influence the emigr6s, encouraging the changing landmarks tendency among them. This policy was symbolized by the founding of the newspaper Nakanune (On the eve), with editorial offices in both Moscow and Berlin. Soviet writers were allowed to publish their books in Berlin, Prague, and Riga as well as Moscow. It was not expressly forbidden to meet with emigr6s, and Soviet citizens who did so were not punished after returning home. Film rental agencies in the Soviet Union, seeking profits, went so far as to print pinup shots of Asta Nielsen and Mary Pickford in Pravda. Scenes of bourgeois decadence in the West, especially of sleazy Russian emigr6 taverns, were regularly featured in Soviet films. Theater audiences viewed with delight the scenes of corruption and splendor from the outside world.
Soviet party leaders engaged in lively polemics with emigi-ё politicians, and Soviet literary critics reviewed the books of emig^ writers. The tone was nasty, sarcastic, malicious; the victors were mocking the vanquished. Still, in a certain sense the emigr6 community remained a part of Soviet life. It was insulted and ridiculed but also feared to some extent. In turn the emigr6 community eagerly followed all developments inside Russia. The emigr6s were influenced by Soviet ideas, but they too influenced Soviet ideology.
The emigr6 community was a faithful reflection of prerevolutionary Russian life, with its countless political parties and groupings and schools of religion, philosophy, and literature. Revolution and civil war, defeat and forced exile strengthened dogmatic and intolerant attitudes. One of the principal lessons of the civil war was never absorbed—that the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik camp was largely the result of lack of unity. In exile the politicians continued the struggle, but mostly among themselves, one party against another.
The church set the example. In the fall of 1921 a council of the church in exile convened in Karlovci, Yugoslavia. The monarchists sought to have the council proclaim a legitimate tsar from the house of Romanov. Others at the council protested that this would be "interfering in politics, which was inadmissable at a church gathering."174 In 1922 Patriarch Tikhon condemned the Karlovci council for its political activities and named Metropolitan Eulogius the head of the church abroad. The majority of emig^s felt that the church in exile should be linked with the Patriarchate in Moscow. In 1926 and 1927 a split took place. Most of the bishoprics (eparchies) in Western Europe recognized the authority of Metropolitan Eulogius, but the bishoprics in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Far East accepted the authority of Metropolitan Antonius, a supporter of the Karlovci council. The monarchist movement was torn by inner dissension, especially between absolutist and constitutionalist tendencies and two rival pretenders: Nikolai Nikolaevich, the uncle of Tsar Nicholas II; and Kirill Vladimirovich, a grandson of Tsar Alexander II and a cousin of the last tsar.
In August 1922 Kirill Vladimirovich proclaimed himself the true heir to the throne, but the majority of the monarchists chose Nikolai Nikolaevich as their leader, although it was left open who would actually ascend the throne. That was to be decided after the monarchy's return to power in
Russia. The monarchist program essentially called for the formation of a new Volunteer Army to invade Russia. The key to success was financial aid, and possibly military aid, from abroad.
Pavel Milyukov, chief organizer and ideologist of what was called the Republican-Democratic Alliance, categorically rejected foreign aid. "I do not know how we will return to Russia," he said in 1925, "but I do know how we will not return." That is, it would be impossible to return in the wake of a foreign army.175 During the NEP Milyukov came to the conclusion that a certain evolution was underway in Russia as a result of the long- term policies of the Soviet government, which was being forced to shift from destruction to reconstruction of Russia's productive forces. Milyukov proposed no plan of action but placed his hopes on a historical process that would lead the Russian people themselves to overthrow the regime that oppressed them.
Petr Struve, the spokesman for conservative liberalism, was attacked by both left and right. For the left he was a monarchist who wanted to rehabilitate the tsarist regime. For the right he was a liberal who, horror of horrors, had been a Marxist in the past. He called for a strong state that would restore order in Russia and defend property rights while respecting the legitimate freedoms of the people.
The numerous parties of the left, People's Socialists, Left and Right Socialist Revolutionaries, Social Democrats, Mensheviks, and anarchists, debated the pros and cons of dictatorship by a party or by a class and argued over whether the Bolsheviks were socialists or not. In 1921 the Mensheviks began to publish Sotsialistichesky vestnik (Socialist herald) in Berlin. It provided a wealth of information about events in the Soviet Union.
Alongside the traditional parties new movements and organizations arose in exile. For example, an anthology was published in Sofia in 1921 entitled Exodus to the East, with the subtitle "Forebodings and Accomplishments: A Profession of Faith by the Eurasians." It set forth the main tenets of "Eurasianism." "We honor the past and present of Western European culture, but we do not see it as the future," said the foreword to the anthology.176 The authors felt, as Herzen had, that "history is now knocking at our door." In the article "A Turn Toward the East," Professor Savitsky asked rhetorically, "Are there many people in Russia in whose veins the blood of Khazars, Polovtsians, Tatars, or Bashkirs does not flow?"177 Russia was not only the West but the East, not only Europe but Asia as well. In fact it was not Europe at all but Eurasia.178 The anthology advocated Russian nationalism as its main secular idea. Its authors warned, however, that they did not want to restrict nationalism to the framework of national chauvinism.179 The Eurasians went further than the Slavophiles, who had spoken not only of the Russian people but of all the Slavic peoples; the Eurasians appealed to "the entire range of peoples of the Eurasian world, among whom the Russian people occupy a special position."180