A split occurred in the ranks of the Eurasians in 1929, marking the beginning of the end for this movement. Its ideas nevertheless inspired a broad range of political currents among Russian emigr6s. The idea that because of its geopolitical situation and national character Russia could never become a democracy drew a section of emigr6s with Eurasian views into collaboration with the Soviet government in the 1930s.
In 1923 a General Congress of Nationally Minded Russian Youth was held in Munich. It founded the League of Young Russians, electing A. L. Kazem-Bek as its president. This later became the Young Russia party, which advocated restoration of the monarchy in Russia with a legitimate heir from the house of the Romanovs to be placed on the throne. The congress passed a declaration that stated in part, 'The development of antinationalist, liberal, and democratic schools of thought undermined the state and cleared the way for aggressive socialism and its logical culmination, modern communism." The declaration singled out as the "most negative factors in modern life" what it called "freemasonry and international capital, which is concentrated mostly in the hands of the Jews."181
The Young Russia movement sought to combine monarchism with "young nationalist ideas," which were said to be on the rise in all countries. This meant, above all the ideas of Italian fascism. Their infatuation with nazism was to come later. (The Young Russians wore blue shirts and greeted their leader Kazem-Bek with shouts that were the equivalent of "Heil Hitler.") Varshavsky, the historian of this second generation of emigr6 youth, the "unnoticed generation," observed that the social orientation of the Young Russians and other Russian nationalist youth groups—expressed in the slogan "a monarchy above classes, a monarchy of the working people"— was related not only to the influence of fascism and national socialism but also to their personal experience. The harsh conditions of emigre life deepened their suspicion and hostility toward democracy. Fascism seemed to provide a program combining the ideas of national and social rebirth.
One of the paradoxes of emigre life was that the right-wing parties and movements which had been conservative in Russia engaged in revolutionary activity abroad, while parties with revolutionary pasts became passive. The activism of the right-wing parties, their training of cadres for a future army and infiltration of agitators and terrorists into the Soviet Union, made them easy prey for the GPU. Soviet agents and provocateurs penetrated all the emigr6 organizations, but those favoring close ties with their homeland were especially vulnerable to GPU tricks and subterfuge.
All the parties and movements whose programs called for the restoration of a strong Russian state, nationalism, and opposition to democracy evolved in the same direction. The changing landmarks group, the Eurasians, and the Young Russians found more and more attractive features in the Soviet system and concluded that "there was no need to exaggerate the differences between the 'ideological' measures of the Communists and the real needs of the people."182 Ultimately they agreed to collaborate with the Communist authorities. The "cunning dialectic of revolution"183 allowed them to close their eyes to all unpleasant features.
Only a small number of Russian emigres belonged to political parties, but the vast majority belonged to military, social, professional, and literary associations of one kind or another. Until the mid-1920s Germany was the center of Russian emigre life, especially Berlin, where there were at least forty Russian publishing houses, each of which brought out more than a thousand titles, and where three daily Russian papers were published, as well as numerous magazines, with views ranging from monarchist to anarchist. There too a Russian-language theater was able to survive. In the mid-1920s Paris became the center of Russian emigration, with as many as 300 emigre organizations. In Paris alone there were seven Russian newspapers and many magazines.
The tragedy of separation from the homeland, the difficulties and misfortunes of life in exile, the petty problems of everyday life, the perennial dissatisfaction with everything Western prevented the Russian emigres from seeing the enormous amount that they actually accomplished, their tremendous contribution to Russian culture. The creative work of major Russian writers in exile such as Ivan Bunin and Marina Tsvetaeva, and of historians, philosophers, theologians, naturalists, engineers, artists, and painters are an inseparable part of the Russian heritage. But to this day no history of the Russian emigres has been written. Very few understood that there was another side to the tragedy of emigre life. This was best expressed by Vladimir Nabokov, who became a great writer in exile. On the tenth anniversary of the October revolution he wrote:
Above all we must celebrate ten years of freedom. The freedom that we enjoy, I believe, is not known in any country in the world. In the unique and special Russia that invisibly surrounds us, enlivens and supports us, feeds our souls, and colors our dreams, there is no law but the law of love of Russia and no power other than our own consciences. ... Some day we will thank the blind Clio for allowing us to taste this freedom and enabling us to understand and cultivate in exile our profound feeling for our native land. ... Let us not curse our exile. Let us repeat in our day the words of
Plutarch's ancient warrior: "Late at night in a savage land far from Rome I pitched my tent and my tent became Rome for me."184
Nabokov composed this paean to inner freedom just at the time when the years of waiting were coming to an end in the Soviet Union.
WHO WILL PREVAIL?
The Thirteenth Party Congress marked the victory of a triumvirate, three leaders who had agreed to assume Lenin's mantle collectively. Kamenev chaired the congress, Zinoviev gave the report for the Central Committee, and Stalin organized the congress. Trotsky admitted defeat. But no sooner had the congress ended than Stalin began to undermine the position of his fellow triumvirs. Thus began the inexorable rise to power of Joseph Stalin.
A debate has gone on among historians for the past half century: Did Stalin create the apparatus or did the apparatus create Stalin? The desire to portray Stalin as the creator of the apparatus, the bureaucratic machine and system, is understandable. This conception allows one to divide Soviet history into the pre-Stalin, Stalin, and post-Stalin periods. But there is no doubt that the apparatus existed before Stalin, just as there is no doubt that he perfected it and used it to consolidate his power—just as his rivals tried unsuccessfully to do. 'To be a leader and organizer," Stalin wrote in 1924, "means first of all to know your party cadres, to be able to grasp their strengths and weaknesses... and second to know how to assign them."185 Stalin's technique was quite simple, but effective. He especially knew the weaknesses of the party members he assigned to one or another post, and in making assignments his aim was above all to punish some and reward others. One of the delegates to the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925 made this revealing observation: 'The comrades are living and eating well right now, and so not everyone will raise his hand to vote against something, only to be sent to Murmansk or Turkestan for that."186