e on the other for the conclusion of an alliance which was to act as a deterrent to the steady advance of the Nazis. In the middle of August though, these talks failed, and a pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany on August 23rd. In this way, the totalitarian systems overtook the western democracies. Bulgaria may also have contributed to the failure of the pact between Berlin and Moscow through its ambassador in Berlin, Parvan Draganov. On September 1st, the Wermacht invaded Poland. Two days later, being unable to convince Hitler to withdraw his troops, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Later, the Red Army also took a part of the Polish territory, and the USSR and Germany signed an agreement for a new boundary between them. In the middle of September, Bulgaria declared its neutrality with respect to the military conflict. This delay is most probably because the Government wanted to understand the situation and make a correct assessment as to whether this was a local conflict or a large-scale war. There were not many options for Bulgaria at that moment. Its moves were closely observed by its neighbors who were well aware of the Bulgarian revanchist desires and who could end up in Bulgaria within hours should it not act peacefully. Thus, on September 15, 1939, Bulgaria declared its neutrality to the war that had broken out. The first months of the war were uneventful, and there were no military actions at that time. Because of this, it has been called „the strange war“, but in the spring of 1940, war became a reality. The Germans invaded on a large scale. The Wermacht occupied Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and France. This eliminated the competition for Germany on the continent. England was pushed back to its islands, and the question about Moscow was there to be solved. Italy also decided to intervene in the war and declared war on France on July 10th. In 1940, it appeared that the issue of South Dobrudzha was ripe for a solution. On June 26th, Moscow delivered an ultimatum to Bucharest: the regions of Bessarabia and North Bukovina were to be given to the USSR. At first the Romanians were inclined to resist, but after they understood that Berlin and Rome would not support them, they acquiesced, and on June 28, 1940, the Red Army advanced into these territories. On July 27th, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov, who in mid-February 1940 replaced Kyoseivanov, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Popov met Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop. The Germans had received the Romanian leaders a few days prior and had advised them to settle their argument with Bulgaria. After Berlin, the Romanians also visited Rome where they were given similar advice. In this way, Sofia received the support of Germany for the settlement of the South Dobrudzha issue. Yet Hitler refused to be an arbitrator between the two countries. The Romanians were forced to begin bilateral negotiations with Bulgaria. After considerable delay on the part of Romania, the Krayov Agreement was finally signed on September 7th, and South Dobrudzha was restored as a territory of Bulgaria. On September 21st, the Bulgarian army entered the restored Dobrudzha territory. A pact was signed only 20 days after the signing of the Krayov Agreement which was to play an important role in subsequent years. Japan also joined the two aggressive European forces. The signing of the trilateral pact shows that Germany had no intention of being satisfied with what it had achieved up to that moment. By the middle of October, Bulgaria’s situation had become quite delicate. Without consulting his ally in Berlin, the Italian dictator decided to manage things with Greece. Mussolini sent a letter to Tsar Boris III informing him of the actions which were under way against Bulgaria’s southern neighbor. The tone of the letter was informative, but Mussolini was hoping that the Bulgarian monarch would agree to joint actions so that Bulgaria could take its claimed territories. Unfortunately for Mussolini, the Bulgarian Tsar was too cautious to participate in such an adventure. After its initial offensive, the Italian army, which invaded Greece at the end of October, was forced by the Greek army to retreat, and Bulgaria actually helped Greece with its neutrality. In addition, in the middle of October 1940, Sofia was invited by Berlin to join the Trilateral Pact. At that time, the Tsar also received a letter from the British King expressing his satisfaction with Bulgaria’s policy, saying that this policy should continue because otherwise there was a danger of the Bulgarian territory becoming a scene for military action. The Tsar managed to get the country out of this complicated situation. Bulgaria was not misled by the Italian suggestion and remained calm with respect to its southern neighbor. The Tsar wrote a personal letter to Hitler assuring him that it was not useful for Bulgaria to join the Pact since a neutral Bulgaria could best assist the German plans. The Tsar wrote that Hitler should think well whether it was imperative for Bulgaria to join the Pact in that moment since Bulgaria’s recent policy had kept the Bulgarian and German enemies at bay. Tsar Boris and Minister Popov make a visit to Hitler and von Ribbentrop on November 17, 1940. They talked about Bulgaria eventually joining the Pact. Hitler behaved well with the Bulgarian monarch, which was not true of von Ribbentrop who treated the Bulgarian Foreign Minister quite unceremoniously. Von Ribbentrop wanted Popov to agree that Bulgaria would sign the Pact, but Popov stood up for his position heroically. According to Genchev’s thesis, Bulgaria refused to join the Pact not on principle but only postponed joining until a later date. According to him, the fact that the German army had yet to reach the Danube combined with the threat coming from Turkey, the unpredictable conduct of Yugoslavia and the British threats were the reasons that the Bulgarian leaders rejected signing the contract. Mihov theorized that German military specialists had been installed in Bulgaria as early as mid-October. He also thought that the suggestion for a pact on the part of the USSR and Arkady Sobolev’s visit to Sofia prevented „the attachment of Bulgaria to the chariot of Nazi Germany“. Mihov expressed his conviction that England also suspected that Bulgaria would enter into the Pact, especially judging from King George’s letter to Tsar Boris. As a whole, his thesis is that talks were being held to unify all possible forces against the USSR. According to Dimitrov, Tsar Boris had not rejected joining the Pact on principle, but instead had asked for a delay and had also declared that he would like Yugoslavia to follow the same path. According to Hitler, Turkey would not dare invade Bulgaria if the latter joined the Pact. The Tsar went to the meeting with Hitler accompanied by Popov instead of Filov in order to evade making decisions in Bergtesgarden. The Tsar told Hitler that the road to Thessaloniki for the Wermacht would be shorter if they passed through the Vardar Valley and not through Bulgaria. According to Stefan Gruev, „The Tsar did not say ‘no’ but rather said ‘not now’.“ According to the same author, five days later Ambassador Draganov passed to Hitler the answer of the Bulgarian Government which agreed in principle to enter the pact but at a later stage. In my opinion, the Tsar agreed to Bulgaria joining the Trilateral Pact but managed to get the delay he was seeking, namely at the time the German troops reached the border of his country. This would give Bulgaria the security it was striving for because, if there were Wermacht troops on Bulgarian territory, none of Bulgaria’s neighbors would think of contradicting its decision to join the Pact. The Tsar did not have much of a choice because he either had to choose the German alternative or simply expose the country to a quite unclear future. Vyacheslav Molotov made a visit to Hitler on November 12th. During the visit, the Soviet diplomat expressed the wish of the USSR to give Bulgaria guarantees similar to those Germany gave Romania where Nazi troops were installed at the beginning of October. Hitler asked if the Bulgarian Tsar had requested such guarantees as the Romanian leaders had. After the meeting between Boris and Hitler on November 19th in Bergtesgarden, the Soviet Government delivered to Ivan Stamenov, the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow, an offer to sign a pact of mutual assistance. A year earlier, Georgi Kyoseivanov, simultaneously the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, rejected a similar offer declaring that the time had not come for the signing of such a pact. According to Dekanozov, Molotov’s deputy, now was the right time for the signing of a pact. Such pacts were also signed with the Baltic states in the summer of 1940, after which they were annexed into the USSR. Given the nature of the Government in Moscow which did not tolerate any monarchical form of government, as well as a fear that Bulgaria would become ‘Balticized’, the Tsar and the strong four members of the cabinet, namely Prime Minister Bogdan Filov, Foreign Minister Ivan Popov, Minister of Defense Teodosi Daskalov and Minister of Interior Petar Gabrovski, categorically rejected the offer.