Выбрать главу

On November 23rd, Popov sent an answer to Stamenov, saying that Bulgaria did not feel threatened and that no guarantees were necessary. It also said that Bulgaria had been invited to enter the Trilateral Pact and was studying this offer. The Soviet diplomat Arkadi Sobolev arrived in Sofia on November 24th. The purpose of his visit was to deliver the draft agreement between Moscow and Sofia. The next day the Communists made public the text of the Pact and a movement was started in its defense. Moscow had no objections to military guarantees being omitted with Moscow being the only one giving such guarantees to Sofia. The USSR had nothing against Bulgaria joining the Trilateral Pact. Possibly the USSR itself might enter the Pact at a later stage. The USSR acknowledged Bulgaria’s territorial aspirations. After a conversation with the Soviet leaders Yosif Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, Dimitrov sent a telegram to the Bulgarian Communists instructing them to start a large scale propaganda campaign for the acceptance of the Soviet offer of a pact. The Bulgarian Communists undertook large-scale activities to popularize the Soviet offer. Some members of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (BWP) were not well briefed on the general situation, and in their opinion England was still the instigator of the war. The BWP proclaimed that signing a pact with the USSR would not lead to balticization or bolshevization of the country. In spite of all maneuvers by the Tsar, Bulgaria was forced to define its position at the beginning of 1941. Filov met with von Ribbentrop and Hitler to discuss Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Trilateral Pact. Germany promised the White Sea region as a territorial acquisition for Bulgaria. A Bulgarian-Turkish declaration on non-aggression was declared „publicly“ in Ankara and in Sofia on February 17th. This declaration was signed with the knowledge of Berlin, and with this step, the Bulgarian Government secured Turkey’s neutrality concerning Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Pact, which was under way. The members of the delegation who were to leave for the signing of the contract, were changed because of Popov’s supposed illness. On principle, he was skeptical about Bulgaria joining the Pact, however he did not resign and decided instead to feign illness so that he would not have to go to Vienna. Bulgarian Prime Minister Filov, the head of the Bulgarian delegation in Vienna, signed a protocol joining Bulgaria to the Trilateral Pact on March 1st at 13.30 o’clock. On the part of the Axis, the protocol was signed by von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Count Chano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. On the next day, Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Trilateral Pact was ratified by the Governmental majority with a „loud ovation“. The members of Parliament in the opposition were not given an opportunity to express their protest. The entry of the German army into Bulgaria began on March 1st. After Bulgaria joined the Trilateral Pact, Moscow expressed its disapproval, and England broke off diplomatic relations with Sofia on March 5th. Genchev described three possible options for action which Bulgaria had on the eve of the signing of the pact. Option one was for Bulgaria to render military resistance to the Wermacht. This option would have been disastrous for Bulgaria since as it became clear only a month later, far better equipped armies capitulated to Germany within days. Option number two was for Bulgaria not to joint the pact and not to render resistance to the advancing Wermacht troops. The risk in this case was to create chaos in the country when the governing faction might be replaced by extreme supporters of the Reich. Option three was the one chosen by Bulgaria — to join the Pact. This option was the most suitable at that moment. England promised to help Bulgaria if it resisted Germany, but these promises were not well-grounded because England itself was suffering great difficulties and could not exit its islands. According to Sirkov there was also another possibility for Bulgaria besides those described by Genchev. This was the possibility of signing a pact with the USSR which in the opinion of the author would have made it difficult for Germany to have pursued its aggressive actions. The author rejects the possibility that Germany moved to the Balkans mainly because of the war between Italy and Greece. In his opinion, even if there were no such war, Germany would have advanced towards the peninsula. The parameters of an eventual pact between Sofia and Moscow were also of importance. It was some hours before the Wermacht invaded Yugoslavia that a pact was signed between the USSR and Yugoslavia which did not influence in any way Germany’s aggression. It is written in volume two of „The History of Bulgaria“ published in 1955 that the Bulgarian leaders entered into an agreement with Germany to join the Trilateral Pact as early as the autumn of 1940. Generally speaking, the Bulgarian Government at that time did not have many alternatives. Genchev defines three options while Sirkov adds a fourth one. Maybe the most correct decision is the one made by the Bulgarian leaders, namely for Bulgaria to join the aggressor’s pact but to evade participation in military operations. Of course, the option involving armed resistance to the Wermacht is only theoretical since the Bulgarian army was too weak and poorly armed in comparison to the German army. In the second place, why would Bulgaria oppose Germany? Germany was the primary advocate for changes in the demands of the Versailles Treaty when at the same time Bulgaria was trying to revise the Neuilly Treaty. Therefore it appears there was no well-grounded reason for Bulgaria to render military resistance to Germany. The above said, one should not ignore the Germanophile attitude of the Government which was in power at that time and especially that of Prime Minister Filov. The next option which can also be defined as purely theoretical was for Bulgaria not to join the Trilateral Pact and not render resistance to Germany for allowing the Wermacht to pass through the territory of the country. This was also impossible because the governing faction would have been threatened by an eventual change, and rulers who were extremist supporters of Berlin could replace it. Besides, if this option were to be used, Bulgaria could not expect any solution to its territorial claims. The next theoretical option would have been for Bulgaria to have signed an agreement with Moscow and in this way evade the German advancement through its territory. Yet where is the guarantee that Germany would stop had such a pact been signed? Even if this were the case, there were still no favorable grounds for narrow cooperation between Bulgaria and the USSR. The Tsar was terrified of a communist system that rejected the monarchy. So, if the rulers wanted to maintain their positions, there were no options to reach an agreement between the two countries. Also, the example of the Baltic states was too recent for the rulers in Sofia to consider a more serious rapprochement with Moscow. Considering the options above, perhaps the most advantageous for Bulgaria and the rulers in Sofia was the option which was finally chosen — to join the Trilateral Pact and align the country with the camp of the revisionist countries which had already acquired the appearance of aggressors.