In an attempt to verify or supplement the information he had learned from the Desio group, Whiteside checked with scientific sources in Milan, only to be told that symptoms of dioxin exposure that had been observed in and around Seveso included “diminished white-blood-cell counts, neurological disorders of various kinds, such as blurred vision and loss of conduction time in peripheral nerve tissue… disturbances of the endocrine system, and the normal functioning of the enzymatic system. Between 1976 and 1977 the incidence of infectious disease among the affected population tripled, and this striking increase has been interpreted by some specialists as an indication of the capacity of dioxin contamination adversely to affect the functioning of the immune systems of people living in the Seveso area.”14
The birth rate in the area has also dropped sharply, and although Whiteside writes that some physicians thought this might have been due to the increased practice of birth control by women who were afraid of bearing defective children, a study by Dr. James Allen at the University of Wisconsin has demonstrated that TCDD causes female rhesus monkeys to abort their fetuses or, in spite of repeated mating, not to conceive at all. Out of eight rhesus monkeys fed TCDD at levels of fifty parts per trillion for seven months and then mated, four suffered spontaneous abortions, two did not conceive “although they were mated on repeated occasions” and only two were able to carry their infants to term. All eight of the control group of pregnant rhesus monkeys carried their babies to term.15
Whiteside also talked with people who lived near, but not within, the most contaminated zone and found that they were suffering from a variety of physical and emotional problems commonly associated with dioxin exposure.
Signora Brambilla said that a number of the people in the apartment house had developed blurred vision, which made it difficult for them to watch television. “So many people seem to have disturbances here on the block,” she said. “It’s not normal at all. They get dizzy spells and headaches, and there is still a lot of diarrhea. The doctors say the people’s platelet counts are very low. They have skin problems, and when they go to the sea and it’s windy the itching is terrible—un tormento!” She said she was convinced that that there were a number of people on the block who really weren’t well, adding, “But they won’t say anything about it to the health authorities because they’re ashamed to say that they ate fruit from the trees after the accident.”16
Even if an epidemiological study were conducted in Zone A, it would not be conclusive in accessing the damage to residents of the surrounding area because no one has determined the exact extent to which dioxin was dispersed. What is certain is that the dioxin released in the accident did not fall in neat patterns upon the residents of a prescribed area, who could then be subjected to various tests to determine the deleterious effects of dioxin on human beings. “Traces of dioxin,” wrote Whiteside, “have been found in mud as far south as Milan, thirteen miles away. Also, significant dioxin levels—whether spread directly by the toxic cloud or indirectly by the Seveso inhabitants themselves—kept turning up outside Zones A and B for months after the evacuation of the residents. And the incidence of chloracne among children of the inhabitants continued to increase.”17
To argue that the incomplete, confusing, and contradictory epidemiological information from the Seveso accident proves that dioxin has not yet been proven harmful to human beings is rather like concluding that the accident at Three Mile Island proves that nuclear power is safe. Dioxin does not enter the body like a bullet, smashing through vital organs, splintering bone, and leaving the wounded or dying person physically helpless. Sometimes its effects are felt immediately in the form of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, dizziness, bleeding from body orifices, and in just a few days the individual appears to recover completely. This seems to have been the case for many Seveso residents, but without constant medical monitoring for elevated porphyrin levels, without liver or fat biopsies, and careful statistical comparisons of Seveso residents to Italians living in nonexposed communities, how can anyone be sure that five, ten, fifteen years from now those exposed to dioxin will not begin succumbing to a host of symptoms similar to those which have damaged the health and taken the lives of Vietnam veterans? A decade ago, when the majority of Americans had returned from Southeast Asia, the claim might easily have been made that troops exposed to phenoxy herbicides suffered no adverse effects, save an occasional upset stomach, skin rash, or headache. Today that claim has been proven tragically untrue.
On July 22, 1980, Robert O. Muller, executive director of Vietnam Veterans’ of America, told the Veterans’ Affairs Subcommittee on Medical Facilities and Benefits about a Vietnam veteran who had tried to convince the Veterans Administration that he had been exposed to Agent Orange. The veteran had rashes on his legs and other symptoms of dioxin exposure, including recurring migraine headaches, severe chest pains, and respiratory problems. But the only treatment he had received from the VA was three and a half weeks in the psychiatric ward, and prescriptions for Valium, lithium, and sleeping pills. Unable to cope with being told that his chronic medical problems were psychiatric in nature, or with the apparent indifference of the nation for which he had fought, the veteran sent his wife and children away for the weekend and, said Muller, “put the VA prescribed pills to their final use.” Muller, whose spine was shattered by a bullet in Vietnam, concluded his testimony as follows: “Mr. Chairman, there is, and has been, human evidence on the health impact of exposure to 2,4,5-T. Now, finally, the public recognizes that the evidence exists.
“That recognition allows us to push past the meaningless threshold debates to the fundamental questions. It allows us to stop saying, vacuously, that we need more evidence; and to start asking the serious questions: precisely how much evidence, and precisely what type of evidence, do we need?
“The VA’s answer to this question is becoming regrettably clear. They are waiting for something like absolute certainty. The VA’s theory of some fundamental biological distinction between Vietnam veterans and the rest of the human race is, of course, laughable. But it is, unfortunately, only the final implication of the VA’s underlying quest for absolute certainty. But what is this ‘certainty’? What does it require? More importantly, is the VA’s ‘certainty’ achievable at all?”18
Although he was speaking on behalf of his fellow Vietnam veterans, the answer to Muller’s questions, provided answers are forthcoming, will have profound implications for people throughout the industrialized world. How many studies of the effects of dioxin on rats, mice, monkeys, and guinea pigs must be done before scientists are able, or willing, to extrapolate from the results of these experiments the effects that dioxin might have on human beings? If human beings are so biologically distinct from other animals, then why bother researching the effects of dioxin at all? Why not just concede that no matter how much “anecdotal evidence” indicates a connection between dioxin and the suffering and death of human beings, there will never be “conclusive” evidence—because human beings are not rhesus monkeys or rats or mice.[21]
According to the Environmental Defense Fund, “the American population as a whole is Dow’s guinea pig and the environment is Dow’s laboratory…” But in spite of Eriksson and Hardell’s studies of Swedish workers, warnings from the World Health Organization about the toxicity of dioxin, and outbreaks of chloracne among its own workers, Dow Chemical continues to manufacture and market a product that its own scientists have admitted contains an animal carcinogen, and residuals of which Dow’s scientists have discovered in beeff at from cattle grazed on rangelands where 2,4,5-T was sprayed. Dow’s argument for continuing the company’s crusade to keep this particular herbicide on the market is based, according to company spokesmen, not so much on profit as on principle. “We think,” said one Dow spokesperson, “that 2,4,5-T is a very important symbol. If we were to lose on this issue, it would mean that American public customs would be beaten back a couple hundred years to an era of witch hunting. Only this time the witches would be chemicals, not people, and that’s the importance of this issue.”19
21
It is interesting that other substances, including the artificial sweeteners, cyclamates, have been banned under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act on the basis of studies showing they were carcinogenic in animals. And although scientists know less about the effects of formaldehyde than the components of Agent Orange on human health, at least three federal agencies have proposed regulating formaldehyde, while the Consumer Product Safety Commission believes it should be banned in certain home products.