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The latest conflict in Darfur is deep-rooted, and there are key differences between the 2003–2004 conflict to prior bouts of fighting. The aggression started to have serious racial and ethnic undertones; a number of previously neutral ethnic groups became involved and it was hard for them to remain on the outside of the conflict. Basically, the hostilities were between the government and its militia and an insurgency was composed of two groups – the Sudan Liberation Army/ Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Initially the rebels consisted of three main ethnic groups – Zaghawa, Fur and Masaalit – but smaller groups of rebels joined in following attacks by the janjaweed militia on their communities. In addition, the militia were joined by some Arab and even non-Arab tribes in their fight against the rebels.

The SLA first emerged in 2003 and were originally called the Darfur Liberation Front. Its political demands included socio-economic development for the area, an end to tribal militia, and a share of power with the central government. Khartoum refused to co-operate with the SLA, who they considered to be little better than a group of bandits. In April 2003, the SLA surprised the government by launching an attack on El Fashir, which was the capital of North Darfur. They damaged several government-owned aircraft and helicopters and looted fuel and arms depots. The SLA captured a colonel in the Sudanese air force and made him give an interview on the Arab satellite TV news station, El Gezira. This was followed by another attack on Mellit, which is the second largest town in North Darfur, where again the SLA rebels raided government stocks. The conflict continued to escalate and the government were forced to make counter-attacks on the rebels, despite a cease-fire that was put in place in late 2002.

The government attacked villages and towns in North Darfur, and these attacks consisted of heavy aerial bombardment followed by ground attacks by the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed militia. Following President Bashir’s orders to ‘annihilate the hirelings, traitors, agents and renegades’, they launched major aerial bombing in the Zaghawa areas of Darfur, which caused thousands of civilians to flee into neighbouring Chad. Those who tried to stay in their homes were later forced to leave due to heavy military ground attacks. Although their initial plan was to destroy the bases of known rebels, the attacks got out of hand, especially when the Janjaweed militia were offered an incentive. They were given the opportunity to freely loot and capture the land of communities they had coveted for so long. They certainly took advantage of the conflict to loot, not confining their attacks to SLA or JEM troops or assets, but stepped over the line by targeting undefended villages.

As the war advanced, particularly after the collapse of cease-fire talks in 2003, the Janjaweed militia grew in size. The government, far from condemning the action, encouraged the Janjaweed in their activities. In fact, the destruction of water sources, burning of crops and theft of livestock were all key elements in the government’s campaign. They realized that if they could cut off all food sources and water, that this would lead to inevitable forced displacement or even starvation – however, which under international laws this is a violation of humanitarian law.

The main target of aerial bombing in 2003 was the North Darfur state, which was the homeland of the Zaghawa. Sudanese government aircraft, mainly Antonov planes, although MiGs and helicopters were also used, repeatedly bombed towns and villages at any time of day and night, without any prior warning. The attacks continued into 2004, with a disproportionate use of force in areas where there possibly could have been rebels present, although they were predominantly inhabited by defenceless civilians.

The bombing forced many people to leave their villages and move into the wadis, tree-lined riverbeds, that are dry except when there is heavy rain. They dug wells with their hands to access water under the riverbeds. However, even in the wadis they were not safe from attack and were continually being targeted by both air and ground assaults. It was obvious that the bombing of the wadis was part of the government’s strategy to destroy the water supplies and other civilian institutions such as schools and hospitals.

The attacks spread to West and South Darfur, where Masaalit and Fur villages became the prime targets. At first, the attacks were carried out by armed Arab militia on either camels or horses and consisted mainly of theft of livestock and just verbal threats. However, as the months went by the attacks became worse, and by early 2004 they became more numerous and much more violent. Individuals have also reported that they were forced to pay the Janjaweed to allow them to return to their villages and farm their own land. However, once they return, their villages were attacked again or, in some cases, were already occupied by settlements of Arab nomads.

THE JANJAWEED

It is reported that the Sudanese government may have recruited as many as 20,000 Janjaweed militia to fight alongside their own army. Most of the Janjaweeed are believed to have come from Arab camel-herding tribes from North Darfur and Chad. Many of the tribesmen were attracted to the Janjaweed by the added incentive of looting. They have been described as wearing Sudanese government military uniforms, generally khaki in colour. Although they sometimes bear an insignia of a man on horseback, or a red patch on the shoulder, their ranks are generally broken up as regular government ranks, with the main leader taking the title of ‘general’. They are armed with the latest military weapons, and although typically ride on camels or horses, they have often been seen travelling in Sudanese government vehicles.

Members of the Human Rights Watch have been told by credible sources that Janjaweed can be paid US$100 to US$400 as an enrolment fee, and that their relatives are guaranteed continued support should any member of the militia be killed in battle. They are also given identity cards and regular food supplies, stipends and communications equipment.

There have been numerous reports of rape by the Janjaweed militia. One 18-year-old woman, the victim of a brutal racial attack, reported that the janjaweed had inserted a knife into her vagina saying, ‘You get this because you are black’. Young boys who worked as shepherds have allegedly been abducted from Abu Gamra by the Janjaweed and were then subjected to sexual abuse and forced into domestic labour. In February 2004, residents of the town of Tawila were attacked; 67 were killed and 41 schoolgirls and female teachers were raped. Following the rape, the women were supposedly branded on the back of their hands to permanently stigmatize them.

There have also been an alarming number of abductions of both young girls and boys, although it is not possible to obtain an accurate number. It is estimated that the numbers are likely to be in their hundreds, ranging in age from infants to adolescents. A 20-year-old Zaghara woman named Mecca Hissab, was shot to death by the Janjaweed when she tried to stop them from taking her three-year-old son. Three shepherd boys from the village of Jirai, aged 10, 12 and 13, were all shot to death when they tried to stop the Janjaweed from stealing their animals. A 12-year-old girl from the same area also disappeared at the time of the attack and has not been seen since.

The primary target of the Janjaweed looting has been livestock – thousands of camels, cattle, sheep and goats belonging to Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa villagers. Throughout the whole region of Darfur the native population rely heavily on their livestock for survival. Livestock are not only used for trade but also for family consumption, and the impact of the theft on the lives and livelihoods of millions of people cannot be stressed strongly enough. Without any compensation for their losses, thousands of families have already been rendered destitute. Any civilians attempting to stop the militia from stealing their stock or looting their homes risked death or serious injury.