Kostilek got straight to the point. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he said gravely, “as you all know, Russian forces, responding to a so-called terrorist attack on a school in Donetsk, invaded Ukraine this morning. In New York the UN Security Council will shortly be meeting and we now need to consider our own response to this aggression. Before we do so, I call upon SACEUR to brief the Council on the military situation.”
Admiral Max Howard leaned forward in his seat, his aquiline face, gold-braided uniform and extensive medal ribbons giving him a presence that immediately commanded attention.
“Secretary General, ladies and gentlemen, NATO faces an exceptionally dangerous situation. We have already seen Russia attacking and shooting down US aircraft engaged in lawful training activities in Ukrainian airspace and claiming it a provocation. Our assessment is that the attack on the school in Donetsk was Russian-executed to provide the pretext for breaking the ceasefire. In the early hours of this morning, Russian regular forces attacked Ukraine, a valued NATO partner. The Russians started by launching an airborne operation by 98th Guards Airborne Division to secure key communications nodes along their axis of advance in southern Ukraine toward Crimea. They followed that up with an attack on land by 20 Guards Tank Army, supported by air and naval forces in the Sea of Azov. I have to tell you that the Russians appear to have secured all their initial objectives. The key town of Mariupol has been captured and the land route from Russia to Crimea opened up. At this stage it is too early to say whether Russia will advance further into Ukraine, but we cannot rule it out, as the Ukrainian army has effectively capitulated.”
Howard looked around the NAC table in case of any questions.
“What is your recommendation now, SACEUR?” asked Kostilek.
“Secretary General,” continued Howard, “there is little NATO can do militarily to stop Russian aggression in Ukraine. The imperative now is for the Alliance to demonstrate its resolve and readiness to defend itself. Above all, we must ensure there is no spillover of the crisis. I recommend that NATO’s immediate reserves are mobilized to deter any aggression against any Alliance member. In practical terms, this means reducing notice to move times for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the NATO Response Force. It would also be prudent to deploy forces to the Baltic states to pre-empt any Russian surprise attack there. But none of this is possible unless member nations provide the necessary troops and equipment.”
Looking around the table, McKinlay could see a number of the ambassadors nod in agreement: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland, which only made sense as they were probably next on the Russian wish list. Others, notably Germany and Italy, sat with their faces as if frozen, giving nothing away. Not good news. He looked next at Dame Flora Montrose, the elegant, erudite, Oxford blue-stocking with the flawless complexion, who was the UK’s ambassador to NATO. Her body language was important. If she showed any sign of sitting on the fence at this moment of crisis, his own position, even though he was a NATO rather than a UK officer, would become very much more difficult. With some relief, he spotted the most imperceptible of nods from his fellow Scot in support of the Eastern Europeans. He would not have to take issue with Whitehall. Yet.
Howard looked at Kostilek. “Secretary General. I suggest that DSACEUR, the man responsible for ensuring NATO has the means to implement strategy, tells the NAC where we stand in generating such forces.”
Kostilek turned to McKinlay. “Very well, DSACEUR. The floor is yours.”
McKinlay looked around the table at the assembled ambassadors. This might be a moment of high drama for NATO, but the Scottish Royal Marine remained practical, down to earth and focused.
“Secretary General, ladies and gentlemen, I will be brief. First, let me point out that NATO has a small maritime presence in the Baltic already. The Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group, or SNMCMG, is currently exercising in the Baltic with ships from Germany, Poland, Norway, UK and Belgium. However, while an important demonstration of NATO’s presence in the Baltic, it is not a deterrent force as such, as it only has very limited offensive capability. As for the would-be ‘Very High Readiness Joint Task Force,’ the VJTF if you will forgive another NATO acronym, the reality is that, despite the best of intentions, it is a long way from being ready for anything. It is an ad hoc formation of units from fourteen different nations and it has never trained together properly in the field, so—and I’m going to put this bluntly so there are no misunderstandings—it is simply not ready for combat. Not only that, while the lead element of the Task Force is at high readiness to move, the reality is that we’d be doing well to get it ready in place within twenty-eight days.”
McKinlay looked around the room. None of the ambassadors looked surprised.
He continued, “And then there are the force levels. Of the nations who have offered troops to the Very High Readiness Task Force, only the designated Danish, French and UK units are ready for deployment within three days. I have spoken to the Chiefs of Defense of the other contributing nations, but none can give me any assurances that their forces will be ready in less than two weeks. Or at all…”
Now a few of the ambassadors began to look unhappy at the implied criticism. Kostilek intervened. “Thank you, DSACEUR, for the reminder about the NATO minesweeper group. But you do not bring any comfort with your comments about the problems with the High Readiness Task Force. What about the NATO Response Force, the NRF?”
“I’m afraid the situation doesn’t get any better,” replied McKinlay. “The aspiration to deliver forty thousand troops as part of the NRF is just that. An aspiration and one which only exists on paper. Things are better for the maritime and air components, but we have to be realistic about the land component. Even if the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of five thousand could be made available in time, it would not amount to a credible and capable deterrent to the Russians. But…” and he resisted the temptation to laugh sardonically, “we do have a headquarters which could command the force if, that is, it had a force to command. However, even that depends on the framework nation—the country responsible for providing the bulk of the manpower and equipment to ensure that the headquarters can operate—being prepared to see notice to move reduced.”
“So?” questioned Kostilek. “Why is there a problem with at least doing that?”
McKinlay had been long enough in NATO to know that he should avoid any direct criticism of a NATO member state. He said nothing.
At this point, the German ambassador, a large man, with the grim demeanor of an Osnabrück landlord chucking out drunken British soldiers at closing time, scowled and raised his hand. “Secretary General, I must protest at this implied criticism of Germany. Yes, Germany is currently framework nation, but we insist on the correct procedures before we can reduce the notice to move of the VJTF. And we have yet to be convinced that Russia poses a sufficient threat to NATO to justify such a reduction. In fact, it may just ratchet up the tension. Furthermore, we are not convinced that the necessary consensus is achievable. To reduce NATO forces notice to move requires a unanimous vote in the NAC.” As he said this, he looked hard at the two ambassadors to his immediate right, the Greek and Hungarian ambassadors.
McKinlay could see from the body language that both were clearly unhappy at this talk of deterring Russia. Of course, both nations were in thrall to the Kremlin; Greece thanks to the bailout of Russian cash, and Hungary as a result of the sizable nuclear deal agreed a couple of years earlier with the President. Neither would want to jeopardize those deals by voting for anything that might antagonize Russia and the President.